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CONFIDENTIAL

Governmental Affairs

NEW YORK TIMES
21 March 1973

C.I.A.-I.T.T. PLANS ON CHILE REPORTED

By EILEEN SHANAHAN
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, March 20 —

A vice president of the International Telephone and Telegraph Corporation said today that a top official of the Central Intelligence Agency had "agreed with the recommendations" the corporation made to try to prevent the election of Salvador Allende Gossens, a Marxist, as President of Chile.

The recommendations in 1970 reportedly included steps to maneuver the departing Chilean President back into power, to foment violence that might bring about a military takeover of the country, to use American governmental agencies to supply anti-Allende propaganda to other Latin American countries, or some combination of these things.

The C.I.A. official who was said to have "agreed with" these proposals was William V. Broe, director of the agency's clandestine activities in Latin America.

The I.T.T. official who testified about this conversation and many others with Mr. Broe and other high officials of the United States Government was William R. Merriam, formerly head of the corporation's Washington office.

Mr. Merriam was the first witness to be heard in public session by a special subcommittee of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that is headed by Senator Frank Church, Democrat of Idaho.

The subcommittee will conduct what is expected to be a two-year inquiry into the behavior of United States corporations that operate around the globe.

Among the main things the subcommittee wants to find out is the extent to which these multinational corporations influence United States foreign policy.

The first two weeks of the hearings will deal exclusively with the reported attempts of International Telephone and Telegraph to enlist the help of various branches of the United States Government to keep Dr. Allende out of office.

It is not yet known whether any official of the Central Intelligence Agency will testify, in person or in writing, in public session or behind closed doors, about the agency's activities regarding Chile. The subcommittee was said to be

NEW YORK TIMES
18 March 1973

Merging of Kissinger and Rogers Posts Suggested

By JOHN W. FINNEY
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, March 17—

As a step toward reforming the nation's foreign policy machinery, a panel of prominent citizens suggested today that consideration be given to combining the posts of Secretary of State and the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs.

The suggestion came in a report, "Foreign Policy Decision Making," submitted by a panel of the United Nations Association of the United States of America. The panel, which is

negotiating with the C.I.A. about this.

What came of the reported agreement on a course of action between the corporation and the agency was not made clear in the opening day's hearings.

Dr. Allende was elected president of Chile and took office on Nov. 3, 1970. He subsequently took over business properties belonging to I.T.T. and some other United States companies, as he had promised in his campaign and as corporation officials had feared he would.

The picture that emerged from the day's testimony was of the Central Intelligence and International Telegraph as hard-line anti-Communist groups that greatly feared Dr. Allende's accession to power and that worked together to try to persuade the State Department and Henry A. Kissinger, the White House adviser on National security, to adopt an equally hard anti-Allende view.

The outlines of the corporation's attempt to enlist the help of the Government to preserve its interests in Chile were disclosed a year ago when portions of a number of internal I.T.T. documents were published by the columnist, Jack Anderson.

Today's testimony, together with additional documents made public by the subcommittee — documents that were voluntarily submitted by the corporation — depicted a much more prolonged and extensive pattern of consultation between the company and various government officials than had previously been disclosed.

Mr. Merriam spoke, for example, of "25 visits" to the State Department and of having talked with Mr. Kissinger and members of his staff for a "year."

His testimony also indicated that most of the visits by company officers to six high Nixon Administration officials in 1970 and 1971 — these were disclosed yesterday by another Congressional committee — had the dual purpose of talking about the company's antitrust problems with the Justice Department

headed by Howard C. Petersen, a Philadelphia banker and former White House and Defense Department official, and has financial support from the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, conducted a two-year study.

A central conclusion was that the interrelation of foreign and domestic policy issues, such as in the current "energy crisis" means that more and more of the decision making must be done at the White House level.

It was as a step in that direction that the panel suggested having the same individual

and about I.T.T.'s attempts to keep Dr. Allende from being elected and, later on, attempts to oust him.

The ouster plans centered on ideas to bring about "economic collapse" in Chile, according to company documents and testimony.

As part of this plan, according to Mr. Merriam, C.I.A. officials made "repeated calls to firms such as General Motors, Ford Motor Company and banks in California and New York," asking them to stop or reduce their activities in Chile to hurt her economy. These companies, refused, according to other I.T.T. documents that were put into the record.

Among other items of economic warfare against the Allende Government that were proposed by the company were a cessation of all United States aid, under the guise of a review, and intercession with the World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank to get them to stop making loans to Chile. It was not clear whether any of these proposals were accepted.

Mr. Merriam also acknowledged, when asked, that a group of Washington representatives of companies with economic interests in Chile had met several times in his office to discuss how to cope with the Allende Government.

It was not he who initiated the meetings of this ad hoc group, Mr. Merriam said, but rather the Washington representative of the Anaconda Cop-

per Company. Other companies represented included, he said, Kennecott Copper, W. R. an dthe Bank of America. Such meetings among corporate representatives in Washington occur "all the time," he said.

Mr. Merriam said that the group had never arrived at any conclusions on what to do. Senator Edmund S. Muskie, Democrat of Maine, asked why I.T.T. wanted to bring about the collapse of the Chilean economy if its aim was, as Mr. Merriam said, to make sure that Chile gave the corporation "better terms" in payment for Chileco, the telephone company owned largely by the corporation after the Allende Government took it over.

Mr. Merriam replied that he thought "the threat of economic collapse" might prove effective with Mr. Allende "if he knew that the banks might stop lending."

Senator Muskie suggested that the threat was an attempt to "blackmail Allende."

NEW YORK TIMES
22 March 1973

McCone Defends I.T.T. Chile Fund Idea

Denies Company Sought to Create Chaos to Balk Allende Election

By EILEEN SHANAHAN

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, March 21—John A. McCone, former head of the Central Intelligence Agency and now a director of the International Telephone and Telegraph Corporation, denied repeatedly today that a fund of \$1-million or more that the company had offered the United States Government for use in Chile had been intended to finance anything "surreptitious."

The willingness of I.T.T. to commit the money to the cause of preventing the election of Salvador Allende Gossens, a Marxist, as President of Chile was apparently made known both to the C.I.A. and to Henry A. Kissinger, President Nixon's adviser on national security. The person who decided to offer the money was Harold S. Geneen, board chairman of I.T.T.

Mr. McCone no longer headed the C.I.A. at the time of Mr. Geneen's original offer, in mid-1970, though he was still a consultant to the agency. He said that as an I.T.T. director he had not been told of the offer until after the first phase of the Chilean election in September, 1970, in which Dr. Allende won a plurality but not a majority.

Dr. Allende was elected by the Chilean Congress a month later and took office in November, 1970. Subsequently he took over business properties belonging to I.T.T. and some other United States companies.

Mr. McCone was testifying today before a special subcommittee of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that is looking into the activities of American corporations that operate all over the world.

Mr. McCone said that at no time had Mr. Geneen contemplated that the proffered fund of "up to even figures" would be used to create "economic chaos," despite repeated recommendations to that effect from various people within I.T.T. and others within the C.I.A.

"What he had in mind was not chaos," Mr. McCone said, "but what could be done con-

structively. The money was to be channeled to people who support the principles and programs the United States stands for against the programs of the Allende-Marxists."

These programs, he said, included the building of needed housing and technical assistance to Chilean agriculture.

Both Democratic and Republican members of the subcommittee reacted with considerable skepticism.

Senator Frank Church, Democrat of Idaho, the chairman of the subcommittee on multinational corporations, noted that there was nothing in the scores of internal I.T.T. documents in the committee's possession that indicated the money was for such "constructive uses."

Senator Clifford P. Chase, Republican of New Jersey, asked whether the money might not have been intended to bribe members of the Chilean Congress, who had to decide the election, since none of the three candidates had won a majority. Mr. McCone denied this.

Economic Aid Noted

Senator Case noted that the United States had put more than \$1-billion in economic aid into Chile in the decade before the election of Dr. Allende and that he was elected anyway.

"How could a man of Mr. Geneen's intelligence possibly think that \$1-million for these kinds of purposes in six weeks could make any difference?" he asked, referring to the period remaining before the Chilean Congress decided the election. "I have too much respect for his intelligence to think that."

Senator Charles H. Percy, Republican of Illinois, suggested that another way in which \$1-million might have been used to real effect would have been in subsidizing anti-Allende newspapers, which were in financial difficulties.

Other testimony has showed that I.T.T. officials had proposed this, but, according to Hal Hendrix, the company's director of public relations for Latin America, the plan was never approved.

Mr. Hendrix, who was another of today's witnesses, explained that he had proposed doubling the advertising in such newspapers as Chitelo, the Chilean telephone company owned by I.T.T.

But he said this was vetoed by Chitelo officials "and other executives in New York" because they feared the purpose would be too obvious.

Chilean Source Cited

Mr. Hendrix also disclosed that the source of one of the most widely discussed asser-

tions contained in the internal I.T.T. memoranda that have come to light—that in September, 1970, the American Ambassador to Chile, Edward M. Korry, had received a "green light" from President Nixon to do all possible short of military action to keep Dr. Allende from taking power—was Chilean, not American.

Mr. Hendrix said that the information had come to him from a highly placed member of the Christian Democratic party, which was opposed to Mr. Allende, a man whom he had known and trusted for years.

Mr. McCone disclosed that as head of the C.I.A. he had received offers of financial help, similar to that made later by I.T.T., from various American corporations.

Such offers were infrequent, he said, and had always been "summarily rejected."

A main point in Mr. McCone's testimony was that none of the plans for interfering in the Chilean election—either by the C.I.A. or by I.T.T.—had been approved by the necessary high officials in either the Government or the company.

Propriety Questioned

Senator Edmund S. Muskie, Democrat of Maine, expressed concern, however, that the plans were ever "seriously considered."

"The instinct for returning to such measures in the future will be very strong and that's what concerns us," he said.

Senator Church questioned the propriety of interference by either the American Government or a company in what appeared to be a free election, no matter how much the United States might dislike the outcome.

Mr. McCone replied that "almost two-thirds of the people of Chile were opposed to Allende."

The popular vote in the election had split fairly evenly among the three candidates, with Dr. Allende receiving a small plurality.

Mr. McCone said that his general philosophy about private corporate involvement in situations such as that in Chile was that any action taken should conform with governmental policy. That is what I.T.T. was proposing, he said.

Senator Church suggested that private financing of such activities abroad was potentially so dangerous—partly because it would put the operations beyond Congressional control—that it might be wise to pass a law forbidding it.

NEW YORK TIMES
16 March 1973

FORD FOUNDATION AT ODDS WITH C.I.A.

By DAVID BURNHAM

The president of the Ford Foundation has denied an assertion by the Central Intelligence Agency that New City policemen were trained by the agency at the suggestion of the foundation.

The denial contradicted a "fact sheet" on the case prepared by the agency for Representative Chet Holifield, Democrat of California chairman of the House Government Operations Committee.

In the sheet, the C.I.A. said that "at the suggestion of the foundation representative, the NYC police sought assistance from the agency as to the best system for analyzing data."

The denial of the agency's assertion came in a letter from McGeorge Bundy, president of the Ford Foundation, to Representative Edward I. Koch, Democrat of Manhattan, who has charged that C.I.A. training of policemen from more than a dozen cities violated the law.

After Mr. Koch had complained to Mr. Holifield, James R. Schlesinger, the new Director of Central Intelligence, said in a letter made public on March 5 that because of the sensitive nature of such training, it would be "undertaken in the future only in the compelling circumstances and with my personal approval."

Mr. Bundy, responding to an inquiry from Mr. Koch, said that he had carefully examined the C.I.A. assertion and had concluded that "these inquiries disclose no evidence" that any suggestion for C.I.A. training of policemen was made "by any member of the Ford Foundation or the Police Foundation or any employee of the New York City project funded by the Police Foundation."

The Police Foundation is an offshoot of the Ford Foundation.

Police Commissioner Patrick V. Murphy, who could not be reached for direct comment, was quoted yesterday by Deputy Police Commissioner Richard Kellerman and an official of the Ford Foundation as saying he believed the idea of going to the C.I.A. originated with Don R. Harris, a private consultant.

Mr. Harris, a former C.I.A. intelligence analyst, was one of three consultants hired by the Police Department last year under a \$166,000 grant from the Federal Law Enforcement Assistance Administration to help the department reorganize its intelligence files.

In November of 1971, the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, a branch of the Justice Department, published a 150-page manual, co-authored by Mr. Harris, which was designed to instruct state and local police agencies how to "apply intelligence to combat organized crime." The other author was E. Drexel Godfrey Jr., also a former

BALTIMORE SUN
19 March 1973

Better policy role urged for State Department

By JAMES S. KEAT
Washington Bureau of The Sun

Washington — A restructuring of the nation's foreign policy machinery to make it more adaptable to new international conditions was recommended yesterday by a private organization of businessmen and scholars.

A policy panel of the United Nations Association of the United States of America, a group that supports the activities of the international organization, called for a reorganization of the State Department and a greater role for it in policy making.

The group's most provocative but least decisive suggestion was for the merger of the President's two principal foreign policy advisers. A majority of the panel, with varying degrees of enthusiasm, said the Secretary of State and the President's national security adviser should be the same man.

Kissinger Favored

At present, Henry A. Kissinger, the national security adviser, is acknowledged to be President Nixon's principal adviser and, in most key areas, his favored negotiator with other governments. William P. Rogers, the Secretary of State, plays a secondary role.

At a news conference, Howard C. Petersen, board chairman of the Fidelity Bank, Philadelphia, and chairman of the panel, acknowledged that any President is going to structure his advisers in the way that best suits him.

The panel conceded this point by citing alternative arrangements, primary reliance on the national security adviser, as at present, or assigning principal responsibility to the State Department, as was the case during the Eisenhower administration, when John Foster Dulles was Secretary of State.

Restructuring urged

The panel's other main proposals were based heavily on its belief that solutions to the post-Vietnam foreign policy problems facing the United States "will have to be sought through more general multilateral means, often through either strengthened or new international organizations."

Therefore, it urged that the President "give high priority to fostering and strengthening international institutions" and that he restructure the government's machinery accordingly.

In Mr. Petersen's words, there should be "more functionalism and less bilateralism" in the foreign affairs agencies, particularly the State

Department. More officials should specialize in subjects, rather than in geographic areas, as is the case with the classic political officer in the diplomatic service, he said.

The panel also recommended the creation of a "strong and highly competent policy planning staff" in the State Department to help deal with "the new global interdependencies."

Such a staff was created during the Truman administration, but it has rarely, if ever, played an effective role in long-range policy making. Now known as the Planning and Coordination staff, technically responsible to the Secretary of State, the office is employed mostly for research.

Four of the panel's 22 members dissented at least in part from major recommendations. David E. Bell, executive vice president of the Ford Foundation and a former high government official, and Adam Yarmolinsky, professor at the University of Massachusetts and a former Defense Department official, said the panel had failed to come to grips with the basic problems facing the policy makers.

Along with Hugh H. Smythe, professor at Brooklyn College, and James R. Ellis, a Seattle lawyer, the two former officials disagreed with the proposed merger of the two foreign affairs posts.

Other members of the panel included Richard Newell Cooper, provost of Yale University and a former State Department official; Thomas L. Hughes, president of the Carnegie Endowment for Peace and a former career diplomat; George B. Kistia-kowsky, professor emeritus at Harvard University and a former White House science adviser; Francis O. Wilcox, dean of the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies and a former State Department official, and George D. Woods, former president of the World Bank.

Pennsylvania, McCloskey joined the State Department in 1955 as a Foreign Service staff officer and was first assigned to the American consulate general in Hong Kong. He entered the Bureau of Public Affairs in Washington in 1957 and became the State Department's press spokesman in 1964. His wife is the former Anne Taylor Phelan of Chevy Chase, Md. They have two children.

C.I.A. employee.

Informed of Mr. Murphy's belief that Mr. Harris had originated the idea of sending 14 New York policemen for training with the C.I.A., an agency spokesman in Washington said the available information indicated the plan first was suggested by Wayne Kerstetter, one of six lawyers brought into the department in October, 1971, under a grant from the Police Foundation, the branch of the Ford Foundation.

Neither Mr. Kerstetter, who recently left New York for a law enforcement position in Illinois, nor Mr. Harris could be reached for comment last night.

WASHINGTON POST
14 March 1973

Sentencing Set For Watergate 5

Chief U.S. District Judge John J. Sirica announced yesterday that he has set March 23 as the date for sentencing five defendants who pleaded guilty to charges of conspiracy, burglary and illegal wiretapping and eavesdropping in connection with the bugging of the Democratic Party's Watergate headquarters.

Sirica also announced that two other defendants, convicted of the same charges after a trial by jury, will be sentenced the same date if he denies their motions for a new trial.

WASHINGTON POST
20 March 1973

State Spokesman McCloskey Gets Cyprus Diplomatic Post

By Murrey Marder

Washington Post Staff Writer

Robert J. McCloskey, for nearly a decade "the voice" of the State Department, will be the new U.S. ambassador to Cyprus; officials in Nicosia have been informed.

A formal announcement of McCloskey's appointment is expected to be made by the White House in a few days.

McCloskey long has been considered for assignment to a variety of ambassadorial posts, after an exceptional career on the public firing line during innumerable crises in American foreign policy.

While the credibility of the federal government as a whole suffered heavy damage during this period, espe-

cially because of the Vietnam war, McCloskey's own reliability with newsmen remained notably intact.

On several occasions, McCloskey's job hung in the balance as he sought to maintain his reputation for straightforwardness with newsmen and meet superiors' demands for obfuscation.

The most celebrated rebound came in June, 1965, when McCloskey, himself a former Marine, acknowledged that the first Marine units sent to South Vietnam were authorized to engage "in combat" if attacked. President Lyndon B. Johnson, determined to conceal the marine combat role at that stage, was furious, and ordered a White House denial. Secretary of State Dean Rusk finally calmed the presidential indignation.

At another point, in 1967, McCloskey encountered another Johnsonian explosion when he said the United States would be "neutral in word, thought and deed" in the 1967 Arab-Israeli war. Rusk again came to McCloskey's aid with a "clarifying" statement reaffirming U.S. support for Israel's survival.

Secretary of State William P. Rogers also came to rely heavily on McCloskey, naming him, in July, 1969, to the dual post of deputy assistant secretary of state for press relations and special assistant to the Secretary of State.

McCloskey, now 50 and gray-haired, has operated less frequently behind the scenes on policy guidance and often accompanying the Secretary of State on trips abroad.

Nixon Committee Returns \$655,000 to 3 Big Donors

**Robert Allen, Texas Oilman, Confirms It
Was His \$89,000 That Ended Up With
Barker, a Watergate Defendant**

By CHRISTOPHER LYDON

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, March 9—President Nixon's re-election committee said today that it had returned \$655,000 to three big contributors, including \$100,000 to Robert H. Allen, the Texas oilman. Mr. Allen was the source of \$89,000 that passed through a Mexican bank to the leader of an alleged political espionage operation against the Democratic party headquarters here last June.

The committee also announced that it had returned a \$305,000 note to Walter T. Duncan, a financially troubled Texas land speculator who had borrowed money for large contributions to the Nixon campaign and earlier to the unsuccessful nomination drive of Senator Hubert H. Humphrey of Minnesota, a Democrat.

Further, the committee confirmed the return of \$250,000 to Robert L. Vesco, a principal defendant in the Securities and Exchange Commission's investigation of the alleged plundering of Ios, Ltd., and a subsidiary mutual fund.

Even after the return of this money, the re-election campaign committee reported, it had \$4.7-million on hand at the end of February, including \$246,000 in new contributions made since the beginning of this year.

Letters made public by the re-election committee today indicated that Nixon campaign lawyers had taken the initiative in returning Mr. Vesco's money, but that Mr. Allen and Mr. Duncan had asked for theirs—Mr. Allen for "personal reasons" and Mr. Duncan because of his financial problems.

Mr. Duncan said, however, that he would make "major contributions to Republican candidates in 1974 and 1976 if I am able to recover my financial situation to my satisfaction by that time."

The letter from Mr. Allen,

president of the Gulf Resources and Chemical Company, to Maurice H. Stans, finance chairman of the Nixon campaign, confirmed that it was Mr. Allen's \$89,000 that had ended up in the hands of Bernard L. Barker, one of four Miami men who pleaded guilty to breaking into the Democrats' Watergate offices here.

But Mr. Allen insisted that he would not have given the money if he had known how it would be used. He said that his gift had been routed through Mexico for reasons of "convenience" and "privacy"—not, as has been charged, to rid the money of traces to other sources.

Mr. Allen told Mr. Stans that because he made his contribution on April 5, 1972—two days before the new Federal disclosure law effect—"I felt, and still do, that under the law I had every right to expect and enjoy the right of privacy and full anonymity."

"It was for this reason, as well as convenience, that I arranged to have the contribution delivered from Mexico," he said. "I realize that this resulted in some embarrassment to you and the committee, in that the press made preposterous and bizarre assumptions concerning the purpose of this procedure. In actual fact, your committee did not participate in that arrangement in any way."

Mr. Allen did not explain why he had requested the refund.

Mr. Duncan was an obscure real estate dealer in Bryan, Tex., before he gave \$300,000 to the Humphrey campaign last May and June and instantly became the largest recorded contributor in the 1972 campaign.

It was later discovered that he had borrowed heavily for the Nixon and Humphrey contributions but had concealed large outstanding obligations from the banks that lent him the campaign money. Since then, he has been through foreclosure on several large tracts of land in Texas for failure to pay notes. He faces trial in July on a \$2.2-million suit by an insurance company over another Texas land deal.

NIXON AIDE TELLS OF TALK TO F. B. I.

By JOHN M. CREWDSON

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, March 9—

John D. Ehrlichman, President Nixon's chief adviser on domestic affairs, said today that he had personally asked that a White House legal counsel sit in on an interview he had with agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation about the Watergate case.

"I have always felt it appropriate to have counsel present at an interview of that kind," he said. "I just felt more comfortable." Asked if he had had any choice in the matter, he replied that "I might have been in a little jeopardy with the employer" if he had refused to allow the counsel, John W. Dean 3d, to be present.

It was previously disclosed that Mr. Dean had sat in on interviews agents had with other White House personnel in the inquiry into the bugging of Democratic headquarters here. Earlier this week, L. Patrick Gray 3d, acting director of the bureau, told the Senate Judiciary Committee that, "from a purely investigative standpoint," he would rather the interviews had been conducted without Mr. Dean.

At the time of Mr. Ehrlichman's interview last July 21, Mr. Dean was in charge of a special inquiry ordered by Mr. Nixon to establish whether any White House personnel had been involved in the Watergate incident. The President said later he was satisfied that none of them had been.

Mr. Ehrlichman also said, at a news briefing today, that he had no knowledge of an arrangement, disclosed by Mr. Gray on Wednesday, whereby a high White House aide had directed the payment of large sums of money to a man accused of directing a political espionage and sabotage ring for the Republicans in the election campaign last year.

Mr. Gray told the Judiciary Committee that Herbert W. Kalmbach, Mr. Nixon's personal attorney, had told Federal agents that he had made the payments from campaign funds at the direction of Dwight L. Chapin, then the President's appointments secretary.

According to Mr. Gray, Mr. Kalmbach said he paid from \$30,000 to \$40,000 to Donald H. Segretti, a young California lawyer, after receiving a telephone call from Mr. Chapin in September, 1971.

Yesterday, Ronald L. Ziegler, the White House press secretary expressed "concern" at the release of Mr. Kalmbach's account on the ground that it was "raw, unevaluated material" and might violate the rights of the individuals involved to privacy and due process of law. But he did not deny the ac-

curacy of Mr. Gray's report.

Mr. Ehrlichman expressed the same beliefs today, but, he did not criticize Mr. Gray for releasing it to the committee.

The Judiciary Committee is considering the nomination of Mr. Gray to hold a permanent appointment as director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Democratic members of the committee criticized him this week for turning over to Mr. Dean more than 80 raw interview reports gathered by agents in the Watergate investigation.

Asked for Interviews

Three reports involved employees of the Committee for the re-election of the President who had asked to talk to agents in the absence of the re-election committee's lawyers to give information about the destruction of campaign records by committee officials shortly after the Watergate case arose.

Senator John V. Tunney, Democrat of California noted yesterday that "the same Mr. Dean" had obtained a job at

the re-election committee for G. Gordon Liddy, who has been convicted of conspiring to tap the Democrats' telephones.

Mr. Tunney told the committee today that he was visited this morning by two F. B. I. agents carrying "a number" of the bureau's Watergate files. After reading them, he said, he still planned to introduce a motion next week to call Mr. Dean to testify before the committee.

The committee heard today from a number of witnesses who spoke against the Gray nomination.

Representative Edward I. Koch, Democrat of Manhattan, who is seeking the Democratic nomination for the Mayor of New York City, said that his opposition stemmed from Mr. Gray's refusal to allow him to look at a file the bureau had compiled on him.

Mr. Koch recalled that when Mr. Gray last year ended a 22-year program of keeping files on major Congressional candidates, he said that they contained only biographical data from published sources. Mr. Koch and two other Democratic Representatives, Jonathan B. Bingham of the Bronx and Benjamin S. Rosenthal of Queens, immediately wrote to Mr. Gray asking to see their files.

Mr. Gray refused, Mr. Koch said, noting that, shortly after taking over the bureau on the death of J. Edgar Hoover last May, Mr. Gray had asserted that the bureau did not maintain "political dossiers."

"Based on the fact that they are refusing to reveal certain files to members of Congress," Mr. Koch said that he could only conclude "that they do have at least three political dossiers."

"Clearly, there is more in that file than simply biographical material," he said.

NEW YORK TIMES
13 March 1973

Eastland Favors Calling Dean to Testify at Hearings on Gray

By JOHN M. CREWDSON
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, March 12—James O. Eastland, the chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee, said today that he would vote to call a White House counsel, John W. Dean 3d, as a witness in the committee's hearings on the nomination of L. Patrick Gray 3d as director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

Mr. Dean's name has come up daily during the last two weeks of confirmation hearings, and there has been growing sentiment among Democratic members to invite Mr. Dean to explain the facts behind his receipt of F.B.I. files compiled during the Watergate investigation.

Senator Eastland's support made it virtually certain that the committee, when it met tomorrow in executive session, summon Mr. Dean.

The White House reaffirmed today, however, that President Nixon had no intention of allowing Mr. Dean to appear.

Subpoena Opposed

Senator Eastland, a Democrat from Mississippi, made it clear that he would not favor issuing a subpoena if Mr. Dean refused the committee's invitation. One committee source said that a vote on issuing a subpoena would be "very close."

Senator John V. Tunney, Democrat of California, said last week that he would move tomorrow to call Mr. Dean. Mr. Tunney has said that he will not be able to vote to approve Mr. Gray's nomination without an appearance by Mr. Dean to clarify the latter's "omnipresence" in the Watergate case.

Mr. Gray told the committee last week that he had sent numerous raw reports dealing with the case to Mr. Dean at his request. Mr. Gray said he had done so because Mr. Dean had been selected by the President to head a separate investigation to determine whether any White House personnel had been involved in the break-in at the Democratic headquarters in the Watergate complex last June 17.

Mr. Tunney disclosed last week that "the same Mr. Dean" secured a job on the Nixon campaign staff for G. Gordon Liddy, who was recently convicted of conspiring to tap telephones in the Democratic headquarters.

There have also been reports that E. Howard Hunt Jr. who pleaded guilty to the same charges in January, attempted to seek legal assistance from Mr. Dean shortly after the day five men with bugging equipment were arrested inside the headquarters.

Democratic Senators, led by Mr. Tunney and Edward M.

Kennedy of Massachusetts, have charged that Mr. Gray's willingness to make the F.B.I.'s Watergate files available to Mr. Dean is evidence of a lack of "political independence" on his part.

Mr. Gray has said that he was operating on a "presumption of regularity" in sending the documents to the White House and that he first passed them "through the chain of command" to Attorney General Richard G. Kleindienst.

The committee made public today an opinion by the bureau's legal counsel, requested by Mr. Gray last July, "on the legal basis for dissemination by the F.B.I. to the White House of information concerning a criminal case being investigated."

The opinion concludes that "the authority and the obligation of the F.B.I. are to keep the Attorney General fully informed and to leave the rest to him."

This portion was underlined by Mr. Gray and carries the penciled notation to "do so in this particular case and in all future cases."

The committee concluded today the portion of its hearings dealing with the testimony of public witnesses.

The United Auto Worker's general counsels, Stephen I. Schlossberg, asked the committee to hold a decision set

up a decision to the Gray nomination until a special Senate committee set up to investigate the Watergate case had completed its work, so that the Senators would have before them "the full record of Mr. Gray's conduct of the investigation of that sensitive matter."

Another witness, Edward Scheidt, who retired 20 years ago after a 21-year career as an F.B.I. agent, told the committee that he was disturbed by indications in some of Mr. Gray's speeches that, if confirmed Mr. Gray might draw the traditionally nonpartisan bureau into politics.

Mr. Scheidt, who was once in charge of the F.B.I.'s New York City office, urged the committee to tell the White House to "send us another name; you can do better than that."

At the White House briefing today, Ronald L. Ziegler, the President's press secretary, said that Mr. Nixon did not want to withdraw the Gray nomination, and he added that there was "no validity" to a report by Newsweek magazine that the capital's police chief, Jorry V. Wilson, had been chosen as the White House's back-up nominee if Mr. Gray was not confirmed.

NEW YORK TIMES
13 March 1973

Nixon Remarks on Executive Privilege

WASHINGTON, March 11—Following are excerpts from a statement issued today by President Nixon on his use of executive privilege:

The doctrine of executive privilege is well established. It was first invoked by President Washington, and it has been recognized and utilized by our Presidents for almost 200 years since that time.

The doctrine is rooted in the Constitution, which vests "the executive power" solely in the President, and it is designed to protect communications within the executive branch in a variety of circumstances in time of both war and peace.

Without such protection, our military security, our relations with other countries, our law enforcement procedures and many other aspects of the national interest could be significantly damaged and the decision-making process of the executive branch could be impaired.

The general policy of this Administration regarding the use of executive privilege

during the next four years will be the same as the one we have followed during the past four years: Executive privilege will not be used as a shield to prevent embarrassing information from being made available but will be exercised only in those particular instances in which disclosure would harm the public interest.

'Pledged to Openness'

During the first four years of my Presidency, hundreds of Administration officials spent thousands of hours testifying before committees of the Congress. Secretary of Defense Laird, for instance, made 86 separate appearances before Congressional committees, engaging in over 327 hours of testimony.

By contrast, there were only three occasions during the first term of my Administration when executive privilege was invoked anywhere in the executive branch in response to a Congressional request for information. These facts speak not of a closed Administration but of one that is pledged to openness and is proud to stand on its record.

Requests for Congressional appearances by members of the President's personal staff present a different situation and raise different considerations. Such requests have

been relatively infrequent through the years, and in past Administrations they have been routinely declined.

I have followed that same tradition in my Administration, and I intend to continue it during the remainder of my term.

Under the doctrine of separation of powers, the manner in which the President personally exercises his assigned executive powers is not subject to questioning by another branch of government. If the President is not subject to such questioning, it is equally inappropriate that members of his staff not be so questioned, for their roles are in effect an extension of the Presidency.

Loss of Candor Feared

This tradition rests on more than constitutional doctrine. It is also a practical necessity. To insure the effective discharge of the executive responsibility, a President must be able to place absolute confidence in the advice and assistance offered by the members of his staff. And in the performance of their duties for the President, those staff members must not be inhibited by the

possibility that their advice and assistance will ever become a matter of public debate, either during their tenure in government or at a later date. Otherwise, the candor with which advice is rendered and the quality of such assistance will inevitably be compromised and weakened.

What is at stake, therefore, is not simply a question of confidentiality but the integrity of the decision-making process at the very highest levels of our government.

As I stated in my press conference on Jan. 31, the question of whether circumstances warrant the exercise of executive privilege should be determined on a case-by-case basis.

In making such decisions, I shall rely on the following guidelines:

1. In the case of a department or agency, every official provided that the performance before the Congress, provided that the performance of the duties of his office will not be seriously impaired thereby. If the official believes that a Congressional request for a particular document or for testimony on a particular point raises a substantial question as to the need for invoking executive privilege, he shall comply with the procedures set forth in my memorandum of March 24, 1969. Thus, executive

privilege will not be invoked until the compelling need for its exercise has been clearly demonstrated and the request has been approved first by the Attorney General and then by the President.

2. A Cabinet officer or any other governmental official who also holds a position as a member of the President's personal staff shall comply with any reasonable request to testify in his non-White House capacity, provided that the performance of his duties will not be seriously impaired thereby. If the official believes that the request raises

a substantial question as to the need for invoking executive privilege, he shall comply with the procedures set forth in my memorandum of March 24, 1969.

3. A member or former member of the President's personal staff normally shall follow the well-established precedent and decline a request for a formal appearance before a committee of the Congress. At the same time, it will continue to be my policy to provide all necessary and relevant information through informal contacts between my present staff and committees of the Congress in ways which preserve intact the constitutional separation of the branches.

WASHINGTON POST
16 March 1973

Executive Privilege Reaffirmed

By Carl Bernstein
and Bob Woodward
Washington Post Staff Writers

President Nixon announced emphatically yesterday that he will prohibit any member of the White House staff from testifying in the Senate's upcoming investigation of the Watergate case or any other "formal session" of a congressional committee.

The President openly challenged members of Congress to go to the Supreme Court as the only means of obtaining testimony from White House aides, particularly presidential counsel John W. Dean III.

The challenge was immediately accepted by angered members of both parties on Capitol Hill, including the chairman and ranking Republican member of the special Watergate investigating committee.

During a press conference, the President also moved to restrict the Watergate committee's access to Federal Bureau of Investigation records of its probe into the bugging of Democratic Party headquarters. He implicitly criticized acting FBI Director L. Patrick Gray III for already supplying such information to the Senate Judiciary Committee.

Under no circumstances, Mr. Nixon said, would he permit Dean to testify in either the Watergate investigation or in the current Judiciary Committee hearings on Gray's nomination to be permanent director of the FBI.

Observing that the Senate might hold Mr. Gray as hos-

tage to a decision on Mr. Dean," the President said: "I cannot believe that such responsible members of the United States Senate would do that."

But Mr. Nixon left no doubt that he would sacrifice Gray's nomination rather than produce his White House counsel for testimony.

"My decision has been made," the President said in regard to any congressional appearance by Dean.

"Perhaps this is the time to have the highest court of this land make a definitive decision with regard to this matter," the President said, adding:

"I am not suggesting that we are asking for it. But I would suggest that if the members of the Senate, in [their] wisdom, decide that they want to test this matter in the courts, we will, of course, present our side of the case, and we think that the Supreme Court will uphold, as it always usually has [sic], the great constitutional principle of separation of powers rather than to uphold the Senate."

On Capitol Hill, the President's remarks appeared to have the effect of jeopardizing even further Gray's nomination and intensifying the increasingly bitter struggle between the President and Congress over the separation of powers.

Gradually, the focus of Gray's confirmation hearings has been shifting away from the nominee and toward the issues of executive privilege and the White House role in the FBI's Watergate investigation.

Leaders of the move to call Dean as a witness have said they believe they can block the Gray nomination in the Judiciary Committee if the President's counsel does not testify.

Sen. Lowell P. Weiker, a Republican from Gray's home state of Connecticut, saw Dean's appearance in the Gray hearings as a side issue and added: "But in the case of the Watergate the White House staff is not a side issue. The

people around the President and in the White House are the issue."

Asked if he would vote to subpoena Dean or other presidential aides in the Watergate investigation, Weiker said, "absolutely."

The question of Dean's testimony before Congress has become an issue because of Gray's agreement to turn over investigative reports to the White House counsel during the FBI's Watergate investigation. Members of the Judiciary Committee have questioned the propriety of Gray's decision and want to determine if Dean misused the information he received from the FBI. In his remarks at the White House yesterday, President Nixon said Dean and other members of the White House staff "will furnish information under the proper circumstances" to congressional committees — presumably by answering questions in writing.

In addition to closing the door on testimony by his aides, the President said that "the practice of the FBI furnishing 'raw files' to full committees must stop" with the recent release of information by Gray to the Judiciary Committee.

"I understand why Mr. Gray did, because his hearing was involved," Mr. Nixon said. "But I would say that should not be a precedent for the future."

Last week, Gray released information showing that the President's personal attorney and his appointments secretary had arranged for the payment of \$30,000 to \$40,000 in Nixon campaign funds to Donald H. Segretti, an alleged political saboteur.

Both of yesterday's statements about White House aides and FBI files will effectively limit the extent to which the upcoming Senate investigation of the Watergate case will be aided by the administration.

Sens. Sam J. Ervin Jr. (D-N.C.) and Howard H. Baker Jr. (R-Tenn.), the chairman and ranking minority member of the special Watergate investigating committee, said the inquiry would be seriously hampered by the President's actions and said they would go to court, if necessary, to fight the restrictions.

"If we get information indicating that any White House aide has any knowledge relevant to this investigation I will certainly recommend to the committee that he be subpoenaed," Ervin said, adding:

"If he fails to appear or refuses to give information after his appearance, I will recommend to the Senate that he be adjudged in contempt of Congress and that the Senate ask the Department of Justice to appoint a special prosecutor to prosecute the individual—I don't care who he is."

Baker, who has close ties

to the White House, said: "I'm disappointed at the President's statement. I had hoped early on for a successful accommodation . . . to get all the relevant facts."

Regarding possible testimony from Dean before the special Watergate investigating committee, Baker added: "I'm not prepared to say I'd be satisfied with written questions only. . . . At the moment my personal inclination is to insist on a personal appearance. If we can't negotiate a way around this impasse, the only way is to litigate it."

Ervin said yesterday that he feels the President's statement about FBI files was designed to curtail, if not cut off, his committee's access to important data.

Although the President indicated he did not object to the FBI showing "raw files" to committee chairmen and the ranking minority member, Ervin said that in the Watergate probe such a limitation would be "unacceptable."

"It would take days to go through those files," Ervin said. "I don't have the time. The staff has to do it."

If the President's statement that raw files should not be furnished to a full committee is translated into action, it would put the decision in direct conflict with the Senate resolution that established the Watergate select committee.

That resolution, which passed the Senate Feb. 7 by a 77-to-0 vote, grants all seven senators on the select committee and at least two staff members access to the FBI's voluminous Watergate files.

The President's statement yesterday also seemed to counter earlier statements by Gray, who told the Judiciary Committee considering his nomination that all 16 members could look at the raw files. At least two members have already accepted the offer and looked at some of the files.

Gray had said that he would cooperate fully with the Ervin select committee investigation and did not quarrel with the provision allowing two staff members access to the FBI files.

By his statements yesterday, President Nixon indicated that he was primarily concerned that information in FBI files, involving what he called "hearsay," "guilt by innuendo" and "guilt by association" might be made public and leaked to the press.

During his testimony last week, Gray released information in FBI files that showed that Herbert W. Kalmbach, the President's personal attorney, and Dwight L. Chapin, the President's former appointments secretary, arranged for the payment of more than \$30,000 to Segretti, a California attorney.

The information Gray released was based on a statement given to the FBI by

WASHINGTON POST
20 March 1973

Nixon Unit Answers Post's Legal Brief

By Lawrence Meyer
Washington Post Staff Writer

Kalmbach and could not be classified as a "raw, unevaluated file," according to Justice Department sources.

Spokesmen for both the Justice Department and the FBI had no comment yesterday on whether the President's stated position would cause Gray to modify his offer to either the Senate Judiciary Committee or the Ervin select committee. The White House also had no additional comment.

The initial offer to make the FBI Watergate files available to the Senate was made in January by Attorney General Richard G. Kleindienst, who at the time specified that there would be some limitations placed on what could be made public.

In addition to closing off the Senate's access to FBI files and his White House aides, President Nixon said that he and his press secretary, Ronald L. Ziegler, would make no more comments on the Watergate investigations.

"I could comment on them," the President said. "Mr. Ziegler could in the future. I will not. He will not. And the reason that we will not is that when the committee completes its investigation, we will then have comments, if we consider it appropriate to do so."

The President said that he would cooperate fully with the Senate other than allowing the direct testimony of his aides.

"I have confidence in all of the White House people who have been named," the President said in apparent reference to the allegations in press reports that some of his closest advisers were involved in a campaign of political espionage and sabotage.

The President also said that officials from his re-election committee do not have an executive privilege to refuse to testify before the Ervin select committee.

With specific reference to former Attorney General John N. Mitchell, the President's campaign manager, and former Commerce Secretary Maurice H. Stans, the chief fundraiser, Mr. Nixon said:

"None of them have the privilege, none of them, of course, will refuse to testify, none has when he is asked to, and I am sure they will give very good accounts of themselves, as they have in the court matters that they have been asked to."

In a pretrial deposition by Mitchell, the former Attorney General refused to answer certain questions about discussions of the Watergate bugging, claiming the attorney-client privilege.

Yesterday's developments also left a confused situation in regard to the withdrawal of Ervin's request for access to the transcript of the federal grand jury inquiry into the Watergate bugging.

In a letter to Chief Judge

Lawyers for President Nixon's re-election committee attacked yesterday statements made in a legal brief filed on behalf of The Washington Post as being "in poor taste" and "outrageous."

The response by lawyers for the Committee for the Re-Election of the President, directed at The Post's brief and also separate briefs filed by three other publications, was filed yesterday in U.S. District Court.

Reporters and officials of the four publications—The Post, The New York Times, The Washington Evening Star-News and Time Magazine—have been served with committee subpoenas demanding that they make available all notes, story drafts and other documents they have concerning the Watergate incident.

The re-election committee is being sued by the Democratic National Committee for invasion of privacy damages growing out of the break-in and bugging of the Democratic Party's Watergate headquarters by employees of the re-election committee.

Re-election committee officials have filed countersuits for abuse of court process and libel against former Democratic Party Chairman Lawrence F. O'Brien.

The publications last week filed with U.S. District Judge Charles R. Richey their opposition to the re-election committee subpoenas, arguing that complying with the demand would force them to reveal confidential sources, irreparably damage their ability to pursue investigative reporting and violate First Amendment rights to freedom of the press.

The Post also asserted that the re-election committee "is the political arm of the President of the United States" and that the subpoenas "are part of an attempt by the incumbent administration to intimidate the free press of this country . . ."

In its response yesterday, the re-election committee lawyers said, "These parties unabashedly accuse the President of the United States and these defendants of the most unscrupulous sort of conduct, but by their very words reveal their own political animosity and misguided actions. The defendants resent these unfair accusations."

The re-election committee brief said that its lawyers, "in the best interest of their clients, have attempted to discover evidence relevant to the cases at hand, and to this end have caused subpoenas to be issued to certain material witnesses—who happen to be journalists."

"For this honest effort the defendants have incurred the wrath of The Washington Post, the self-styled 'newspaper which has dared to let the American public know' and have opened themselves to more ridicule and charges of political intrigue," the re-election committee brief said.

Addressing the arguments of all four publications and the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press, the re-election committee brief said, "Reduced to bare essentials, the plea of these (parties) is a unified demand of the Fourth Estate for exemption from the duty to appear and give testimony in virtually all civil litigation."

"The public's right to know the whole truth, and the parties' right to ascertain it by accepted means" of litigation, the re-election committee's brief said, "go to the very core of our adversary system. The juries in these cases should not be denied the testimony of essential witnesses."

A hearing is scheduled Wednesday concerning the subpoenas.

John J. Sirica of U.S. District Court here, Ervin said he would not need the transcript because of Gray's promise to provide the committee with "all of the data collected by the FBI in its investigation . . ."

WASHINGTON POST
17 March 1973

Bug Case Accord Reached

By Lou Cannon
Washington Post Staff Writer

The Nixon administration and the Senate select committee probing the Watergate bugging case reached a compromise yesterday that Sen. Sam J. Ervin Jr. (D-N.C.) said would allow the committee the "full benefits" of the FBI's Watergate investigation.

Sources close to the committee said that the compromise, details of which were not publicly announced, would allow the two top staff members of the investigating committee access to the FBI raw files on the Watergate case. But the only senators on the seven-member committee who will be permitted to see the files are Chairman Ervin and Sen. Howard Baker (R-Tenn.), the ranking minority member.

The President said at a news conference Thursday "that the practice of the FBI furnishing raw files to full committees must stop." He said he did not object to showing these files to the committee chairman and the ranking minority member.

Ervin objected, however, that this procedure would make it difficult for him to proceed with the investigation.

"It would take days to go through those files," Ervin said. "I don't have the time. The staff has to do it."

The resolution establishing the Senate select committee, passed unanimously by the Senate, grants all seven senators and the two staff members access to the files.

Both the administration and the committee backed down from their original positions yesterday in negotiations among Attorney General Richard Kleindienst, Ervin and Baker.

The administration, while remaining adamant on withholding the files from the full committee, agreed to allow their inspection by Samuel Dash, the staff director and majority counsel, and Fred Thompson, the minority counsel. Both will be strictly sworn to secrecy.

The agreement, Ervin and Baker said in a joint statement, will give the committee "the full benefit of the results of the FBI investigation concerning the Watergate incident and other matters related to the 1972 presidential campaign."

One of the senators on the Ervin committee, Joseph M.

THE WASHINGTON POST Wednesday, Mar. 21, 1973

White House Quizzed

Gray on Data Leaks

By Bob Woodward
and Carl Bernstein
Washington Post Staff Writers

Acting FBI director L. Patrick Gray said yesterday that he had been "called on the carpet" last year by two of President Nixon's top advisers for leaks of information in the Watergate bugging case.

Gray introduced records into the testimony at his confirmation hearings before the Senate Judiciary Committee showing that he met or talked with Presidential counsel John W. Dean III and John Ehrlichman, the President's top domestic adviser, at least 15 separate times about leaks during a four-month period before the election last year.

Gray's records indicate that news leaks were, in fact, the major topic of discussions about the Watergate investigation between Gray and the White House.

The telephone calls or meetings generally came soon after news stories about the alleged involvement of former or present White House aides in the Watergate bugging or in a reportedly broader campaign of political espionage against the Democrats.

"I resented it," Gray said yesterday, "because I don't think there were those leaks within the FBI." Gray suggested that the leaks may have come from the U.S. attorney's office or the grand jury investigating the Watergate.

The first call about the leaks came from Ehrlichman the morning of June 21, the day after the first report appeared linking White House consultant E. Howard Hunt Jr. with the Watergate break-in June 17.

In the written information supplied to the Judiciary Committee, Gray noted the date of Ehrlichman's call (June 21), the time (9:35 a.m.), and added that the call concerned "safeguarding investigative procedures against leaks." Gray said he "advised we were handling the case as a major special with usual precautions for such a case and (had) very restricted distribution of information."

response to allegations that he had used his White House position improperly in behalf of industrialist Bernard Godfine.

"I am not going to parallel the two situations," Ziegler responded. "I do not think I have to."

Senate Democrats have

Two days after Ehrlichman's first call, Dean called Gray about "rumors of leaks of FBI information," according to Gray's written answer. About six hours later that day, June 23, Gray told he called Dean back to deny that information was being leaked from the FBI.

On June 28, the day G. Gordon Liddy was fired as finance counsel from the President's re-election committee for refusing to answer FBI questions about the Watergate, Gray was contacted by Dean about leaks and talked by telephone and met with Ehrlichman about "safeguarding investigative procedures against leaks," the written statement says.

Liddy's dismissal was not announced at the time and did not become public until more than two weeks later. Liddy, Hunt and five other men either pleaded guilty or were convicted at the Watergate trial in January.

Gray apparently was not contacted by either Dean or Ehrlichman during the entire month of July, a period in which relatively few news accounts of major significance appeared on the Watergate.

The White House contacts resumed with a call from Dean to Gray on Aug. 2, the day after the first news report saying that a \$25,000 Nixon campaign check had been deposited in the bank of one of the Watergate bugging suspects. The call, according to Gray's written testimony, was about "leaks of FBI information."

The next contact about leaks by Dean was made Sept. 19, the day after the first news report that two high officials in the Nixon campaign organization had received large cash disbursements from a fund used in part to finance an intelligence-gathering operation against the Democrats. Gray was in Kansas City, according to his documents, and Dean telephoned him there. In addition, Dean called Gray again about leaks the next day, Sept. 20.

Dean also called Gray about leaks on Oct. 12, two days af-

ter The Washington Post reported that the FBI had uncovered a White House directed campaign of political spying and sabotage against the Democratic presidential contenders.

According to Gray's records, Dean called him at 9:05 a.m. on Oct. 18 and 25 minutes later appeared at Gray's office to discuss the news leaks. This was three days after the first news accounts saying that alleged political saboteur Donald H. Segretti was hired by the President's appointments secretary, Dwight L. Chapin.

The next day, Oct. 19, Ehrlichman talked by telephone, and met with Gray about leaks of information.

The last contact by Dean concerning leaks was made Feb. 2, according to Gray. This was the day after Sen. Edward M. Kennedy (D-Mass.) released a report saying that an investigation by his subcommittee had uncovered evidence indicating White House involvement in "a wide range of espionage and sabotage activities" during the 1972 presidential campaign.

Gray said the Feb. 2 contact by Dean also concerned an "FBI request to interview Mr. Chapin." This was four days after Chapin announced that he was resigning from the White House staff. Chapin had been earlier interviewed by the FBI. It could not be learned yesterday why the FBI might have wanted another interview with Chapin after Feb. 2. The Watergate bugging trial was completed on Jan. 30.

According to federal sources, the FBI conducted several internal investigations during its Watergate inquiry to determine if FBI agents were the source of news accounts. Similarly, Dean reportedly attempted to determine if members of the White House staff were providing information to the press.

At the Committee for the Re-election of the President, according to employees there, the entire staff was instructed not to discuss the Watergate case with the press and several internal investigations were conducted to identify potential leaks.

Montoya (D-N.M.), said he suspected Kleindienst of an "ulterior motive" in withholding the FBI files from the full committee.

"It is my feeling that every member of the committee needs all the information the FBI has collected in order to place the Watergate matter in proper perspective," Montoya said.

Hours before the compromise was announced, White House press secretary Ronald L. Ziegler indicated that Acting FBI Director L. Patrick Gray III would be expected to withdraw his offer allowing the full Senate Judiciary Committee to inspect the Watergate files.

Citing the President's statement of the day before, Ziegler said "Individuals in the government traditionally take guidance from what the President says."

Gray offered the files to the full Judiciary Committee last week during hearings on his confirmation as FBI director.

Only two senators have actually inspected them, Sen. Roman Hruska (R-Neb.), who spent more than six hours looking at files, and Sen. John Tunney (D-Calif.), who inspected three specific files for a half hour.

While reiterating the President's opposition to Senate inspection of raw FBI files, Ziegler also promised administration cooperation with both committees and hinted at one point that a written report by White House counsel John W. Dean III on the Watergate case might be made available.

Mr. Nixon has refused to allow Dean to testify before the Judiciary Committee, but Ziegler has said that he will answer "relevant" questions in writing. Dean has not yet been asked to testify by the Ervin committee.

Asked yesterday whether Dean's written report on the Watergate case would be made available to the Senate committees, Ziegler declined to answer specifically but said "the objective of the administration will be to cooperate and provide the facts and provide relevant information and details that the committees want."

President Nixon maintained in his Thursday news conference that he was upholding the traditional constitutional doctrine of separation of powers between the executive and legislative branches in declining to allow his aides to testify. He defended withholding of the FBI files on grounds they contained hearsay that made available to the Senate "could do innocent people a great deal of damage."

Ziegler was asked yesterday about the example of Sherman Adams, personal adviser to President Eisenhower, who agreed to testify voluntarily before a Senate committee in

threatened to hold up Gray's confirmation unless Dean testifies before the committee.

Mr. Nixon has said he will not back down on his invocation of "executive privilege" for Dean even if the Senate holds the Gray nomination "hostage."

March 9, 1973 THE WASHINGTON POST

CIA Analyst Says U.S. Tried To Still Him

By Sanford J. Ungar
Washington Post Staff Writer

LOS ANGELES, March 8—An analyst for the Central Intelligence Agency charged under oath today that there had been "a definite attempt on the part of the government to prevent me from testifying" as a witness in the Pentagon Papers trial.

Samuel A. Adams, who was subpoenaed to testify in defense of Daniel Ellsberg and Anthony J. Russo Jr., said that his superiors at the CIA "lied" to him in an effort to dissuade him from appearing in federal court here.

After learning of dealings between the Justice Department prosecutors in this case and an assistant CIA general counsel, Adams told the jury, he came to the conclusion that "I had been had."

The unusual testimony was the first inkling the jury has had of defense allegations that the prosecution in this case has "suppressed" evidence and tried to "silence" Adams as a witness.

U.S. District Court Judge W. Matt Byrne Jr. prohibited Adams from discussing some aspects of the situation—including matters that have previously occurred in court out of the presence of the jury—but admitted the testimony on the narrow issue of whether Adams is "biased or prejudiced" against either side in the case.

That was the impression which chief prosecutor David R. Nissen sought to give during extended cross-examination of Adams today.

Nissen's questions were apparently aimed at portraying the intelligence analyst as a chronic complainer within the CIA, who once accused top military officials of being in a "conspiracy" to fabricate data on Vietnamese Communist troop strength.

Adams has held that view for several years now, and that was the thrust of his original testimony for Ellsberg and Russo—that some of the top-secret documents which they duplicated in 1969 contained falsified statistics on the "enemy order of battle."

As a result of those statistics being inaccurate and the documents being "dated" at the time, Adams testified, they would have been "virtually useless" if they had fallen into the hands of a foreign nation's intelligence appa-

ratu. When he first read newspaper reports of testimony to the contrary from a prosecution witness, Lt. Gen. William G. DePuy, Adams urged his superiors to send internal CIA memoranda he had written on the "order of battle" to the Justice Department for transmission to the court here.

The intelligence analyst felt that he had evidence which might tend to establish the innocence of the defendants—namely, that U.S. military officials had intentionally underestimated the opposing forces in Vietnam in order to create "the impression that there was light at the end of the tunnel."

Questioned by the judge this afternoon, Adams said he was "advised by assistant CIA General Counsel John K. Greaney that his memoranda had been submitted to the court, only to learn later that they had not at the time, actually been turned over to the judge."

Greaney told Adams in a written memo on Feb. 9 that, according to a message transmitted from Nissen through the Justice Department, the judge had decided the material was not "exculpatory" and so there would be no need for the Adams testimony here.

On the basis of that advisory, Adams said today, he decided to "desist" from his efforts to bring the evidence before the court himself.

It was on Feb. 17, when talking with Morton H. Halperin, a former Defense Department official who is a consultant to the defense attorneys here, that Adams learned this information was "inaccurate," he testified today.

The prosecution has denied that it made any attempt to suppress Adams' evidence, and Greaney—in an affidavit submitted to the court two weeks ago—said the allegation that he sought to persuade the CIA analyst not to testify was "absolutely false."

Adams has now been on the witness stand for three days, far longer than originally anticipated, and this has delayed the testimony of McGeorge Bundy, who was national security adviser to the late Presidents Kennedy and Johnson and is now president

NEW YORK TIMES
21 March 1973

ELLSBERG WITNESS EXPLAINS SECRECY

By MARTIN ARNOLD
Special to The New York Times

LOS ANGELES, March 20—The late Ho Chi Minh would have had to telephone the Defense Department to determine whether one of the "top secret" documents in the Pentagon papers trial was genuine, a defense witness testified today.

The witness was William G. Florence, who spent 43 years as an Air Force officer and a civilian working in Federal bureaucracy on the classification of Government secrets.

During long cross-examination from David R. Nissen, the chief prosecutor, Mr. Florence said that one of the documents in this case, a 1968 Joint Chiefs of Staff memorandum, would have been virtually useless to foreign intelligence because there was nothing in the document itself to authenticate whether it was genuine.

"It could have been counterfeited?" Mr. Nissen asked.

"It could be a counterfeit," Mr. Florence replied.

"You mean he'd have to telephone and say, 'This is Ho Chi Minh; I'd like to know whether this is genuine?'" Mr. Nissen asked.

"If he wanted to do it [to know] I'm sure he would," answered Mr. Florence.

Indirect Defense Route

Mr. Florence, who has been testifying for several days, squinted through his black-rimmed glasses at the jury and the prosecutor, rattling off the various divisions and subdivisions of the Government's classification regulations.

He was there mainly to attack the Government's system of classifying documents, but United States District Court Judge William Matthew Byrne Jr. has refused to allow Daniel Ellsberg and Anthony J. Russo Jr., the defendants, to mount a direct attack on the system. As a result, Mr. Florence is attempting to do it indirectly.

His answers were long and convoluted, and the judge often interrupted him to keep him to the point.

The essence of his testimony was considered extremely important by the defense. It was to the effect that there was no real way to tell whether the Pentagon papers were properly classified "top secret-sensitive" when they were compiled in 1967, let alone when they were allegedly stolen by Dr. Ellsberg in 1969.

There were many reasons for this, he said, including the fact

of the Ford Foundation.

It was also revealed in court today that the defense had subpoenaed a recently retired Army colonel, Gaines Hawkins, of West Point, Mississippi, to corroborate Adams' testimony on the alleged fabrication of the "order of battle" but that Hawkins on arrival in Los Angeles had declined to cooperate with defense attorneys and had been dismissed from the subpoena.

that Leslie Gelb, the head of the study group that compiled the papers, did not have the authority to give them an original "top secret" classification.

Derivative Classification

If this was so, Mr. Florence testified, then the papers were classified under a Defense Department procedure called derivative classification, that is, a system under which a document receives the classification of classified research material, even if that material is only a single sentence that had been previously classified.

Mr. Florence, over several days, had insisted there was no way of reading the Pentagon papers to tell whether its source material was properly classified; if the source material was not properly classified, then surely the papers themselves were not either, the defense contends.

In a sense, Mr. Florence's testimony was aimed more at the judge than the jury, for the defense is attempting to subpoena the source material used in compiling the Pentagon papers. If, through the development of Mr. Florence's testimony, Judge Byrne is prompted to grant that subpoena, then the defense might succeed also in prompting the judge to allow it to attack the classification system directly.

So the battle between the consultant and the prosecutor stretches over the hours, with the former holding to the point that he cannot tell without the source material whether the papers were properly classified and the latter trying to make the witness appear foolish.

Mr. Nissen asked whether in the absence of any official communication covering the Pentagon papers, the papers did not authenticate themselves.

"They do not for me," replied Mr. Florence.

Dr. Ellsberg and Mr. Russo are accused of six counts of espionage, six counts of theft and one count of conspiracy.

WASHINGTON POST
9 March 1973

ITT Denies Connection With Watergate Figure

International Telephone and Telegraph Corp. yesterday denied that it had any connection with any of the Watergate defendants as was alleged in a column by Jack Anderson Thursday.

In a statement from New York, R. G. Bateson, associate general counsel of ITT, said that the allegations in the column "are completely inaccurate and untrue."

"ITT never hired E. Howard Hunt or any so-called 'Mission Impossible team.' There is no link between ITT and any of the Watergate defendants, or break-ins of the Chilean embassy or Chilean diplomat's residences," Bateson said.

GENERALNEW YORK TIMES
21 March 1973**Anarchy of Diplomacy**

• By James Reston

WASHINGTON—Secretary of State Rogers has begun a quiet but intensive inquiry into the problem of protecting American ambassadors and their staffs in foreign capitals from the outlaws who are now terrorizing the diplomatic community.

This is now a worldwide problem. For the Arab terrorists are beginning to avoid the major capitals of the world, where U.S. embassies have fairly good security forces, and are concentrating on less prominent capitals, where it is easier to kidnap American officials and hold them as hostages for the release of Arab outlaws elsewhere in the world.

Some fairly obvious protective measures have been taken, with the help of the C.I.A. and the Pentagon, since two American diplomats were captured and assassinated recently in Khartoum, the capital of the Sudan. More security officers have been assigned to all U.S. missions overseas, and from now on, they will not only travel with U.S. ambassadors wherever they go, but will also help protect their families.

Also, now bullet-proof cars are being provided for all embassies, and the U.S. Government is emphasizing that security for U.S. officials and their families is the primary responsibility of the home government.

Secretary Rogers has also been pointing out to these governments that this wave of kidnapping will never be stopped so long as the people who commit these crimes are permitted to go free. Of all the criminals involved in attacks on foreign embassies in recent years, only one is still in jail. All the rest have been released, including the Arabs who survived the attack on the Israeli athletes at the Olympic games in Germany. Accordingly, Mr. Rogers is pressing for the death penalty for those engaged in diplomatic kidnapping, though this penalty is against the law of the United States.

These precautions, however, do not satisfy Secretary Rogers or the U.S. Foreign Service officers, who now head about 70 per cent of the 130-plus American embassies overseas. Mr. Rogers points out that protecting all U.S. personnel in all embassies is a mammoth job, and total security cannot therefore be guaranteed.

Also, some Foreign Service officers are critical of the Nixon Administration's method of handling a crisis when American officials are kidnapped and held for ransom. The policy is to handle each case as best the Government can, but in general to avoid being "blackmailed," even if this means risking the lives of the captured American officials.

Most foreign governments holding prisoners whom the kidnappers want

WASHINGTON

released approve of this policy, which is generous to them but not to the kidnapped Americans. Golda Meir, the Prime Minister of Israel, recognized the American Government's dilemma when she was in Washington the other day.

This anarchy in the diplomatic world will not only go on, she said, but it will probably get worse. The attacks are likely to take place in the smaller capitals, she observed, and it is not impossible that the wives and children of diplomats will be seized one day. Then, she asked, what will you do?

Secretary Rogers' answer to this is that much stricter security measures will soon be in effect, not only for U.S. officials overseas, but for their families as well. Obviously, there is no satisfactory answer to this problem, but at least this crisis in the diplomatic community should remind us of the service of these officials and their families.

Henry Kissinger gets all the headlines on the spectacular missions to Peking and Moscow, and the American ambassadors in London, Paris, Rome, and Tokyo are fairly safe and fancy; but the State Department and the Foreign Service officers still have to deal with most of the drudgery of American foreign policy, and now most of the physical risks as well.

Diplomacy has been transformed by the fast jet airplane and by instant communications via the satellite and the computer, and the copying machines that distribute an ambassador's dispatches quickly through the Washington bureaucracy.

When the head of an American mission abroad reports something really important in his capital, the chances are somebody from Washington will be sent out to deal with it. The rest of the time, the ambassador is left with the routine dog-work, and the social routine, which may be more injurious to his health than kidnapping.

Ironically, about the only place where an American ambassador is reasonably safe these days is in the major Communist capitals of the world. In Haiti, or the Sudan, or Austria, he may be kidnapped any night on his way to a birthday party, and held for the release of political scoundrels thousands of miles away, and nobody here quite knows how to deal with this anarchy.

Secretary Rogers can give them bullet-proof cars and more Marines at the U. S. embassy door, and the President can proclaim that he "won't be blackmailed," but this doesn't quite deal with the problem, and nobody knows it better than the Secretary of State.

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
8 March 1973**Khartoum killings**

By Charles W. Yost

New York

As one who has spent most of his life as a career diplomat and has been considerably concerned with the Middle East, I am moved to make several comments about the assassination of the American Ambassador and his deputy in Khartoum last week.

The most obvious judgment is that this was an atrocity which could not conceivably be excused by any claims for "justice" for the cause in whose name it was committed, or by the misfortune and "alienation" of its perpetrators. Moreover, as Talleyrand remarked on another occasion, it was worse than a crime, it was a mistake.

All over the world it has served to confirm, the popular association of Arabs with "terrorism," to buttress the Israeli argument that their Draconian retaliations are necessary against irrational savages like those of "Black September," and to discredit and undermine support abroad for the Arab side in the Middle East conflict. It was an unmitigated catastrophe for everyone concerned except a few fanatics.

That being said, any realistic understanding of the confrontation in the Middle East over the past 20 years must lead to the conclusion that atrocities of this kind are almost inevitable and, until that confrontation is brought under control, will probably grow worse. When two generations of young Palestinians are brought up in refugee camps, without decent homes or regular employment, without a country or a future, it is certain that many, having little other occupation, will dream of revenge and some will indulge in it.

The responsibility for that crime, that is, the crime of neglecting a generation of outcasts, is widely shared. It is shared by the Israelis who cast them out in the first place, who refused to compensate them and who now refuse to make a viable political settlement. It is shared by the Arab governments who, holding the refugees in their ghettos as a means of pressure on Israel, refused to resettle or assimilate them. It is shared by the world community, which turned its back on them, and by the United States which, while paying conscience money through UNRWA, failed to pressure the two primary recipients of its largess, Israel and Jordan, into resolving the problem.

Incidentally one wonders whether a similar young generation is not being forgotten and corrupted in the ghettos of America's great cities, and whether the fruits of this neglect and alienation are not the drug problem and "crime in the streets" about which we so piously protest, while failing to do more than tinker with the underlying causes.

Indeed, hard as the Black Septemberists try to capture the label of terrorism for their exclusive property, the competition is very keen. Both sides in Vietnam have been and still are engaging in terrorism, torture, and atrocity on a substantial scale. Moreover, Lieutenant Calley is not the only American who participated in them. In Northern Ireland both sides indulge daily in assassinations of entirely innocent persons on a scale and with a callousness outdoing Black September. Hideous as the latter's atrocities are

they are far from unique. Even the most "civilized" in the modern age seem to succumb as easily to fits of senseless violence as did their barbarian ancestors.

To return to the two American diplomats who died in Khartoum, as the President said the other day, the trade of diplomacy can still be a very dangerous one. It is far from being all cocktail parties or windy speeches at the conference table. Diplomats of one country or another are being kidnapped or shot at somewhere almost constantly. Very few of them but have had narrow escapes in hostile crowds, on the edge of war zones or, as in Khartoum, in what seems the most innocent surroundings.

Those in the Foreign Service take all this very much in their stride and consider it part of their duty, an inevitable component of their chosen profession. They would, however, appreciate a little more understanding on the part of their compatriots and masters, a little less chatter about the State Department having "no constituency," less penny-

pinching on their small budget by congressmen willing to vote billions for "defense," less forced retirement when they are still in the prime of life and usefulness. Most of all perhaps they would like a better chance to rise, like those in the armed forces, to the top of their service, rather than to see most of the prime (and safest) posts awarded to big contributors to political campaigns. (Could one of those be sent next to Khartoum?)

Perhaps the tragic death of Noel and Moore, two officers of the American Foreign Service who spent their careers in the Arab world, will remind the Arabs that their friends need to be protected, and will remind Americans that they have faithful servants abroad who deserve to be encouraged and honored before they are dead.

The author of this article writes from a background of 40 years as a United States diplomat.

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WASHINGTON POST
18 March 1973

Joseph Kraft

America Is Not Over the Hill

Many thoughtful and friendly American watchers saw in the Vietnam war the beginning of the end of this country's supremacy in international affairs. In that vein, for example, Roy Jenkins, Britain's former Chancellor of the Exchequer, called his graceful set of lectures on America "Afternoon on the Potomac."

But recent events in all corners of the globe show that Americans are far from being the over-the-hill mob. On the contrary, with the Vietnam debacle finally lifted, this country's power is more than ever the dominant force in the world.

The most dramatic sign of American power has come in recent contacts with Communist China. A whole series of events—the release of American prisoners; the agreement to establish high-level liaison offices in Washington and Peking; the reception of Henry Kissinger by Mao Tse-tung—all testify to one point. The Chinese want the whole world to know, in the most striking way, that they have harmonious relations with the United States.

The Russians are hardly less friendly. Big Two negotiations on arms control and trade go on apace. Secretary of the Treasury George Shultz received a very cordial welcome in Moscow last week even though he raised

the touchy subject of Russian restrictions on Jews wishing to emigrate to Israel.

A particularly revealing sign is a hopeful article on prospects for American-Soviet cooperation published by George Arbatov, the head of the USA Institute in Moscow. Mr. Arbatov has frequently published material that is conciliatory toward the United States. What is significant about the present article is that it appears in the ideological redoubt of the regime, the theoretical journal, *Kommunist*.

For once, moreover, this country has improved relations with Russia and China without seriously damaging rapport with western Europe and Japan. No sensible person will bother his head much about the complex details of the international monetary accords recently concluded by Secretary Shultz and his undersecretary, Paul Volcker. But those agreements reflect two political turn-about's favorable to Washington.

Thus Japan has agreed to revalue the yen in a way favorable to American exports. The Japanese revaluation represents a complete about-face by Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka.

The West Europeans have also agreed to a revaluation that is also favorable to American exports. The European decision expresses a complete about-face by France which had previously opposed any joint action helpful

to the American interest.

A final expression of American pre-eminence emerges from the two best-known hot spots. In the Mideast, the Egyptians are looking to the United States for a move towards settlement. Provided the Egyptians themselves show a little more flexibility, there may be such a move. In Latin America, it has become old hat merely to blame all troubles on Uncle Sam. A marvelous occasion for such tactics—a special meeting of the United Nations Security Council in Panama—has drawn only a handful of foreign ministers, and no outside heads of state.

The chief lesson of all this is that American power in the world is dependent, not upon staying in Vietnam, but on getting out. No matter what happens in Indochina, Washington has no interest in becoming engaged again.

A second lesson is that the American position in the world is easy enough to permit serious address to serious internal problems. We can easily afford to concentrate more attention and more resources on such domestic problems as inflation, education, transport, crime, race relations and the cities. Indeed, when the right approach to these problems is through international action, the United States need have no compunction about being what it really is—namely the foremost power in the world.

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NEW YORK TIMES
11 March 1973

Frankfurt Cites Drug Counts

FRANKFURT, West Germany, March 10 (Reuter)—Americans were involved in almost half the narcotics offenses committed in Frankfurt last year, Police Chief Knut Müller reports.

WASHINGTON POST
20 March 1973

Charles W. Yost

SALT II: Where Does National Security

Lie?

The opening in Geneva last week of the second round of SALT II, the strategic arms negotiations with the Soviet Union, is an appropriate moment for reviewing the state of play in this critical field.

Since World War II the United States has spent \$1.3 trillion and the Soviets an estimated \$1 trillion on arms. In the past two or three years, however, the two countries have moved from confrontation to negotiation and made substantial progress toward detente. Willy Brandt's *ostpolitik* has defused the crisis in central Europe. The United States has made a series of significant trade and other agreements with the Russians. Secretary of the Treasury George Schultz recently visited Moscow.

Yet, oddly enough, the arms race with the Soviets seems to roll on with a momentum all its own without any regard to other relations between the two countries. Arms are supposed to provide security but in this case they have become the main element of insecurity. As Fred Charles Ikle remarks in a recent article in "Foreign Affairs": "Toward each other as a people, Americans and Russians harbor practically no feelings of hostility, but by our theories they must indefinitely face each other as the most fearful threat to their future existence." Could irrationality be carried further?

Returning specifically to SALT II, both sides approach the negotiations with some very human hang-ups which may be more appropriate to the football field than to a competition in means of mass destruction. Reiterating a point he has made before, President Nixon declared to the South Carolina legislature last month: "Let us be sure that he [the President] never goes to the negotiating table representing the second strongest nation in the world."

It was precisely to overcome U.S. superiority and achieve "parity" that the Soviets have been frantically building up their strategic and naval forces over the past 10 years. As long as neither side is willing to be "second strongest," and as long as generals and admirals persist in exaggerating the capabilities of the other side and expanding their own, the arms race will never stop.

A further hang-up is the tendency of both sides to start new weapons systems as "bargaining chips" to be traded off in future negotiations. Unfortunately, given the slow pace of negotiations and the vested interests created in military-industrial complexes by each ongoing system, once a new one is started it is rarely stopped. Bargaining chips become building blocks.

If one looks at the SALT negotiations either in technical military terms or in terms of domestic political psychology, the negotiators have an incredibly difficult task. Since the MIRVed Poseidon missiles from a single nuclear submarine could hit simultaneously 160 cities of the adversary, and since such submarines are invulnerable to attack now or in the foreseeable future, one might have thought it could be agreed that a certain number of submarines so armed would constitute a "sufficient" deterrent for both sides.

But that would be much too simple minded. What of the "investment" by each in more than a thousand land-based intercontinental missiles? What of intercontinental bomber aircraft of which the United States now proposes to start a whole new family, the B-12? What of nuclear weapons on carrier-based aircraft in European waters, and Soviet intermediate range missiles targeted on our European allies? The va-

riety of pieces on the chessboard tempt the players to a game as intricate as it is profitless.

It is disturbing that the United States is sending in a new team of negotiators at this difficult juncture. Its chief, Ambassador Alexis Johnson, is a man of great ability and experience, but not in this particular field. The arms control and disarmament agency, which backstopped his predecessor, is being downgraded in both funds and staff. The balance of decision-making could therefore shift to the Pentagon, where each of the three services has its sacred cows to protect. Of course basic choices will be made by the President with the assistance of Dr. Henry Kissinger. Let us pray those choices reflect what our primary security interests really are in the 1970s.

A recent Harris poll showed that more than 60 per cent of Americans believe today that the government should increase spending to curb air and water pollution, to provide federal aid to education, and to help the poor, whereas 55 per cent oppose increased spending for research and development for defense. It is just possible that the public has a more realistic sense of where priorities in the national interest lie than the government has.

Vice President Agnew spoke in scathing terms during the political campaign of those who "disastrously tamper with the national security." Perhaps those who are tampering with national security in the real sense are not those who believe we could safely reduce the billions spent to deter an extremely unlikely nuclear "first strike" against us, but those who are reducing funds needed to make our cities and suburbs safe, healthy and civilized habitats for Americans.

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NEW YORK TIMES 10 March 1973 U.S. Indicts 19 Here As Drug Smugglers In 'Latin Connection'

By JAMES M. MARKHAM

Federal authorities yesterday announced the indictment of 19 reputed heroin traffickers, dealers and couriers and the further disruption of the "Latin-American connection."

The ring was said to have smuggled more than two tons of heroin into this country.

Among those arrested in the United States and several other countries were five employees of Aerolineas Argentinas, a steward on Avianca Airlines and a Cuban voodoo high priest from Washington Heights.

The alleged kingpin of the

band was Francois Rossi, a 34-year-old Corsican who had operated out of Buenos Aires but who was arrested at American request last month in Barcelona, Spain, to which he had fled.

With the arrest of Rossi, Federal authorities believe they have cut deeply into the established leadership of trafficking operations that move European-refined heroin through Latin America and up to Miami and New York.

In the last few months, three major Latin-connection traffickers—Auguste Ricord, Christian David and Michel Nicoli—were convicted here and sentenced to 20 years. Last year, Lucien Sardi, another big-time dealer, was killed in a shootout with Mexican policemen and a fifth, André Gaetan Condemine, is believed by French authorities to have been eliminated.

However, the current Latin-connection investigation is ex-

pected to yield still more indictments. And when those have taken their toll, a "new generation" of South American-based traffickers is expected to emerge, as one well-placed narcotics official put it yesterday.

At a news conference crowded with representatives of Federal agencies — among them John Ingersoll, director of the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, and Customs Commissioner Vernon Acree—Robert A. Morse, United States Attorney for the Eastern District, announced the four indictments.

Rossi, known for years to the police of several countries as the elusive "Marcello," had, like David, Condemine and Nicoli, originally worked for Ricord, but then set up his own operation.

Rossi, who is wanted on charges of murder in France, will be extradited to this country. He built a typical polyglot smuggling network in Latin America, according to Federal authorities.

Among those indicted as members of his ring were Este-

ban and Cesar Melchlore and Roberto and Eduardo Burns, two sets of brothers who had worked as freight handlers for Aerolineas Argentinas in Buenos Aires. They allegedly eased heroin shipments into the holds of planes scheduled for flights to Miami and New York.

At the United States end, Jaime Pereira, who is chief cargo agent for Aerolineas Argentinas in Los Angeles but who had worked in New York, allegedly met the shipments on arrival. According to agents who trailed him, Pereira was kept moving about the United States, depending on the destination of a particular shipment.

Elio Paolo Gigante, a Brazilian steward for Avianca who was arrested in Bogota, Colombia, in 1967 for smuggling drugs, allegedly served on occasion as a courier for the ring.

The reported involvement of airlines personnel in the case highlights a classic mode of smuggling, which is by no means confined to Aerolineas Argentinas and Avianca, according to narcotics authorities.

The principal receiver at the

American end, according to officials, was Roberto Arenas, a 57-year-old Cuban exile who served as a high priest in a voodoo cult known as Los Santos.

Agents who arrested him said his spacious apartment at 515 West 187th Street in Washington Heights was littered with chicken heads, candles, incense sticks and other voodoo paraphernalia.

Arenas, who reportedly used sect members as distributors, was said to consult the heavens for propitious times to bring in a plane load of heroin and then bless each newly ar-

rived shipment before sending it on.

Attired entirely in white, Arenas was yesterday arraigned before Federal Judge Jacob Mishler, who set bail at \$750,000. The cult leader was unable to post it.

The indictments, which cover the period 1965-1971, name as co-conspirators but not as defendants both Nicoli, the trafficker who was sentenced to 20 years last December, and Hovsep Chambian Caramian, a convicted Argentinian heroin smuggler who had jumped

\$100,000 bail in Miami last year but who was returned from Bolivia in a United States Air Force C-130.

It appeared that Nicoli and Caramian had either been persuaded or were being induced to testify against their former colleagues.

Of the 19 defendants, 5 were arrested in their own countries and will probably not be extradited; 4 were apprehended abroad and will be extradited; 6 were arrested in the United States and 4 were being sought.

In addition to Rossi, Arenas, the Melchiorre and the Burns brothers, Pereira and Gigante,

the following were indicted:

Francisco Toscanino, 38, Italian citizen, alleged lieutenant of Rossi; recently extradited from Brazil.
Francis Chitape, 57, Corsican, alleged Rossi lieutenant; arrested in Argentina.
Miguel Russo, 40, Italian citizen; arrested in Argentina.
Segundo Coronel, 36, Cuban-born Miami resident; alleged Arenas associate; arrested in Costa Rica.
Humberto Coronel, 52, brother of Segundo; held in \$200,000 bail in Miami.
Felice Bonelli, 40, Italian citizen; being sought.
Armando Nicolay, 43, Argentine; alleged Toscanino associate; being sought.
Giovanni Parisio, 48, Italian citizen; alleged courier; being sought.
Mariano Warden, 49, Argentine travel agent; alleged courier; being sought.
Mario Lobo, 47, Cuban-born Miami resident; alleged major dealer; held in \$200,000 bail in Miami.
Aurelio Martinez-Martinez, 31, Cuban-born Miami resident; alleged employee of Lobo; held in \$200,000 bail.

THE COMMONWEAL
16 March 1973

Fixing up America

The Politics of Heroin in Southeast Asia

ALFRED W. MCCOY

Harper & Row, \$10.95

The Opium Trail: Heroin and Imperialism

COMM. OF CONCERNED ASIAN SCHOLARS STUDY GROUP

New England Free Press (Boston), 25¢

STU COTEN

The prevailing wisdom in official circles and much of the media is that the heroin which passes through American syringes begins its journey on the Anatolian plateau of Turkey. There the raw opium is grown and sold to those who transport it to Marseilles. In Marseilles' infamous laboratories it is transformed into heroin and shipped to America. For many years, we are told, the governments of Turkey and France refused our earnest entreaties to join us in the fight against the heroin plague. Now, at long last, they have had a change of heart. Turkey is forcing its opium-growing peasants to abandon their crop and the French police, handcuffed for so long, have been unleashed against the chemists and smugglers. The heroin traffic, it would seem, is coming to an end. Like the war against inflation, the narcotics war has been won by the Nixon Administration. The boundless joy all good citizens must feel at this news is muted, however, by the reality that heroin grows more available as each day passes.

The contradictions inherent in the official view of the heroin trade provide a point of departure for the excellent, complementary studies by McCoy and the CCAS study group. Official wisdom to the contrary, 70% of the world's illicit opium comes, not from Turkey, but from the Golden Triangle in which Burma, Thailand, and Laos meet. Passing through laboratories in Hong Kong

and, increasingly, in Indochina, itself, much of this opium becomes the pure heroin from which American junkies receive their highly adulterated fixes. Behind this story of shifting markets and increasing demand lies the political economy of the heroin trade—several centuries of official complicity stretching from the Portuguese to the Central Intelligence Agency. As McCoy says, "Almost without exception it has been governmental bodies—not criminals—whose decisions have made the major changes in the international narcotics trade." As one might expect, the history of the trade is complex, twisting and turning as the best detective fiction. McCoy carries his readers through the maze with measured prose and superb research. The quality of the research is attested to by the inability of the CIA to debunk any of the book's important facts or conclusions (for their attempt see back issues of the *New York Review of Books*). It is a story which cannot be summarized in a few lines, although the CCAS study group does summarize it effectively without, of course, presenting the massive evidence disclosed by McCoy.

The Opium Trail complements McCoy's work by concerning itself with the human realities of addiction in the military and to the particular problems of women addicts. Concluding sections of each study discuss ways of coping with the problem. *The Opium Trail* focuses upon rehabilitation of addicts and McCoy, upon solutions to the narcotics trade as a whole. It is to McCoy's conclusions that we must turn because they run counter to much of what his book reveals.

Three solutions to the heroin plague are offered by McCoy: cure the addicts, stop the narcotics syndicates, or eliminate illicit opium production. He rejects the first two as being impractical and devotes his attention to the third solution. Illicit opium production can

be halted, he suggests, if the U.S. pays the opium farmers not to plant their crop, and applies economic and political pressure to the governments who now abet and profit from the trade.

Much of McCoy's excellent research has been devoted to uncovering the links between America's Indochinese allies and the opium trade. He demonstrates time and time again that America's anti-Communist crusade, and the alliances made in its name, have perpetuated the international narcotics traffic. Diem, Thieu, Ky, Khiem, Vang Pao, Ouane Rattikone—all of them, and many others, are deeply implicated. Further, McCoy has demonstrated that these leaders are not only involved in the trade, but in many cases it is vital to their power base. Hence, cessation of the illegal opium traffic would seriously jeopardize those governments we rely upon and have propped up for so long. The burden of the book is that whenever it has come to a choice between opium and anti-Communism the U.S. has opted for the latter and covered up the former. Despite a faint hope that things might change, McCoy's "solution" cannot stand against what he has revealed.

Only two successful cases of the suppression of opium farming are discussed at any length in McCoy's book. The Turks are forcing their opium farmers to give up their livelihood without regard, it seems, for the economic consequences of that act. The other example is the People's Republic of China, which produced the bulk of Asia's opium prior to the revolution. China suppressed opium production (almost overnight) through a massive social revolution which created other goals and means of attainment for its citizens. Without America's calculated interference, it is possible that Asia's revolutionaries could have solved their narcotics problems before it became ours.

Far East

WASHINGTON POST

18 March 1973

Downey: A CIA Agent in From the Cold

Recruit on Dual Mission Over China When Captured in 1952

By Thomas O'Toole
Washington Post Staff Writer

There were 30 of them there that day in 1951, 30 graduating Yale seniors all drawn to a small room on the New Haven campus by a recruitment notice on the bulletin board. One of them remembers that the notice was next to one put there by Procter & Gamble.

They were met by a middle-aged man dressed in the Ivy League flannels of the day, noteworthy for nothing except that he smoked a pipe and wore the Yale tie. He told the seniors that he's been a member of the OSS (Office of Strategic Services) during World War II and had operated behind German lines all during the Allied advance across Europe. He said he was now with the Central Intelligence Agency, which was then so new that none of the Yale seniors had heard of it.

The recruiter said he was at Yale to bring qualified bright young men into the CIA, which needed to grow because of the Chinese intervention into the Korean War. He said little about what qualified bright young men could expect in the CIA, leading several of the Yale seniors to press him on what they might have to do.

"Well, this is purely hypothetical," the recruiter said, "but we might expect you to parachute into China to help set up a communications apparatus, sort of get things started."

Hypothetical as it might have been at the time, that is almost what Jack Downey was doing in 1952 when he was captured by the Chinese in the foothills of the Manchurian mountains. Downey refused to discuss his mission when he was released two weeks ago after 20 years in a Chinese prison, but reliable sources say he was on a dual mission that fateful day when his C-47 aircraft was shot down by small arms fire inside China.

For years, the United States has disavowed Downey's mission and whereabouts the day he was caught. The State Department cover story has long been that Downey was a Defense Department employee, on an authorized flight from Seoul to Tokyo the day his plane was lost.

Downey's friends say he could have been released as early as 1955 if the United States had only acknowledged that he was a CIA agent. His friends call him a victim of the Cold War, a victim of the China Lobby that kept the United States friendly with Chiang Kai-shek and a victim of the virulent anti-Communism of the '50s and '60s.

Downey had been a CIA agent for more than a year, one of a dozen Yale graduates who had been recruited off the campus that day in 1951. He was participating in a tradition that grew through the fifties and on into the sixties, when Yale men tended to domi-

nate the ranks of the CIA.

Downey was stationed by the CIA in Japan, where he trained Taiwanese from Chiang Kai-shek's isolated island in the arts and crafts of the profession he'd been taught in Washington. Downey was considered one of the best young agents in the Far East. He was strong, durable, quickminded and a born leader of men.

That leadership was obvious even in Downey's early CIA days. His class of 40 was asked at the end of their training which man in the class they'd like to lead them or be with them in trouble spots. Thirty-one of the 40 chose Downey.

Most of that class wound up in South Korea or Japan, where they trained South Koreans and Taiwanese in espionage. The work was routine, but it had its moments of danger. One agent (also a Yale classmate of Downey's) remembers going aground in the fog off the coast of North Korea, where his "fishing junk" was dropping Korean agents into the north.

"We thought we were aground on an uninhabited island, where we'd be safe until the tide lifted us off," he said. "Then the fog began to lift and we discovered we were less than 100 yards from the main railroad line that moved men and supplies down from Vladivostok."

Nobody, but Downey knows how many missions he flew over China, but the men who knew him in the CIA assume he'd been there more than once. One former agent said there was never any need for Downey to be on the plane. He said that while Downey didn't defy regulations, he overstepped his participation in the mission by being on the plane.

"Jack flew with his men because he liked them and wanted to be with them when they jumped," the one-time agent said. "That was one reason he was there. The other one, I guess, was that it was a lovely moonlit night and Jack just wanted to see China."

The mission Downey flew is believed to have been a dual one. It is understood the C-47 was to pick up a Taiwanese agent who was already inside China. The plane was then to continue on to the mountains of Manchuria and parachute seven other Taiwanese into China to set up a communications base.

Downey's plane never made it to the mountains. Sources said the Chinese arrested the Taiwanese agent Downey was supposed to pick up before Downey's plane left for China. Sources also said the Chinese intercepted radio messages inbound to the Taiwanese agent, which alerted them to the time and place of the pick-up.

When Downey's plane flew into China, men and weapons were waiting for it. The C-47 is understood to have come in low and slow over the spot designated for the pickup when Chi-

nese troops opened fire on the plane.

The C-47 crash-landed in a Manchurian field, which explains how Downey is said to have walked away from the wreckage. All eleven people on board survived the crash. Besides Downey, there was CIA Agent Richard Fecteau, two Taiwanese pilots and the seven Taiwanese agents who were to be parachuted into the mountains.

The seven agents were executed by the Chinese. The two pilots may also have been shot, though there is a possibility they are still in a Chinese prison. Fecteau was sentenced to 20 years in prison, Downey to life. The different sentences were given because Downey was the mission chief, Fecteau a subordinate.

Downey has said he spent the first 10 months of imprisonment in leg irons. Harvard University Law Professor Jerome A. Cohen, a classmate of Downey's at Yale and today a specialist in Chinese law, said there was nothing unusual about Downey's treatment.

"All criminals were treated the same way in the People's Republic of China," Cohen said. "They soaked it to you from the start, then became lenient as you reformed, as you told the truth and as you repented about the truth."

Downey said he told his captors everything he knew in those first 10 months. He was quoted by newsmen interviewing him last week at a hospital in New Britain, Conn., where his mother is recuperating from a stroke: "I would say I revealed about every bit of information I had."

When he'd told the Chinese the details of his work, Downey was taken out of leg irons. But he was kept in solitary confinement for another 14 months, during which time he was not allowed to talk to anybody but his captors. Even that conversation was limited to chats with the jailer who supervised his 30 minutes of courtyard exercise every day.

Downey and Fecteau were moved out of solitary in a rural prison and into Peking's Grass Basket Prison in December 1954. There, they were put in with the crew of a B-29 that had been shot down over North Korea. They were also tried and convicted of espionage by a Chinese military tribunal, which announced the conviction to the world.

"We were elated at the conviction," remembers one of Downey's classmates who had gone into the CIA with him. "We'd never heard of his capture. We'd all given Jack up for dead."

The Korean war ended before the Chinese announced Downey's capture and conviction. When it ended, negotiations began between the United States and the People's Republic of China to arrange a prisoner exchange. A list of prisoners was swapped in Geneva in April 1954.

The United States listed 129 Chinese it had detained, mostly scientists and economists who'd been teaching or

working in the United States. The People's Republic listed 40 Americans, including the fliers Downey and Feeteau, with in Peking. Downey and Feeteau were not on the list.

"They weren't on the list because John Foster Dulles would not admit they worked for the CIA," said Harvard Law Professor Jerome Cohen, Downey's Yale classmate who was later to become a force behind his release. "We never admitted he was missing so they never admitted he was captured."

When the Chinese announced that they were holding Downey and Feeteau, Secretary of State Dulles refused to budge. The story that the State Department issued in 1954 was the story they stuck to until early this year. Downey and Feeteau worked for the U.S. Army. Their plane had gone off course between Korea and Japan and ended up over Manchuria.

The fliers who were in the Peking prison with Downey and Feeteau were released by the Chinese in August, 1955. Downey and Feeteau stayed behind, victims of the growing Cold War between China and the United States.

A witness to this is one of the fliers who met Downey and Feeteau in prison, a man named Steven Kiba, who teaches Spanish in a high school in Norton, Ohio.

"I asked a Chinese commissar if Downey and Feeteau would go home when we went home," Kiba said, "and he told me, 'The only way they will ever get out will be for your government to admit they are CIA agents.'"

Kiba told Washington Post special correspondent Bill Richards that he

reported this to the CIA when he was released. He said he passed along a message from Feeteau that the Chinese were aware of his and Downey's attempt to set up a CIA spy ring under the code name "Operation Samurail."

"The CIA man told me to forget it, forget about the whole period with Downey and Feeteau," Kiba said. "They said as far as they were concerned it never happened. They said it looked pretty hopeless for them and seemed to indicate they would never get out."

Harvard Law Professor Cohen is one who insists the Chinese tried to maintain some kind of contact with the United States over the Downey and Feeteau cases from 1954 to 1957. He said China tried to regularize relations with the United States during this period, but that the United States rejected China's moves because the United States did not want to undermine its relations with Chiang Kai-shek.

China made a last attempt at reconciliation in 1957, when Premier Chou En-lai offered to repatriate Downey and Feeteau if the United States would allow American newsmen to visit China. Dulles refused, declaring that if the United States were to let that happen it would be giving its approval to a regime that "practiced and trafficked in civil."

Downey and Feeteau were finally released when President Nixon chose to acknowledge their roles as CIA agents. He did it at a press conference just before presidential assistant Henry A.

Kissinger left on one of his trips to China. He did it in answer to the last question asked at the press conference, in a way that convinced Jack Downey's friends that the question was planted and the answer rehearsed.

Jack Downey emerged from his 20 years in prison looking and acting like a man who'd never been in prison, almost a symbol of the detente that now exists between the United States and China. Downey had two recreations in prison, reading and exercising. Together, they saved his sanity.

He came out of prison speaking Chinese and able to read and write Russian, which he learned from Russian cellmates and from the Russian novels his Chinese captors let him have. His friends say he is in excellent physical shape at the age of 42. He can run 10 miles, do 100 pushups and as many as 50 chinups. His weight is 190 pounds, a little less than it was when he wrestled and played varsity football for Yale.

Jack Downey is the last of the Yale class of 1951 to come in from the Cold War between the U.S. and China, almost a symbol of the last 20 years. The others who went into the CIA when the Korean war looked like an American disaster all left years ago. One is a freelance photographer in New York, another in an Asian scholar at Yale, a third runs a hosiery mill and a fourth a lobster-tail business in the Solomon Islands.

"We all got bored and disillusioned," one of them said the other day. "The bureaucracy, the paper work and the politicking got too stifling. That, and the times changed. So did we change."

WASHINGTON POST

19 March 1973

2 'Missing' U.S. Pilots Died Flying Downey Into China

By Thomas O'Toole
Washington Post Staff Writer

Two civilian American pilots who had been listed as missing on a flight from Korea to Japan in 1952 were killed piloting the plane that took CIA agents Jack Downey and Richard Feeteau into Communist Chinese hands when it was shot down deep inside China, it was learned yesterday.

The fliers were pilot Robert C. Snoddy and copilot Norman Schwartz. At the time of the crash, both men were employed by Civil Air Transport, an airline which flew covert air operations in the Far East for the Central Intelligence Agency during the Korean war.

A State Department official said Snoddy and Schwartz were on the plane with Downey and Feeteau when it crashed in Manchuria in late November, 1952. Downey and Feeteau survived and were taken prisoner by the Chinese. Feeteau was released in December, 1971, and Downey just two weeks ago.

"We have confirmed all this

in private conversations with Downey and Feeteau," the State Department official said. "We also have a bulletin to this effect from the New China News Agency in 1954, which we have as reference in our files."

The State Department's admission that Snoddy and Schwartz were pilots for Downey and Feeteau surprised even former CIA men who have kept up with the case because of their friendship with Downey. For years, they had believed that the plane had been operated by Chinese Nationalists flying for Chiang Kai-shek.

For the last 20 years, the State Department has told the families of Snoddy and Schwartz that the two fliers were lost when their civilian cargo plane went down at sea on a flight from Korea to Japan. The State Department said that an "extensive search" had been made for the two fliers, but that they were "presumed dead."

The first hint the fliers' families had that this might not be the whole story came in 1954 when the Chinese an-

nounced the capture and conviction of Downey and Feeteau, who the Chinese said were caught when their plane was forced down attempting to supply a Chinese Nationalist spy ring in the mountains of Manchuria.

A year earlier, Snoddy's mother had turned in a small life insurance policy on her son that he had begun payments on when he was a teenage newboy in Roseburg, Ore., where the Snoddys lived.

The policy was paid and returned with a copy of his flight plan the day he and Schwartz were said to have been killed. The flight plan for his C-47 aircraft gave Seoul as his departure point and Tokyo as his destination. It also listed as passengers on the plane J. Downey and R. Feeteau, who were described as Department of the Army civilian employees.

"When we heard a year later that Downey and Feeteau were prisoners in China we didn't know what to think," said Snoddy's sister,

Mrs. John Boss, who today lives in Creswell, Ore. "Of course, all we could think of was that Robert and Norman (Schwartz) might be alive too."

Mrs. Boss said she and her mother wrote to then Sen. Wayne Morse of Oregon asking him for help in finding out what happened to Snoddy. Morse wrote the Snoddy family saying he would pursue it further, but the Snoddys heard nothing more from the State Department.

"We still don't have anything in writing," Mrs. Boss said yesterday in a telephone interview. "We really think we're owed an explanation of what happened after all these years."

Oregon Republicans Sen. Mark Hatfield and Rep. John Dellenback wrote to Secretary of State William P. Rogers last Friday, and asked:

"Are Snoddy and Schwartz dead? If so, how and where did they die? Were they serving their country as employees of the U.S. government at the time? If they were, does the government have any legal or moral obligations to the families of these men since they were acting under the direction of government employees?"

Sunday, March 11, 1973 THE WASHINGTON POST

Portrait: A Man Left Out in the Cold

By Nancy L. Ross

Four years ago blazing headlines announced China's top-ranking diplomat had defected to the West and requested political asylum in the United States.

Liao Ho-shu, 46, chargé d'affaires at the Chinese mission in The Hague, was reported at the time to head the Chinese spy network in Europe. His defection was considered the West's most important intelligence coup in years.

Moscow radio immediately dubbed him "Peking's James Bond." Taiwan cabled Washington it would give him a hero's welcome. Peking demanded his return, charging the U.S. had kidnapped him.

When we refused, the Chinese canceled the upcoming session of Sino-American ambassadorial talks in Warsaw, our only official channel of communication at that time. Secretary of State William P. Rogers expressed formal diplomatic "regret," and that was the end of contacts until January, 1970. The resumption eventually led first to Henry Kissinger's and eventually to President Nixon's visit a year ago to the People's Republic of China.

Two months before that historic trip, the White House received a letter from Liao Ho-shu. He wrote he could not get used to the American way of life, had "made a mistake" in defecting and asked permission to return to mainland China. The letter was turned over to the State Department for routine processing.

In May Liao was on his way home via the Chinese Embassy in Ottawa, Paris and Shanghai. This time there were no headlines. His departure remained unknown to the public at large until January of this year when a succinct wire dispatch from Hong Kong quoted a local magazine as saying he had returned to the PRC. He disappeared behind the Bamboo Curtain like a pebble in a pond.

What happened to make the defector redefect? Did Liao—an embarrassing reminder of the cold war—become a sacrificial lamb on the Nixon-Mao altar of peace and friendship? Was this man, the product of a totalitarian society, unable to cope with the unregimented life in a democracy?

Was he the pawn in the ideological match between resident Chinese here dedicated to Taiwan and those favoring the motherland? Or was he merely the casualty of extended exile—deprived of family and meaningful opportunity for career advancement, physically ill and mentally unbalanced?

Is it possible he was a double agent—or was he, in fact, no spy at all?

The following is an attempt to reconstruct the life of one Chinese defector in the United States, from the time he disappeared from the headlines until he reappeared for one last brief instant.

Since Liao left no known diary, his story derives from the comments of those few Americans and Chinese whose paths he crossed. Many of the former were reluctant to talk, either because of their involvement with the CIA or with mental hospitals and patients. Some of the latter gave conflicting accounts, depending—one suspects—on their own political loyalties. The CIA at first refused comment, but later confirmed the essential elements of this portrait.

The story of intrigue and incipient insanity that is Liao Ho-shu's began in what is now Wuhan, a city in the central province of Hubei, where he was born in 1923. Little is known here of his formative years except that he studied economics at the University of Peking, was assigned to the

Foreign Ministry in 1951 and joined the Communist Party two years later.

He married a pediatrician and had two children. He went to The Hague in 1964. Consistent with P.R.C. practices at that time, his wife and children, then aged 4 and 9, were not

allowed to accompany him. Liao remained there without returning home throughout the Cultural Revolution, whereas nearly all Chinese ambassadors were summoned home for reeducation.

In 1965 a sensational incident occurred at a Chinese legation building in The Hague. A visiting rocket technician, Hsu Tzu-tai, was snatched from a hospital X-ray table, where he had been taken after either falling from a window trying to defect or after foul play. Liao later told the CIA he was one of the kidnappers. A day later the engineer died at the mission.

Peking's news agency said at the time Hsu had passed information to the Central Intelligence Agency in exchange for a promise of asylum. The Netherlands demanded the recall of the chargé d'affaires, Li En-chiu and another diplomat. Liao, who then became chargé and the highest ranking Chinese diplomat left in Europe, later learned his ex-colleagues were harshly and even physically attacked by the Red Guards when they returned to China.

Red Guard diplomats soon were sent to The Hague mission. The younger officials tried to take over his job, Liao told the CIA, accusing him of being a capitalist. "They told me it was bourgeois to raise flowers, that I should raise vegetables instead," Liao later recalled.

One day in late 1968 a Chinese ship arrived in Rotterdam. When his revolutionary colleagues suggested Liao send his baggage to the ship, he sensed he was about to be Shanghaied, the intelligence sources say. Fearing the same fate as his predecessors once back in Peking, he turned himself in to Dutch police headquarters on Jan. 24, 1969, at 4:30 a.m., wearing only pajamas and a raincoat.

Blindfolded the Chinese diplomats who were trying to find Liao, Dutch security officials turned him over to American authorities who promptly flew him to this country. The first official word that he had arrived here came on Feb. 4 when State Department spokesman Robert McCloskey announced that Liao's request for political asylum in the United States was "under consideration."

A few days later Peking's Foreign Ministry charged the U.S. and the Dutch governments with "deliberately engineering" Liao's escape and demanded the "traitor's" return. (This marked the first time since the Korean war that the Chinese had issued a public protest against the defection of one of their officials. The outcry fueled the fire of suspicion here that Liao was indeed the chief of Chinese intelligence operations in Europe.

If Liao were not sent back, Peking warned of "grave consequences." These proved to be cancellation of the Sino-American talks, which were scheduled to resume Feb. 20 after being suspended for 13 months.

Peking accused Washington of "plotting" to send Liao to Taiwan "with a view to creating further anti-China incidents."

Of course, all was forgiven nearly a year later when the machinery was put in motion to end a quarter century of

isolation between the two super powers. Clearly the Liao affair was a dead issue; the man Liao was not, however.

Though dubbed "Peking's James Bond" Liao certainly bore no physical or social resemblance to Ian Fleming's hero. Tall for a Chinese, he was thin, balding, and wore horn-rimmed glasses.

"He was the least outgoing person I've ever known," recalled Dr. Michael J. McCaskey, head of the Chinese-Japanese language department at Georgetown University. The two first met in August 1969 when a government official brought Liao around to work as a "casual laborer" (\$1.80 an hour) on a National Defense Language Institute project to revise basic Chinese language courses for the military.

Liao's existence for those months before he "surfaced" at the university in August, can be reconstructed only piecemeal. He almost never talked about his first months in this country and for a while even declined to let his colleagues know where he was living. (The university listed the department of Chinese as his mailing address). He went to elaborate pains to get off the Wisconsin Avenue bus a few blocks away from his apartment.

Though he habitually refused offers of a lift home, a driving rain once persuaded him to accept. Even then he insisted on getting out of the car before reaching his building and walked the rest of the way.

Come September he did list his address on university records as 2702 Wisconsin Ave., although he did not include the apartment number. The janitor at the Sherry Hall apartments, Willy Barnes, at first denied ever seeing the tall, lanky Chinese. Later, when told Liao's apartment number, 605, Barnes recalled the Chinese did indeed live in the one-bedroom unit—"although he would be gone sometimes for as long as a month at a time." Three or four other men with their own keys used the apartment as well by day, he said, though he knew only one of them.

Apartment 605 was rented from April 1968 to January 1970 in the name of John F. Glonfriddo, the name Barnes recalled in connection with 605. Glonfriddo, a lawyer with an office on K Street and a home in Vienna, Va., signed the lease.

When asked in an interview about Liao and the apartment, he replied he had no knowledge of either. Still, he admitted it was possible his firm had rented the apartment, following its custom, for out of town guests "at times like the Cherry Blossom Festival."

A couple of days later, after checking his file, Glonfriddo found a slip of paper with the name of George Neagoy. Though he had no record of payment he thought he had sublet the apartment to Neagoy, whom he described as a one-time client for whom he thought he had drawn up a will. Neagoy told him he needed the apartment for out-of-town relatives.

Neagoy, who lives in Chevy Chase, is an employee of the CIA.

The two apartments adjoining 605 were at that time rented to a Soviet diplomat and a Defense Department intelligence officer, causing a rental agent for the Sherry Hall Apartments to joke, "One-half of the building was foreigners and the other half, the CIA watching them."

Interrogation led the CIA, at least, to conclude that Liao was no master

spy, simply a middle echelon diplomat. It is unresolved whether even so he was able to supply U.S. authorities with any worthwhile information.

Why then had some people thought he was a spy in the first place? For one thing, the climate of mutual suspicion and hostility coupled with a dearth of knowledge of events inside China sufficed to make the intelligence community jump at anything when defectors were as scarce as dragons' teeth. For another, a Chinese diplomat of lesser rank than Liao, who defected from the embassy in Damascus in 1966, had told Washington that Peking was anxious to avoid becoming directly entangled in the Vietnam war.

Of all those questioned about Liao, not one in retrospect thought he could have been a master spy. "His general indecisiveness made him unsuited for positions of high command and his literal-minded openness made him unsuited for political intrigue," commented one of his closest American acquaintances. Still, the idea that the CIA even suspected he was a high-ranking agent, said a Chinese friend, was one reason Liao disliked America.

Having finished its questioning, the U.S. government began the process of disengagement. The defector was given a monthly allowance, believed to be \$300, a permanent resident's visa, a Social Security card and a job.

Liao's job at Georgetown was to copy in long hand elementary Chinese lessons, a monotonous, mechanical assignment he performed with much grumbling. He made it obvious he considered this work beneath him yet declined to accept any more interesting task.

"He wanted everything all at once," recalled Dr. McCaskey, "but didn't know how to do anything. His knowledge of economics was outdated. He wanted to make a career for himself—anything but diplomacy because he was tired of governments. He kept mentioning he had gone to talk to 'the representative of the U.S. government' (Neagoy) about a permanent job. But nothing ever came of it."

Had the CIA indeed led him to believe it would furnish him a good position as a reward for defection and information and then defaulted when he proved uninteresting?

The CIA denied any "deal" with Liao, but told him it was legally responsible for his welfare while he was an alien in the U.S.A.

"I believe he saw himself in the role of Confucian sage, rejected by an emperor who has lost the Mandate of Heaven," wrote Dr. D. Graham Stuart, a Georgetown University professor of linguistics now on sabbatical in Holland.

At Dr. Stuart's urging Liao enrolled in September 1969 in the university's School of Languages and Linguistics as a candidate for an M.A. in Chinese. However, due to his poor command of English, Liao was unable to complete the required courses in phonetics and phonemes given in that language. He tried the course at least twice more, withdrawing each time after a few weeks. He abandoned his effort finally in February 1970.

Meanwhile he had enrolled the previous month in a 10-week course in the school's English as a Foreign Language division, intermediate level. He received a B plus in the course, the only one he ever finished. In April he returned to his dull copying job, remaining through September. He refused a modest raise to \$3 an hour, calling himself unworthy of it, yet re-

tained a certain arrogance about his expectations.

His primary concern throughout that period continued to be finding a good job. This led him several times to the brink of accepting employment offered by the Nationalist Chinese. Besides work, he was also seeking a new wife and asked Chinese acquaintances if anyone in Taiwan would marry him if he went there. "He was very lonely," said McCaskey, "although he never wanted to meet any women here."

From the moment he set foot in this country, the Taiwan government had tried to recruit him. In the Chinese lexicon, a defector from Communism is presumed friendly to the Chiang Kai-shek regime. Ku Cheng-kang—the man in Taipei in charge of defectors, or as he is officially titled, president of the Free China Relief Association—sent a cable to the Chinese Embassy in Washington inviting Liao to visit Taiwan. Pressure was put on then-Ambassador Chow Shu-kai, now Taipei's Minister without Portfolio, to influence Liao, who was open to the idea.

Six months or so later, after the CIA interrogation was over, Liao and Chow finally met. The meeting was arranged through Chiang Te-cheng, a junior high school classmate of Liao's and now assistant manager of the (Nationalist) Chinese Information Service in New York. Another college friend of Liao's, a former Washington correspondent for a Taiwan paper, Wang Yu-hsu, now studying at Georgetown, also tried to help Liao decide whether to go to Taiwan.

According to them, Liao attended a National Day reception and several banquets at the embassy—where Wang's wife works—and had "intimate and friendly conversations" with Ambassador Chow. Liao was offered a \$300 a month "sweatshop" job with the Chinese Merchants Association, a shipping company in New York's Chinatown that is owned by the Republic of China.

One of the conditions was that he would first have to visit Taiwan. Wang prepared to accompany Liao to Taipei, but at the last minute Liao balked. This was to happen several times until the embarrassed Nationalists gave up on luring Liao, intelligence sources said.

The reasons for his refusal were never clear. Once, for example, he declined at the last moment to sign the regulation Internal Revenue Service form stating he, an alien, had paid his taxes in full. Because the statement is commonly known as a "sailing form" Liao refused to sign, lest he be "shipped" out instead of being sent by plane. A week of explanation failed to convince him.

Then, too, Liao must have known that if he went to Taiwan, it would rule out any remaining chance of returning to the mainland, home and family, given the enmity between the two Chinas at that time.

According to Henry Liu, a Chinese journalist in the Washington area, who wrote under a pseudonym the article on Liao for the Hong Kong magazine North-South Pole, Ambassador Chow gave Liao three guarantees in exchange for agreeing to visit Taiwan: (1) he could return to the United States of his own free will; (2) the Republic of China would support him financially; and (3) they would not use him as a propaganda tool.

Liu points out that Liao must have been aware that two previous defe-

tors, famed violinist Ma Sitson and diplomat Chen Pal, had also agreed to such a deal. But when their plane arrived in Tokyo airport, Taipei put out a statement on their behalf without consulting them.

And others say Liao, as usual, was just unable to make a decision.

Whether due to his experiences at the hands of the CIA and Nationalist Chinese, or to his loneliness and inability to cope with a strange environment, or to his ingrained habits as a long-time Communist, Liao became extremely suspicious and distrustful of everyone. He thought everyone worked for the Chinese government—American, mainland or Taiwan—and seemed a little disappointed to find out his Georgetown colleagues were just ordinary people, McCaskey said.

Once Liao received a piece of radical student literature urging participation in a political demonstration. "I had the hardest time trying to convince him the flyers were sent to all (Georgetown) grad students; that they didn't mean to single him out in particular," McCaskey reminisced.

Liao imagined colleagues joking about him. He was disturbed by police sirens during his nights of insomnia. A televised broadcast of July 4 fireworks sent him panicky into the street, sure someone was shooting at him. He hailed a taxi and drove around for hours, even going to Dulles Airport with some vague idea of fleeing, before he calmed down and returned home at 3 a.m.

Passionately secretive, he refused all publicity. He continually looked over his shoulder as he walked in the park, convinced someone was following him. Indeed, he was under surveillance, perhaps out of humanitarian more than political reasons. The CIA kept an eye on Liao even after he moved from Wisconsin Avenue to his own tiny efficiency apartment at 1717 R St. NW in early 1970.

Though he had made a few friends in the American and Chinese communities early in the game, he began to turn them away. "Don't bother me," he shouted at colleagues who offered to visit. He had only one regular Chinese male visitor, Wang, and, of course, Neagoy.

In the past he occasionally went to restaurants. Now he would accept invitations to have a northern Chinese dinner—he disliked American food except for milk—at friends' homes, and then not show up. He preferred to eat out of moldy cans, alone.

In the fall of 1970 Liao began to neglect his appearance badly. He fancied his food was poisoned. He became emaciated, stooped, his teeth abscessed, and he refused to have a sty treated. "It was almost like someone going through a religious crisis, doing penance by fasting and abstinence. By the strictest ethical conduct, he distanced himself from common men who are less righteous, less literally truthful," a Georgetown mentor concluded.

Alarmed he would let himself die of starvation or would commit suicide, Liao's CIA contact took him to a psychiatrist. He was sent to the psychiatric ward of the Washington Hospital Center Nov. 18, 1970, and three weeks later transferred to D.C. General's ward.

The psychiatrist, who asked his name not be used because of his connection with the CIA, diagnosed "as se-

vere a case of depression as you would want to see. I've seen a lot of schizoids like that; they can't talk to people and feel alone in a hostile world."

One sign of his illness, the doctor said, was his refusal to doff his overcoat while indoors.

The doctor was unable to find out anything about Liao's past, but said it was conceivable he had had such a breakdown before.

In accordance with medico-legal procedure, a hearing to commit him was held Jan. 23, 1971. Many Chinese-American friends testified on Liao's behalf. The proceedings were dropped when the patient was discharged Feb. 11 by doctors who found him "improved." Strangely enough, McCaskey remembered, that democratic process persuaded Liao for the first time that not everyone was involved in a conspiracy against him. He even asked upon leaving D.C. General if he would be allowed to return if he wished.

Liao went to live in a halfway house on Connecticut Avenue for discharged psychiatric patients. Though he lived there until October of that year he remained generally uncommunicative with the other residents. He did not like eating with them. And although the kitchen is open 24 hours a day, he did not feed himself either, because he disdained a house rule requiring a person to clean up after himself.

During that period he worked on special projects for Georgetown's Dr. Stuart. His task consisted largely of running down references in scientific journals on linguistics problems, although he also did some independent research.

"While working for me he gathered more than 800 separate reference items in six different languages from a score or so different libraries," wrote Dr. Stuart. "I paid him the going rate for student help. . . . Although he rapidly made himself indispensable to me in my work, he was constantly suspicious that I was really only making work for him. He resigned saying that he could not take money for doing tasks that any 14-year-old boy could do."

The halfway house frowns on residents without jobs, and besides, Liao was not happy there. Determined not to accept what he considered charity, Liao moved in October, 1971 to an \$18-a-week boarding house at 927 Massachusetts Ave. NW, the edge of Washington's Chinatown. The grim old brownstone, curtains hung between its once magnificent dark woodwork doors to give a modicum of privacy, reeks of stale food and downtrodden humanity. Liao was so furtive, it was two months before the CIA caught up with him there.

The managers, several generations of the Lee Yow family, chatted excitedly when told about the exotic past of their boarder. He never talked to anyone, except to say hello to the children, they said. His only visitor was the director of the halfway house who came twice.

He had no job, yet seemed to be do-

ing "some texts for an embassy" on his battered typewriter. He went out every afternoon for a walk. One day in May he left without saying goodbye . . . or taking his meager belongings.

This marked the resolution of the Liao story, the final phase of which began in December 1971. He was at the bottom of a downward spiral, forsaken he thought by the U.S. government and the Nationalist Chinese, alienated from his few friends, unable to get a decent job, separated without news of his family in Peking, of no use to anyone. His thoughts turned to home.

That dark winter he composed a letter to President Nixon. In it he expressed his gratitude, but said he just could not get used to the American way of life or learn enough English. He wrote, "I love my country," and asked for permission to return to the People's Republic of China. He admitted he had made a mistake in defecting and wanted to correct it although he knew that if he went back he would go on trial for treason. He also expressed fear of dying far from his motherland.

The letter was turned over to the State Department which told Liao he was free to return to China. "No one tried to dissuade him," a spokesman recalled. Still Liao hesitated. "He seemed to be asking us to deport him. He wanted us to contact the (Communist) Chinese for him. We told him to contact the embassy in Ottawa."

In February 1972 Liao wrote to U.N. Ambassador Huang Hua in New York, signifying his desire to return. Peking took its time deciding what to do with the defector who wanted to come home. Finally, permission granted, Liao flew to Ottawa in May, then on to Shanghai. Stopping in Paris en route, Liao penned post cards to the boarding house family and a few other friends, telling them he was on his way to China.

That was the first his acquaintances here knew of his decision to return—and the last they ever heard of him. "It was always in the back of my mind he was playing a double game," McCaskey mused. "But if he did, it was the most fantastic game I've ever seen." There were no headlines in either the Chinese or American press. "We weren't going to publicize it," said the State Department official. "It could have been misconstrued as a deal whereby we forced him to go back."

In the end Liao Ho-shu was a victim of cultural shock in America as well as the Cultural Revolution in China.

His isolation left him mentally broken. His only sense of importance derived from the attention paid him by "the representative of the U.S. Government." The irony of this is that—what ever the CIA first thought—Liao was not the superspy of the headlines—but in all likelihood a small fish left stranded on the shoals of international politics.

WASHINGTON STAR

15 March 1973

CROSBY S. NOYES

Vietnam Needs Peace - and Money

SAIGON — Compared to the cost of fighting the war, the cost of putting this country back on its feet again will be peanuts. But given the mood of the American Congress, the peanuts promise to be hard to come by.

They also will be essential. The two things that South Vietnam needs now are peace and modest amounts of foreign assistance to repair the damage of war. But ironically, as the prospects for peace improve, the availability of foreign aid—at least from the United States—is becoming more problematical.

The American aid program in South Vietnam already is in a tight bind. Congress recently narrowly approved continuing authority for the program for the rest of the present fiscal year at the yearly rate of \$323 million, compared to \$585 million asked by the AID mission here. Prospects for the coming fiscal year are not much brighter, with requested funds projected at \$485 million.

The money is used largely to finance essential commercial imports and a modest AID project program. In addition, there are food imports of about \$150 million a year under the Agriculture

Department's PL 480 program.

The transition from war to peace will not be easy for Vietnam. Already the departure of American troops has cost the country dearly in essential dollar earnings. In 1971, South Vietnam earned \$403 million from the American military presence. The projection for this year is \$112 million. Exchange reserves, already dangerously low, are expected to fall another \$50 million in the course of the year.

Altogether, the outlook is for a very severe aid squeeze in the latter part of this year. There is a hope that the Japanese, who export about \$85 to \$90 million a year in consumer goods to South Vietnam, may be persuaded to pick up the tab with a commercial import program of their own.

Nevertheless, at present levels of foreign aid, the prospect for Vietnam is one of gradually declining living standards. Reconstruction and development of the country will be impossible, with all that that implies for the political future of South Vietnam's 18.7 million people.

What is needed, according to AID officials here, is a program of about \$3 to \$3.5 billion

spread over a five-year period. With that kind of help, the economic outlook changes from fairly dismal to positively dazzling.

For South Vietnam is a potentially rich country of industrious and ingenious people. President Nguyen Van Thieu talks hopefully of an economic boom here comparable to that which has taken place in South Korea and Taiwan. American economists say that, given peace and outside help, they ought to be able to do a good deal better than that within a few years.

The beginning undoubtedly will be the hardest part. The first task will be the resettlement of South Vietnam's 600,000 refugees, which often will mean the rebuilding of entire villages and hamlets destroyed in the war. Thousands of acres of abandoned farmlands will have to be reclaimed and made productive again.

After the years of war, South Vietnam is massively under-capitalized. Much of the country's infrastructure, including secondary roads, railroads, canals, dikes and irrigation projects, have fallen into disrepair. Industrial development, begun in the early 1960s, has been neglect-

ed because of mounting military needs.

But, given peace and foreign capital investment that is certain to follow in its wake, the prospects for rapid development are excellent. The cement and textile industries could be quickly quadrupled in size, eliminating a major drain of foreign exchange. A modernized fishing industry could provide an important source of income.

Although between 25 and 30 percent of South Vietnam's forests were severely damaged by defoliants during the war, the country still has ample resources for a large-scale export of forestry products, beginning with logs and going on to the fabrication of plywood and veneers. So far as agriculture is concerned, it is estimated that rice production in the delta south of Saigon can be tripled, making South Vietnam once again an important rice exporter.

The country's mineral resources still are largely unexplored, but promising surveys have been made for offshore oil, with drilling hopefully expected to start next year. Vietnam's potential for tourism is virtually unlimited, with the country situated squarely in the middle of the major global air routes.

All that is needed is peace and a little money. It is utterly incomprehensible that a nation which has spent close to \$100 billion to achieve the prospect of peace should balk at shelling out \$3 billion over five years to get the payoff. Given the prospects here, it probably is the best investment that any country, or any group of countries, could make.

on Capitol Hill.

The selling process has already begun on a low key, with Mr. Kissinger and Secretary of State William P. Rogers—as well as White House liaison aides with Congress—talking to key members of the Senate and House of Representatives.

There has also been some talk of organizing citizens' groups to bring pressure on Congress.

But the natural constituency for an aid program is the group of Democratic liberals, whose attitudes toward Mr. Nixon, never very favorable, have been embittered by his cutbacks in social programs and his tough positions on such issues as amnesty and capital punishment.

For the moment, the President shows no signs of abandoning that tough line in the face of complaints in Congress about relations with the White House.

NEW YORK TIMES

12 March 1973

TERMS ON U. S. AID TO HANOI DEPICTED

By R. W. APPLE Jr.

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, March 11 — The White House will ask Congress to approve postwar aid to North Vietnam only if Hanoi begins living up to its part of the Paris agreement, Administration sources said this weekend.

Specifically, one well-placed source said, the Administration will go ahead with the request only if the reports of North Vietnamese infiltration into the South cease and only if North Vietnamese troops in Laos are withdrawn.

So far, according to American officials, Hanoi has met neither of these requirements of the cease-fire agreement.

No decision on whether to press forward with the controversial program will be made until middle or late May, the sources said. That would be six weeks after the deadline for the withdrawal of all American

troops from South Vietnam and the release of all American prisoners of war.

The postwar aid plan is in considerable trouble on Capitol Hill even before its presentation. One Senator said recently he thought that no more than 10 of his colleagues were prepared to support it, and that such Senators as Hubert H. Humphrey of Minnesota and George McGovern of South Dakota, who once supported it, had lately soured on the idea.

Nonetheless, the sources said, the Administration is prepared to fight hard for postwar aid. One White House staff member said that the President has "a gut commitment to this and is prepared to make a hell of a fight."

Whether he does or not will apparently depend entirely on the North Vietnamese. It is believed that Henry A. Kissinger, the President's adviser on national security, made that point clear to the North Vietnamese leaders during his visit to Hanoi last month.

"We can't very well ask Congress to vote money now," said an official who has given considerable thought to the problem, "because we'd seem to be trying to buy the freedom of the P.O.W.'s. We can't ask them to vote it to finance a continuing war effort in May."

"It's not only a question of

Congress's unwillingness to pay them to fight South Vietnam," the official continued. "We don't like the idea either."

Mr. Kissinger stated the rationale for aid on his return from North Vietnam last month. Without it, he said, Hanoi's leaders, who have known only guerrilla struggle and war, will be far less likely to become responsible participants in a more peaceful world.

The Administration is prepared to allocate, from the military and foreign-aid budgets, several hundred million dollars a year for aid to North Vietnam. The subject will first be explored by a joint economic commission, the creation of which was announced by Hanoi and Washington last week.

Administration experts, including those at the Pentagon and State Department, are uncertain whether North Vietnam will meet the two conditions. A few of them believe that a struggle is taking place within the North Vietnamese leadership on this question.

To American policymakers, the question is crucial because they think that the Saigon Government's chances for survival would be gravely undermined by infiltration and because they think that the cease-fire in Laos can work only if the North Vietnamese pull out.

Assuming that North Vietnam meets these conditions, the Administration will be faced with a huge selling job

LOS ANGELES TIMES

6 March 73

The Reasoning Behind Aid to North Vietnam

BY MAX LERNER

NEW YORK—It isn't hard to understand why the hottest topic of the day in Washington is that of U.S. aid to Hanoi. Some liberals are asking why President Nixon plumps for humanitarian projects abroad when he is slashing humanitarian projects at home. Some conservatives ask why the United States should pay to rebuild the cities and industries of the people who killed its soldiers. Both questions back a strong charge of emotional dynamite.

President Nixon has deployed his strongest guns to get congressional assent. Secretary of State Rogers talks mostly to the moderates, about making a "good investment" to turn Hanoi "inward" to reconstruction. Henry A. Kissinger used his press conference for an appeal aimed mainly at liberals. And Mr. Nixon himself, in South Carolina, carried the campaign to conservatives of both parties.

Even the dramatic diplomatic recognition between China and the United States—for that is what the new "liaison offices" amount to—failed to overshadow the aid issue. At his press briefing, Kissinger reserved his best prose and his peroration for aid to Hanoi.

Obviously the Hanoi leaders knew about the U.S. Constitution and its quaint idea that the President doesn't have sole power and can't hand out money unless Congress goes along. Yet just as certainly they must have been assured in the peace talks that Mr. Nixon would do his damndest in the end to get the appropriation through and, having witnessed a four-year display of Mr. Nixon's resourcefulness, maneuvers and sheer will, they must have concluded that his damndest would be pretty good.

WASHINGTON POST

13 March 1973

Civilian POW Had Pilot Fly Him to N. Viet Beach

United Press International

The State Department yesterday made public the name of an American civilian who apparently had himself flown to a beach in North Vietnam more than two years ago and was captured as a prisoner of war.

The mysterious civilian, Bobby Joe Keesee, is among the 108 POWs to be set free by the North Vietnamese Wednesday.

A State Department spokesman said Keesee's name was on the list of POWs initially identified by Hanoi Jan. 27, but

that it had not been made public before because the State Department had no idea who the man was or what he was doing in North Vietnam until "very recently."

"It's one of the stranger stories of the year," the spokesman said. "To tell the truth, we're anxious to get him back here and ask him about it ourselves."

State Department sources said North Vietnam had listed Keesee as a military POW, but that the U.S. armed forces had no record of him. Nor did the State Department have any

They probably also reserved a thought to themselves — namely, that if Mr. Nixon didn't prove strong or willing enough to carry through his commitment, they in turn might balk at theirs. The result could be a breakdown of the complex and fragile peace machinery. Thus the cease-fire would be aborted and no real peace would be born. In that sense, my own guess is that the aid provision is indeed crucial to the peace.

Clearly, it is to Kissinger, but in his own sense. Note how he defines the issue. There are four things, he says, that the aid provision is not. It is not a condition of the cease-fire agreement, hence it is not reparations. It is not a way of getting Hanoi to maintain the peace, hence it is not a ransom. It is definitely not a simple handout. Nor is it to be seen on humanitarian grounds.

What then is it? At this point, Kissinger goes psychological on us. Remember that for a generation the Hanoi leaders have been either in prison or fighting. They have had no experience with normal economic and diplomatic relations, especially with the West. Give them a chance, he says, to establish a new nonfighting, peaceful habit. It might take. They might get used to it, might even get to like it.

It is an interesting approach, presented by Kissinger in more diplomatic language than mine, but essentially psychological. The young have talked recently about life-styles. Give the Hanoi leaders, Kissinger says, a chance to establish a new life-style.

I agree with the conclusion, but I feel that Kissinger has given it a

garment that is too cute and artful. The real life-style of the Hanoi leaders is revolutionary. After what has happened, they won't change it in the matter of two or three years.

It took the Russian and Chinese leaders far longer before they would agree to coexistence with the West, and they have the added motivation of hating each other more virulently than they hate Americans.

The real issue comes down to money and power. Hanoi, Kissinger says, will have other reasons for living up to the cease-fire, including presumably the fear that American power may reenter Southeast Asia. True. Yet the image of the \$2.5 billion—added to those other reasons—will help mightily. Don't call this ransom; call it an added sweetener.

Curiously, it is the more embattled liberals in the Senate and the media and universities who will oppose the commitment most bitterly. They have already begun to attack the peace agreement, as anyone can deduce from some of the drearier passages in the left journals.

The antiwar movement has been undercut by the peace, says one writer, who asks plaintively what will hold the movement together now. The peace settlement is impossible, says another; it is antilife. The peace was all a trick, says a third. It is intended as the start of a third Indochina war; President Nixon had to get out in order to get in.

What they don't know is that this kind of attack helps Mr. Nixon's hard-line image with the doubters who would otherwise think he has gone soft on communism, and may even achieve that paradox of our time: economic help for the Communist enemy by a conservative Republican President.

record of a civilian by that name anywhere in Southeast Asia.

"We went back through file after file," a spokesman said. "Finally, we ran across a report attributed to a Thai pilot who said that in September of 1970 he either flew or was caused to fly an American civilian to North Vietnam."

"Apparently they put him down on a beach in North Vietnam."

"At the time we first saw that report we discounted it because it was so far out. We didn't think there was anything to it, but apparently there was."

Just what happened to Keesee after he was set down on

the beach remains—for the time at least—a mystery.

"We have no record of his even being in Thailand, much less North Vietnam," the spokesman said.

Asked if Keesee was attached to the Central Intelligence Agency, the spokesman: "No. Mr. Keesee is, as far as we can tell, a totally private individual. He was apparently acting on his own."

Keesee originally lived in Amarillo, Tex. His parents have since moved elsewhere in the Southwest and have requested the State Department not to make public their address because of the bizarre circumstances surrounding their son's adventure.

THE NEW YORK TIMES, SATURDAY, MARCH 10, 1973

U.S. and Cambodia: At a Critical Crossroad

By HENRY KAMM
Special to The New York Times

PHNOM PENH, Cambodia, March 8 — The United States has come to a critical juncture in its relationship with Cambodia. In the only country in Indochina that remains fully at war, and where American planes carry out daily bombing raids, its policy has been stalemated by both "friend" and "foe." North Vietnam has dashed American hopes that it will extend to Cambodia the scaling down of the war in South Vietnam and Laos.

And the Phnom Penh Government appears to have killed American efforts to share leadership with the man the United States considers best qualified to guide Cambodia out of the war and reverse the Government's alarming military and political decline.

As a result, the United States faces the indefinite continuation of a war in which it participates directly under the stewardship of a Government in which it has little confidence. And that Government depends for its survival entirely on American military and economic assistance, which amounts to about \$200-million a year in addition to the cost of American air support.

The United States must decide whether to continue its present policy or proceed to a radical revision.

The present policy has succeeded in maintaining Cambodia at the edge of military disaster while keeping her from totally succumbing. The Cambodian Army with all its superior equipment supplied by the United States has been outmaneuvered and outfought by its combined Vietnamese and Cambodian foes at every point. Military experts, including Cambodians, believe that it would collapse without American bombing support.

Along with the military predicament, a distintegration of political support for President Lon Nol's Government has left nothing of the enthusiasm and élan, at least among the small number of politically conscious Cambodians, that followed the overthrow of Prince Norodom Sihanouk three years ago.

The unpopularity of the Government is a result of rising prices, incompetence, corruption, authoritarianism and manipulated elections. The man generally held responsible for the regime's failings, by Americans as well as Cambodians, is Gen. Lon Non, much more than his partly paralyzed and remote brother, President Lon Nol.

Well-placed Cambodian and diplomatic sources believe that the demoralizing effect of the continuation of the regime is as much a peril to the survival of a Cambodia not dominated

by the Communists as the military superiority of the guerrilla forces.

United States political and military policy has been dealt severe setbacks in recent days.

Henry A. Kissinger returned from Hanoi and Peking apparently having failed, according to informed diplomatic sources, to obtain any encouragement in his efforts to persuade either capital to act to reduce the war in Cambodia.

The same sources said that more than six weeks after the Paris agreement, which pledges the signers "to put an end to all military activities in Cambodia," North Vietnam and Vietcong troops show no intention of withdrawing.

Consequently, the United States, after an initial suspension of bombing to test the other side's intentions, has resumed air strikes to help the Cambodian army when it is seriously attacked.

Last Monday, United States hopes of introducing Lieut. Gen. Sisowath Sirik Matak into the Government were thwarted. He is the one man it believes qualified to bring some enlightenment into what it considers the mystical muddle of the regime.

General Lon Non declared that General Sirik Matak must not return to the Government.

Sources close to General Sirik Matak as well as interested diplomats believe that General Lon Non's attack, in an interview that he requested with The New York Times—in order, he said, to put his view before the United States—rules out the possibility of General Sirik Matak's participation in the Government while his opponent remains there.

The United States had urged Marshal Lon Nol to persuade General Sirik Matak, his friend since their youth, to accept the vice-presidency, which is vacant. General Sirik Matak, whose power was almost as great as Marshal Lon Nol's, resigned last year as chief of government after students, instigated by General Lon Non, demonstrated against him.

The serious illness of President Lon Nol and his tendency to deal with pressing problems with elliptical Buddhist pronouncements have limited his effectiveness. The political scene has been dominated for three years by a struggle behind the scenes between the two men who exercise influence over him—General Sirik Matak, his friend, and General Lon Non, his brother. The United States has consistently favored General Sirik Matak, whom it trusts.

General Lon Non's public declaration of his antagonism for General Sirik Matak was a dramatic and shocking move in the Cambodian context, because it put the younger brother into open opposition to an expressed wish of the President, who is the head of his family as well as the head of the nation. Respect for elder members of the family is a keystone of the Cam-

bodian social structure.

'Traitors' Are Seen

Sources close to General Sirik Matak said that General Lon Non had succeeded in persuading his brother that General Sirik Matak is surrounded by "traitors" and must be kept out of the Government.

General Sirik Matak's persona and political character make his Cambodian supporters and Americans disinclined to believe that he will answer General Lon Non's opposition directly. His condition for accepting the vice-presidency had been an assurance from the President that he would keep his brother's opposition in check.

The political inertia of Cambodia made General Sirik Matak the only real alternative to the Lon brothers. His apparent elimination as long as the marshal and his brother remain in power leaves Cambodia and the United States the choice of continuing with them, as long as the United States Air Force can keep them in place, or forcing a change.

America's identification with the unpopular Government has not yet led to a perceptible growth in anti-American sentiment. Rather, Cambodians on various levels of society trust the United States to change the Government when it becomes necessary.

The widespread disappointment over the continuation of the war—coupled with fear for Phnom Penh as battles draw nearer daily and with price increases ruinous to an ever-increasing number of people—has led many Cambodians to express a belief that the time for change is at hand. But they do not believe it is their job to bring it about; instead the United States is expected to effect the change, because it supplies all the power Cambodia has. This thought makes American officials shudder and recall the series of events that began when the United States connived at the overthrow of President Ngo Dinh Diem and his machavellian younger brother decade ago—a series of events only now coming to a close.

Trip to U.S. Suggested

Publicly the officials continue to express hope that Marshal Lon Nol will broaden his

Government, a diplomatic way of saying they want General Sirik Matak as vice president and would not mind if the marshal and his brother then decided to go to the United States for the marshal's health, leaving General Sirik Matak in charge.

But General Lon Non said that no such trip was necessary. Privately, Americans voice fear that the marshal might go, leaving his brother in charge without what is believed to be the marshals' restraining influence.

Meanwhile, the Lon brothers have responded to the American desire for genuine efforts to talk peace with statements of harsh intransigence.

In a speech last Wednesday President Lon Nol offered to negotiate with North Vietnam and the Vietcong's Provisional Revolutionary Government but maintained his refusal to recognize that there is a Cambodian resistance movement by not mentioning it.

In his interview, General Lon Non limited his concessions to the insurgents to allowing them to lay down their arms, return to the Government they do not recognize and participate in elections under a constitution they do not recognize.

Guerrillas Continue War

The war continues — at any place the Vietnamese and Cambodian guerrillas choose. The principal battle areas are the outskirts of Phnom Penh, the Saigon-Phnom Penh highway, the banks of the Mekong River, on which vital supplies are transported from Vietnamese ports to Phnom Penh, and the region south of the capital.

The guerrillas overrun Government positions, American planes bomb them out, and the Government announces the reconquest of devastated places. Meanwhile, refugees drift into this city telling of the civilian dead and pillaging by the soldiers.

Well-placed Cambodian and diplomatic sources fear that even American involvement at the support level cannot save Cambodia from defeat under her present leadership.

They believe that the decision of who governs Cambodia will have to be made by the United States, or the United States will soon face the even more painful decision of whether to acknowledge defeat or heighten its involvement.

Bach Mai Deemed in Ruins

North Vietnamese authorities have decided the damage done by American bombs to Hanoi's Bach Mai hospital is so great that the entire complex must be razed and rebuilt from scratch.

According to members of a U.S. private group which has been raising funds nationwide to rebuild the hospital, this new evaluation will escalate the reconstruction costs from \$3 million to at least \$20 million.

A five-member team representing the Bach Mai Hospital Emergency Relief Fund brought back this somber appraisal of their project from a trip to Hanoi last week. The team was scheduled to discuss the hospital reconstruction program at a news conference today.

The estimate comes at a time of growing resistance in Congress to the Nixon administration's plans for a post-war reconstruction program in Indochina.

Far From Success

Larry Levin, a spokesman for Medical Aid for Indo-

china, a private relief group based in Cambridge, Mass., with which the Bach Mai fund-raising effort is affiliated, said yesterday \$750,000 has been raised since the appeal was launched early in January.

Levin described this sum as exceeding most expectations for the first two months of the effort. But now that the total amount needed has swollen to more than six times the original estimate, the fund drive is still far from succeeding.

The revelation that North Vietnamese authorities consider the hospital so badly damaged that none of it can be salvaged focuses anew on the controversy surrounding the American bombing of the hospital in December.

The North Vietnamese first reported the hospital was destroyed by bombs a few days before Christmas, during the 10 days of intense bombing by B52s that preceded the Vietnam cease-fire.

Pentagon authorities first denied the claim, then on Jan. 2 grudgingly admitted it

may have been hit accidentally during attacks on a petroleum storage area a few yards to the west and a military command facility a few hundred yards to the south.

Photographs widely distributed at the time showed the archway of the hospital's main building still standing, surrounded by heaps of rubble.

It later emerged from records in the hands of Senator Edward M. Kennedy's subcommittee on refugees that the hospital was also hit by a bomb in June, leaving a large crater in the courtyard and partly demolishing one building. The Pentagon quietly acknowledged to the subcommittee that it had reconnaissance photographs of the hospital taken in July which showed the water-filled crater.

More recently, the Pentagon has declared that the more destructive accidental December bombing was confined to only one building of the hospital, North Vietnam's largest.

Members of the five-man team are Peter H. Wolff, a

Harvard Medical School psychiatrist; John Pratt of the University of Pennsylvania medical school; Lillian Shirley, associated with a private medical aid group; and two staff members of Medical Aid for Indochina, Alex Knopp of Philadelphia and Terry Provence of Pittsburgh.

Meanwhile, staffers for Kennedy's subcommittee have announced that a separate medical fact-finding group which had been planned since October left quietly for Hanoi last week.

Members of that team, which went to North Vietnam via Vietiane, Laos, Saturday, are Nevvin S. Scrimshaw of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology; John M. Levinson, a gynecologist and population expert from Wilmington, Del.; David French, a pediatric surgeon with Boston University School of Medicine; Michael J. Halberstam, a private physician in Washington, and Dale S. de Haan of the subcommittee staff.

—OSWALD JOHNSTON

BALTIMORE SUN
12 March 1973

Viet 'weather warfare' queried by scientists

Washington Bureau of The Sun

Washington—A scientists' group has asked President Nixon to disclose any use of weather modification in the Vietnam war.

"There are many different kinds of geophysical warfare which, if they were to be engaged in by ourselves and by opponents, would be to the clear disadvantage of mankind," said the Federation of American Scientists, which includes 21 Nobel laureates.

"The use of weather modification as a weapon of war is an opening wedge to the use of climate modification, the inducement of earthquakes, and other still more terrible methods," the federation warned.

In Washington, two federation spokesmen, Herbert Scoville, Jr., and Gordon J. F. MacDonald, released the contents of a petition and a letter to President Nixon dated March 1.

Dr. Scoville, the federation secretary, is a former deputy director of the Central Intelligence Agency under Presidents Eisenhower and Kennedy. Under the latter and under President Johnson he was assistant director for science and technology of the Arms Control

and Disarmament Agency.

Dr. MacDonald is a member of the federation's Executive Committee and until last year was on the President's Council on Environmental Quality.

"The time has come for this disclosure," said the federation director, Jeremy L. Stone, in introducing Dr. Scoville and Dr. MacDonald. Government officials have continually evaded inquiries, Dr. Stone noted, with "carefully couched denials, such as it [weather warfare] didn't happen over North Vietnam."

Asked if weather modification was used in the war, Dr. MacDonald cited references in Volume IV of the Pentagon papers, to a Project Pop-Eye designed to slow traffic on the Ho Chi Minh trail.

"There is evidence," Dr. MacDonald said, "that experiments were carried out and increased rain ... was achieved."

Dr. MacDonald urged "some sort of international agreement" to ban such activities, adding: "I strongly support Senate Resolution 71" on such a ban.

Senate Resolution 71, which proposes a treaty to prohibit

use of weather modification in war, was introduced by Senator Claiborne Pell (D., R.I.) February 22 and sent to the Foreign Relations Committee.

Weather modification "can be a very devastating type of warfare," Dr. Scoville said, with "potentialities much more dangerous than weapons in space or seabed." And, he added, "it is an awfully lot easier to control something before it is a practicable weapon."

Ways of modifying weather, Dr. MacDonald said, could include seeding clouds with silver iodide crystals, to increase rainfall setting off powerful ground explosions along a fault line, or changing the ozone content in the ionosphere, thereby changing the surface level of ultraviolet radiation.

"There is evidence [cloud seeding] was experimentally attempted as early as 1966 to reduce traffic on the Ho Chi Minh Trail," he said. "Experiments have been conducted in this country, Florida for example, where seeding produced rain and flooding."

Dr. MacDonald noted that many countries operate under marginal conditions where a small change in climate or temperature could disrupt crops and the economy. "The Soviet Union is a good example," he said, noting its wheat shortages.

"We can conceive of no valid national security reason for denying these disclosures about the past," the scientists' letter to President Nixon said. "We see geophysical warfare

as a Pandora's box to which the seemingly inoffensive weather modification may be the disastrous key."

Senator Pell said in testimony on his resolution that, "in my own mind, there is no doubt that the United States did indeed conduct weather-modification operations in Southeast Asia."

A spokesman for the Foreign Relations Committee said at the weekend that "there is nothing scheduled on [the resolution] yet."

The proposed treaty would ban "any activity designed to increase or decrease precipitation, increase or suppress hail, lightning, or fog, and direct or divert storm systems."

"It also would ban any earthquake modification activity which has as a purpose ... the release of the strain energy instability within the solid rock layers beneath the earth's crust," and "any ... change in the ocean currents or the creation of a seismic disturbance of the ocean [tidal wave]."

Two known demonstrations of weather control have occurred in Florida and the Philippines. In April and May, 1971, cloud-seeding was used in an attempt to alleviate a drought in Florida.

The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration's efforts were followed by 3 inches of rain in one afternoon. But Miami reported getting pea-sized hail, arousing fears of unfrozen, possibly extreme,

consequences from weather modification.

Spectacular success was claimed for an attempt to end a drought in the Philippines with cloud-seeding from April 28 to June 18, 1969. United States Air Force planes working in coordinated patterns caused individual clouds to become greatly enlarged and finally blend into a wide rain system.

The project report estimated that the cloud-seeding caused more than 12 million acre-feet of rainfall and increased the value of the sugar crop alone by \$43 million.

Both Senator Pell and Weather Engineering Corporation of America sought information on cloud-seeding in the Vietnam war after Jack Anderson, the columnist, reported in March, 1971, operations to

cause heavy rain and mud on the Ho Chi Minh Trail.

Requesting specific answers from Melvin R. Laird, then Secretary of Defense, Senator Pell received a letter from John S. Foster, Jr., Mr. Laird's director of defense research and engineering. Mr. Foster said the information was classified and "I find it necessary to respectfully decline to make any further disclosure of the details of these activities."

Secretary Laird testified April 18 before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that the Defense Department had not conducted rain-making activities over North Vietnam. He reiterated this in July, again specifying North Vietnam only, and declined to comment on whether it was done in South Vietnam or Laos.

NEW YORK TIMES

16 March 1973

Eight May Face Courts-Martial For Antiwar Roles as P.O.W.'s

By SEYMOUR M. HERSH

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, March 15—At least eight of the enlisted men scheduled to return early tomorrow from Hanoi are known to be bitter critics of the Vietnam war whose refusal to participate in camp life in North Vietnam provoked deep hostility among their fellow prisoners, according to military sources.

The eight formed what a top-ranking officer described as "the Peace Committee" in North Vietnam and refused all orders given by senior officers of the highly organized prison camps.

Military sources said that they expected court-martial charges to be filed by some returning officers against the men as soon as the remaining prisoners were freed from Hanoi. March 28 is the end of the time limit set for such returns by the Vietnam peace agreement. Under the Military Code of Conduct, any officer or enlisted man can file charges against a military colleague.

The eight enlisted men, the military sources said, had been captured in South Vietnam, but then were marched north to a separate camp near Hanoi some time in 1970. All of the 27 military men scheduled to be returned from Hanoi tomorrow had been captured in the South.

At various times, as many as 15 enlisted men and officers captured in the south have signed the same antiwar state-

ment. The most notable was a message to Congress in June, 1972, urging the legislators to "exercise your constitutional power to force the Administration to return to Paris to negotiate an end to the war."

Many of the returning pilots, however, are known to be especially furious at the eight members of the "Peace Committee," whose antiwar messages have been harsh in tone.

In July, 1971, for example, according to a broadcast on the Hanoi radio, Specialist 4/Michael P. Branch of the Army, who is scheduled to be returned early tomorrow, described himself as a deserter and said:

"I have disassociated myself from the military. I have taken it upon myself to desert and cross over to the side of the South Vietnamese people on May 4, 1968." Army officials said that Specialist Branch, of Highland Heights, Ky., had been captured by the Vietcong in May, 1968. Other messages broadcast from Hanoi and reportedly made by Specialist Branch called on American troops fighting in the South to desert their units and to "refuse combat and just botch up all your operations."

According to a 1971 tape recording, an Air Force staff sergeant, John Young of Waukegan, Ill., and Chicago, who also returns tomorrow, told President Nixon: "I no longer want to fight for you or anyone like you. In fact, I won't ever fight for your kind of American people."

"I cannot support the killing of innocent Vietnamese men, women and children, or the destruction of their beautiful

country," the tape went on. "My conscience tells me it is wrong to kill—the Bible tells me it is wrong. Most important, my mother and father have taught me it is wrong to kill or harm anyone."

Military officials identified Specialist Branch and Sergeant Young as members of the "Peace Committee." The six other members, the officials said, were tentatively identified from interviews with prisoners returned previously.

Pentagon sources said that the antiwar enlisted men had apparently shared quarters at various times with some of the pilots who were shot down and captured in the North. The pilots, many of them senior officers, immediately clashed with them.

"The G.I.'s were advised to knock it off," an officer said, adding that they had refused. Another source said that at least one officer "attempted to pull rank on the enlisted men—they didn't take to it."

The reported activities of the eight have angered many senior military officials in the Pentagon who have generally been reluctant to discuss the prisoner issue over the last few weeks.

One officer complained during an interview that the White House had refused to let the Pentagon make a public statement condemning the activities of the "Peace Committee." He said that the apparent reason was a fear that adverse publicity on the prisoner issue would further erode Congressional support for the Administration's proposed multibillion-dollar aid program for North Vietnam.

Another officer noted that the eight men were trouble-makers "before they got in there," meaning in the prison camps. While in prison, he said, "they were seen fraternizing with guards."

"Some of them were even getting out of camp to take tours of Hanoi," he said.

He further accused some of the enlisted men who lived with other prisoners of "giving away vital camp secrets," such as details of how prisoners maintained communications among themselves.

Pentagon officials did note, however, that some of the men to whom virulent antiwar statements were attributed after their capture in South Vietnam in 1967 and 1968 had grown

more restrained upon being moved to the North years later.

Some officers here are known to be particularly pleased by the apparent change in attitude on the part of one officer, scheduled to be returned tonight, whose wife was a leading antiwar figure in last year's Presidential elections.

That prisoner, to whom many written and broadcast antiwar statements were attributed while he was in South Vietnam, expressed concern in a letter—smuggled to his wife by a prisoner recently released—about the growth of "radical" politics in the United States and cautioned her that he was politically conservative. The letter, well-informed sources said, was read by some officers in

the Pentagon before it was given to the prisoner's wife.

The military concern over the status of the eight men and over the possibility that they might stage some kind of an antiwar demonstration during their return to the United States was reflected in heavy cable traffic in the middle of the week between the Pentagon and Clark Air Force Base in the Philippines, the prisoners' first stop after Vietnam. A senior officer said during an interview that "these men intend to try to jump ship before they get back here." However, he did not amplify the remark or offer any basis for it.

Other Government sources, with access to the debriefing papers from returning prisoners, were far less concerned about the eight.

One official confirmed that "there is hard feeling between the pilots and some of the others," but added that the only real information about these feelings thus far had come from the returned officers, whom he characterized as one-sided sources.

"None of them are officers and some of them are black," the official added, referring to the antiwar soldiers, "so the club is going after them."

He accused some of the returned pilots and many senior Pentagon officers of "looking for blood" in connection with the dissident G.I.'s. He noted that classified details about the enlisted men "are coming out awfully easy all of a sudden."

"There are those of us who are hoping to handle this so some officers don't get what they're looking for," he said. "I hope we can ease the men out so they don't face charges."

Other sources noted that the bad blood between most of the returning pilots and at least two senior officers who had made antiwar statements while in Hanoi had apparently eased in recent weeks as the returnees began adjusting to freedom.

The two officers, who had been accused of disobeying orders and had even been ostracized while on their way from Hanoi to the Philippines, apparently will not now be charged with disobeying orders, officials said. The officers have yet to hold news conferences or to speak out in any other way since their return to the United States.

In interviews three weeks ago, Pentagon officials acknowledged the charges pending against the two officers, but also disclosed that they were attempting to discourage any formal proceedings against them.

In the case of the "Peace Committee," however, the same officials have noted that many of the men were absent without leave when they were captured, and could presumably face desertion charges.

At least two of the enlisted men already returned from South Vietnam had been absent without leave at the time of their capture and had made antiwar statements while imprisoned. The Pentagon has an-

NEW YORK TIMES

11 March 1973

The Other Prisoners

By Tom Wicker

Two young French school teachers, André Menras and Jean Pierre Debris, left New York last week to speak in cities across the United States about a matter that stands in sad counterpoint to the return of American prisoners of war from North Vietnam.

In 1968, they went to South Vietnam as exchange teachers in a French Government program. In July, 1970, outraged by what they regarded as the corruption and tyranny of the Thieu regime, they mounted a monument in downtown Saigon, unfurled a Liberation Front flag, and started handing out peace leaflets.

This was unwise, if bold; they were immediately jailed by South Vietnamese military police. After a trial in which they were not allowed to speak, they remained in Chi Hoa prison in Saigon for more than two years, until they were suddenly released and deported last Dec. 29. Now they have a grim story to tell about the inhumane treatment, starving, beating and torturing of political prisoners in South Vietnam, of whom they maintain there are at least 200,000 (other estimates range from 35,000 to 300,000, a lot in any case).

There is nothing particularly new about the accounts by the Messrs. Debris and Menras (aside from their impressive earnestness) of their harrowing experiences and of the terrible suffering in the South Vietnamese prisons. The existence of the infamous "tiger cages" in Con Son prison has been well-publicized here and as far back as May, 1969, the story of one prisoner, Ho Nhan Hieu, was detailed in this space—how, for instance, he had spent a month in

IN THE NATION

solitary in a "tiger cage." As the two Frenchmen tell it convincingly, things have only gotten worse since then, particularly with the great influx of political prisoners arrested during last spring's Communist offensive.

But somehow, American public opinion has never been aroused by these activities of the nation's ally in Saigon, even though it has been documented—for example in Don Luce's authoritative study, "Hostages of War"—that American funds and companies helped build the "tiger cages" and American personnel sometimes helped in the political roundups.

Predictably enough, Messrs. Menras and Debris did not get much response to their appearances in New York (including a news conference at the U.N.), in a week when C.E.S. mockly

bowed to the fears of its affiliates and refused to show a drama about a Vietnam veteran who did not get the red-carpet treatment now being accorded returning bomber pilots.

Nevertheless, there was one element of the Menras-Debris account that needs repetition, if only because it could bode trouble for the cease-fire agreements now uneasily in force. They contend, with a wealth of eyewitness detail, that the Thieu Government is systematically forging records and callously shifting bodies about from prison to prison, so that thousands of its political captives can be reported as common criminals and kept in jail, cease-fire or no cease-fire. The reason is obvious; once released, most of these political prisoners are not likely to support President Thieu in the political struggle for power.

(The two French teachers believe they were released in December so they could no longer witness this process, which was being stepped up as the cease-fire approached.)

Aside from questions of compassion and justice, this effort by the Thieu regime to hold on to its civilian political prisoners (its exchange of prisoners of war with Hanoi and the Vietcong is a separate matter) is a direct violation of the Paris accords. They define "civilian detainees" as anyone arrested for "having in any way contributed to the political and armed struggle" in South Vietnam, and provide that such persons shall be released, by agreement between Saigon and the Vietcong, who are supposed "to do their utmost" to accomplish this within ninety days.

The Menras-Debris charges of a violation of this provision are probably the most direct and convincing, but the same charges have been heard from others; moreover, the Thieu regime may also have violated or circumvented other provisions of the accords on Feb. 6, when it suddenly released 10,000 prisoners on the Saigon streets. These were said to be former Vietcong, but no one can be sure, and if they were, they should have been returned to the so-called Provisional Revolutionary Government.

It may be of little interest to some Americans that, aside from its general sponsorship of President Thieu's regime, the United States has aided and abetted his political repression; but it ought to concern all Americans that, by violating the accords on the release of political prisoners, he could endanger the cease-fire, not to mention the peaceful political development of South Vietnam.

In the preamble, after all, the accords state that the signing parties "undertake to respect and to implement them." That means all of the accords and protocols, not just those that serve President Thieu's political interests; and it means the United States has an obligation to see to it that his political prisoners are released, just as it has an obligation to see to it that its own P.O.W.'s are returned.

announced that it will not press charges in those cases.

The enlisted men, however, have not yet been made accessible to newsmen. All telephone calls to them are intercepted by military public information officials.

WASHINGTON POST
20 March 1973

Hospital Sources Say Keesee Tortured as Spy

CLARK AIR BASE, Philippines, March 20 (Tuesday) (UPI)—North Vietnamese interrogators knocked out the front teeth of civilian prisoner Bobby Joe Keesee and pulled his fingernails because they thought he was a spy, hospital sources said today.

Keesee, 39, a Korean War paratrooper who was captured in North Vietnam in 1970 under mysterious circumstances, was freed last Wednesday with 107 military POWs in Hanoi. He underwent medical examinations and processing at the Clark Air Base hospital prior to being flown back to the United States Saturday.

Hospital sources said Keesee was fitted with new teeth to replace those he lost at the hands of his North Vietnamese captors. They said his fingernails also had been yanked.

Two Thai pilots said Keesee, a one-time resident of Amarillo, Tex., forced them to fly him at gunpoint from Bangkok to a beach in North Vietnam where they left him on Sept. 18, 1970.

Eastern Europe

WASHINGTON POST
8 March 1973

Victor Zorza

The Shrewd Soviets

Some of the shrewdest American capitalists were taken in last week by the oldest sales trick in the world—and by the Russians, at that. The businessmen, 800 of them, came to Washington to learn from a high-powered Soviet delegation about the huge deals which the Russians are offering to American corporations. The two-day conference was arranged by N. A. M., the National Association of Manufacturers.

The Russians soon confessed that they did not have the kind of money that could tempt the Americans. It was therefore up to the United States, they explained, to provide the credits and to make the purchases in Russia that would in turn enable the Soviet Union to buy American.

But—and this was the catch—they advised the Americans to hurry, because the Soviet Union was now drawing up a 20-year plan which would determine the pattern of its trade for years to come. If American business moved quickly, it would get in on the ground floor. But the Russians also made it clear that, if the United States did not offer the "right" terms, the Japanese and the West Europeans would be only too eager to do so—and that American business would be excluded from what was potentially the greatest market in the world.

The fear of Japan is now beginning to take in the businessman's mind the place once held by the Soviet bogey. The Russians know this and exploit it with considerable skill. Reactions at the conference convinced the Russians that they had found the right approach.

No one asked why the Russians were so anxious to do business with the United States if they could so easily get a better deal in Japan or Europe. The answer is that many of the things the Kremlin needs most can be obtained only from the United States. The gas and oil deposits, the copper and other minerals, with which the Kremlin is trying to lure American capital into deepest Russia are so inaccessible, so costly to exploit, that the projects would make economic sense only if they were to be developed on a truly gigantic scale.

Only the United States can think and act that big. Europe and Japan could not provide the necessary capital, nor the market to absorb the output, nor the advanced technology needed to get at the deposits, with which to make the Russian dreams a reality.

There are many other reasons, political and economic, why the Russians would prefer to deal with the United

States. The Soviet Union could not have got from Japan or Europe the grain which Mr. Nixon provided, on favorable terms, to save the Kremlin from a serious political crisis. The Russians got those terms partly because they had managed to conceal the extent of their harvest failure.

They understated their needs, and could therefore pretend that if they did not get the right terms from the United States, they would be able to buy the grain from some of the smaller suppliers. But when the dust cleared they were found to have bought \$1 billion of grain, which was available in that quantity only from American suppliers. The United States could have got a much better price if it had seen through the Russian game.

At the Washington conference the Russians reversed their tactics and grossly overstated the possible volume of trade. The purpose was to make American corporations compete with each other, as well as with foreigners, and induce them to offer the best possible terms now, perhaps even at a loss, in the hope of large profits in the future—and, to judge again from some of the remarks at the conference, it worked.

The business acumen of American capitalists is exceeded only by their ignorance of foreign politics, particularly Communist politics. This is going to cost them a lot of money, unless they find some way to learn how the Kremlin really works—and not just how to read the technical specifications in Soviet contracts.

Even a corporation like ITT is groping in the dark in its dealings with the Russians because it is not aware of the internal political implications of its proposals. ITT, which owns Avis, tried to teach the Kremlin about the car rental business. It knew that the Russians had tried, and failed, to build up a car rental network.

What it did not know was that this had become a politically explosive issue in the Soviet leadership. Similarly, it discussed with the Russians the introduction of ITT's Levitt modular housing in the Soviet countryside, without realizing that the Kremlin had been engaged in a disruptive debate about the building of rural settlements.

The United States can and should do business with the Russians, provided the terms are right, but unless its businessmen learn something about Soviet politics, and the Soviet trick of playing off one profit-hungry capitalist against another, they may come off second best.

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LOS ANGELES TIMES
2 March 1973

Death of Russian Defector Ruled an Accident at Inquest

BY ROBERT JONES
Times Staff Writer

A coroner's jury ruled Thursday in San Bernardino that the shooting death of Russian defector Sergei Kourdakov was accidental, the result of his mishandling a borrowed .38-caliber pistol.

The final day of the inquest came after a one-week postponement ordered when an Indiana congressman telephoned the coroner's office Feb. 22 with "new information" concerning Kourdakov's death.

After the call from Rep. Earl P. Landgrebe, San Bernardino County Coroner William Hill said the information, if true, contradicted other testimony and ordered an investigation.

On Thursday, however, San Bernardino sheriff's detectives discounted the new evidence, saying Landgrebe's sources had "no information at all."

Controversy has surrounded the circumstances of Kourdakov's death since New Year's Day, when he was found dead of a head wound in a mountain cabin near San Bernardino.

Kourdakov apparently went to the resort area to spend the weekend with a friend, Ann Johnson, 17. Miss Johnson testified at the inquest that she was present in a motel room when Kourdakov raised the gun to his head and it went off. The gun had been borrowed from Miss Johnson's father, she said.

Sheriff's detectives listed the death as a probable accident, but a religious group that had sponsored Kourdakov on a lecture circuit raised the possibility that he was murdered by Russian agents.

L. Joe Bass, president of Underground Evangelism, said the young defector once told him, "If you ever hear I have had an accident or committed suicide, don't believe it. I know how the Soviet police work." Bass' group also sent out mailings that mentioned "unanswered questions" in the shooting.

On Thursday, Hill said Underground Evangelism was also connected to Landgrebe's request for the one-week postponement and investigation.

The basis of the request, Hill said, was information from two of Landgrebe's constituents claiming they had been told by an officer of Underground Evangelism during a fund-raising benefit that Kourdakov was indeed murdered by Russian agents. After passing along the information,

THE NEW YORK TIMES, WEDNESDAY, MARCH 21, 1973

tion, the officer then asked for contributions, the persons said. "They left no stone unturned to capitalize on his death," one constituent wrote. She had doubts about both the group and Kourdakov, she said, because "if he was a born-again Christian, why was he shackled up with that girl?"

The officer of Underground Evangelism, Kenneth Boughman, later denied to San Bernardino sheriff's detectives that he had claimed Kourdakov was murdered and denied having any knowledge of such an occurrence.

"He said he had no information at all," said Det. James Cox, who later concluded that "there was no indication of foul play" in Kourdakov's death.

Kourdakov, 21, gained note in 1971 when he jumped from a Russian trawler and swam to the British Columbia coast in a 20-hour ordeal.

Bass later signed him to a contract under which Kourdakov toured church groups telling his story. A bill was introduced in Congress last year by Landgrebe to grant Kourdakov permanent U.S. residence.

Critics of Underground Evangelism have said that by distracting attention from the circumstances of Kourdakov's death the group hoped to create a martyr—and quick financial profits—from the incident.

On Thursday, however, Bass told coroner's jurors that his doubts over Kourdakov's death "had been greatly answered" by the inquest investigation.

U.S. Says Soviet Improves ICBM's

By WILLIAM BEECHER
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, March 20—Administration military analysts report that the Soviet Union has conducted its first successful test of a computer aboard a new intercontinental ballistic missile.

This development, the analysts said, is considered highly significant in that it should improve the accuracy of the SS-11 type of missile to the point where it could be used to attack American Minuteman missile silos and not only cities and airfields. Such missiles constitute the bulk of the Soviet ICBM force.


The Administration analysts said the placement of a computer aboard an intercontinental missile also could markedly advance the time when the Soviet Union might develop accurate multiple independently targetable warheads, or MIRV's, for its intercontinental missiles.

Administration officials said this technological progress could have some impact both on the current negotiations to seek a treaty limiting or reducing the number of offensive nuclear weapons in the United States and the Soviet Union, and on the Administration's interest in improving the capability of its existing MIRV warheads.

The Russians have reportedly made four tests of the SS-17, an improved version of the SS-11—the first last September, the most recent earlier this month. Officials here said the missiles were fired from the test complex at Tyura Tam, near the Aral Sea, about 4,000 miles eastward into the Kamchatka Peninsula, in Soviet Asia.

These, however, were only partial-range tests, as it is estimated that the SS-17, at full range, will be able to travel more than 6,000 miles.

Analysis of telemetry readings convinced the United States that a computer was aboard on each of the four, ordering corrections in the missile's flight because of high winds and other unanticipated



Soviet missiles were reportedly fired from Tyura Tam (1) to somewhere on the Kamchatka Peninsula (2).

factors affecting the missile's trajectory.

Soviet ICBM's now ready for operation employ a ground-based computer that attempts to forecast before launching such variables as shifting wind, engine velocity, and engine burnout time.

Principally because of this limitation, the SS-11 is believed to land consistently only within about one mile of target, and the larger SS-9, about one-half mile of target.

But, Administration analysts say, because the SS-11 carries a warhead of only about one megaton, compared with the SS-9's 25 megatons, it is not regarded as a weapon against underground steel-and-concrete Minuteman silos. A megaton is equivalent to the explosive force of a million tons of TNT.

Two analysts say that if the accuracy of the improved SS-11, the SS-17, can be brought to about a quarter of a mile, this should be sufficient to employ the weapon against Minuteman silos.

Under the five-year interim agreement on limiting offensive nuclear weapons signed last year, the Soviet Union is permitted to retain and improve more than 1,000 SS-11-class missiles. Its total ICBM force is put at 1,618.

Having a computer aboard an ICBM is considered by military experts even more important for achieving accuracy for MIRV warheads where the missile must make a series of precise maneuvers as it fires the warheads at widely separated targets.

To date, military analysts re-

port, the Russians have conducted one test launch of an advanced version of the SS-9 from Tyura Tam. It is believed that this missile also carried a computer, but analysts say additional test information is necessary to confirm this.

All American strategic missiles have on-board computers. The same is true of Britain's American-designed Polaris missile. France is believed to have developed a computer for her submarine-based missiles, but China is not believed to have such computers.

Early in the first phase of the negotiations with the Soviet Union on the limitation of strategic arms, the United States reportedly inquired whether the Russians would like to explore restrictions on MIRV warheads. Officials say the Russians appeared uninterested.

But in the second phase of talks, which got under way in Geneva in November, the Russians brought the subject up, Administration officials say.

There is a good deal of puzzlement over this seeming shift. Some planners has assumed that the earlier disinterest stemmed from Moscow's desire not to get frozen into a disadvantageous position because the United States had already perfected, and begun to deploy, accurate MIRV's, while the Soviet Union was far from success.

Military analysts believe that Soviet engineers have made progress since then, but they estimate that it will take six months to two years before the Soviet Union develops effective MIRV's.

THE NEW YORK TIMES, MONDAY, MARCH 19, 1973

U.S. Said to Weigh Stationing of Rabbi in Moscow

By IRVING SPIEGAL

Spiritual leaders of the three major faiths said yesterday that the State Department had "under serious consideration" the appointment of an American rabbi for the United States Embassy in Moscow.

The rabbi would, they said, "minister to Jews in the rapidly growing American colony in Moscow, which includes the diplomatic corps, businessmen, scientists, journalists and students." Roman Catholic and Protestant chaplains are already stationed at the Moscow embassy.

The report was made at a news conference at the Regency

Hotel by the Rev. Donald R. Campion, editor in chief of the Jesuit weekly, America; Rabbi Arthur Schneider, spiritual leader of the Park East Synagogue in this city; and the Rev. Dr. Harold A. Bosley, senior minister of Christ Church, United Methodist, New York.

The three, who recently returned from the Soviet Union and a tour of Eastern Europe, are leaders of the Appeal of Conscience Foundation, with headquarters at 119 West 57th Street. The foundation is composed of religious and lay leaders concerned with religious freedom for all denominations. Rabbi Schneider, who serves as president of the foundation,

said the three had been told last week by a State Department official that "no impediment" should stand in the way of the stationing of a rabbi with the embassy in Moscow.

U.S. Declines Comment

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, March 18—The State Department declined comment today on the reported plan to appoint an American

rabbi to the Moscow embassy.

The right of the United States to station chaplains at its embassy in Moscow is specifically provided for in the 1933 agreement that re-established diplomatic relations between the two Governments. Some department sources said there were no chaplains with official status in any other embassy so far as they knew.

WASHINGTON POST
13 March 1973
Marquis Childs

A U.S.-Soviet Trade-Off on Tariffs?

In President Nixon's office the other day that tireless grandmother, Prime Minister Golda Meir of Israel, was given — along with promises of continuing aid — a warning of conflict ahead. The government of the United States, she was told, cannot dictate the emigration policy of the Soviet Union.

The Nixon administration wants to give the Soviet Union "most favored nation" tariff treatment together with credits through such agencies as the Import-Export Bank. Opening the way to greatly expanded trade, this was the heart of the agreement reached in Moscow last May.

That agreement is now clouded by a controversy that has its roots deep in domestic politics. Although the administration has not yet sent up a Soviet trade bill, the opposition is waiting with a trap to sidetrack it. This is an amendment by Sen. Henry M. (Scoop) Jackson (D-Wash.) denying the concessions unless the Soviets stop applying an exit tax on Soviet Jews emigrating to Israel.

Jackson's aide, Dorothy Fosdick, says he already has 60 signers, well over a majority. In the last Congress, 76 senators endorsed a similar amendment. With this roadblock looming so large, Moscow may find a way to call off the exit tax.

Those in the White House directly concerned are less optimistic. They point out that this is intervention in the domestic affairs of the Soviet Union and, moreover, it is not alone the Jews who want out. Other minorities, the Catholics in Lithuania for example, would be quick to take advantage

of any relaxation of exit visa controls.

The key figure is Leonid Brezhnev, No. 1 in the Kremlin. He told the Americans in Moscow in May that the charge levied against Jews leaving the Soviet Union — the equivalent of the cost of their education, as high sometimes as \$25,000 — was an error. He described it as a "bureaucratic bungle."

But he went on to say that since it had received such wide publicity with angry denunciation from Jews around the world, his government could hardly seem to yield to U.S. dictation. What, as one Soviet official put it, if we should say to you that we cannot reach agreement on any matter unless you desegregate all the schools in Mississippi and give the blacks free access to higher education.

Look, say the proponents of the Jackson amendment, that is all very well as a theoretical case but the economic plight of the Soviet Union is so dire that Brezhnev will find a face saving formula to end the exit charge. The Kremlin may be on the verge of such a formula and therefore it is wrong, with so much bargaining power in Washington, to bring the matter up at all.

The order to bomb North Vietnam and mine Haiphong harbor came only days before the Nixon mission to Moscow. Would Moscow cancel the visit? It could happen as Henry A. Kissinger, the President's adviser on national security affairs, and others most in the know understood.

But it went through on schedule. In the background was the Nixon spectacular in China which Moscow could hardly ignore. And so it will be in the controversy over the exit visas.

There is, it seems to me, room for doubt. The agreements signed in Moscow were largely to the advantage of Washington. The Berlin agreement, impossible without Moscow's sanction, was a plus for the West. A certain amount of East-West pacification would have taken place without the Moscow accords.

All important for Moscow was trade — the need for grain to overcome the food shortage; the need for computers and every form of advanced technology to boost a halting economy. If this is ruled out by denial of the concessions such as "most favored nation" that go to America's trading partners, little or no reward is left for the Soviet Union. So, others in the hierarchy, perhaps rivals, can say, what was all this fuss about and where has it got us?

A bit of history may be instructive. Nikita Khrushchev was invited to America by President Eisenhower who was seeking to ease off the cold war. Then came the shooting down over Sverdlovsk of the U-2 spy plane and Eisenhower's fumbling response. It marked Khrushchev's end and the end of the initiative. Could this same thing happen again? With all the factors weighed in, conspicuously the Sino-Soviet quarrel, the odds are against it. But a categorical no is hard to come by.

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NEW YORK TIMES
11 March 1973

Nazi-Zionist Link in War Is Seen in a Soviet Novel

By THEODORE SHABAD
Special to The New York Times

MOSCOW, March 10—A recent Soviet historical novel that seeks to demonstrate a link between Zionists and Nazis in World War II has been favorably reviewed in the officially controlled press.

The novel, "The Promised Land," depicts the Nazi official Adolf Eichmann as having been a Zionist agent who arranged to send young and healthy Jews to Palestine while committing others to the gas chambers.

The Haganah, the military arm of the Zionist movement, was said to have accepted German arms for its struggle against the British, which then administered Palestine under a League of Nations mandate.

A Soviet review, published in the literary weekly *Literaturnaya Rossiya*, has praised

the work, by Yuri Kolesnikov, as an "interesting novel" and as a "true denunciation of Zionism."

Some Jews, both in the Soviet Union and abroad, see anti-Semitic overtones in the portrayal of the extermination of Jews under the Nazis as a Zionist plot.

Soviet Jew Reacts

One Soviet Jewish reader, Mikhail Agursky, said in a statement to the foreign press:

"This novel seeks to release the Nazis from their responsibility for those massacres. The Soviet press is strictly regulated and such a novel could not be published without official approval. Simply because of that fact, its publication is highly alarming."

The statement expresses fear that the novel reflects a body

of opinion in the Soviet Union that "longs to rehabilitate Nazi Germany" and represents "a great potential danger to Soviet Jews."

Mr. Agursky, an electronics engineer who is about 40 years old, published an article last Nov. 16 in *The New York Review of Books*, condemning another Soviet publication, "Caution, Zionism!" by Yuri Ivanov, as anti-Semitic. Mr. Ivanov has been identified as an expert on Israel working in the Soviet Communist party's Central Committee.

The Soviet authorities have insisted their publications directed against Zionism are not anti-Semitic and are designed only to combat Zionism as a political force viewed as antagonistic to Communism.

"The Promised Land," the latest example of this genre, appeared in two installments in the September and October issues of the literary monthly *Oktyabr*.

A footnote in the journal, which has a circulation of 169,000, described the installments as the magazine version of a proposed book titled "The Curtain Is Lifted." As far as is

known, the book has not yet appeared.

The involved plot with dozens of characters is basically the story of a young Rumanian Jew, Chaim Volditer, who leaves for Palestine in 1940 to escape what he perceives as a rising wave of Rumanian anti-Semitism under the Nazi-like Iron Guard.

Once in Palestine, he becomes disillusioned and at the first opportunity leaves to return to his home in Bessarabia, which meanwhile had passed from Rumania to the Soviet Union.

In an apparent attempt at authenticity, the Russian text of the novel is sprinkled with Hebrew and Yiddish expressions, translated in footnotes.

A Zionist emissary is quoted as welcoming Hitler's appearance in Germany on the ground that he spurred the migration of Jews to Palestine. "If there had been no Adolf Hitler, we Zionists would have had to invent him," the emissary says.

Jewish financiers are portrayed as controlling the economies of major Western countries and as representing channels for Zionist influence in these nations.

PARADE • MARCH 18, 1973

PARADE'S SPECIAL

EDITED

by LLOYD SHEARER

**INTELLIGENCE
REPORT****PAYING FOR
COMMUNIST
ERRORS**

How much longer can the United States afford the mistakes and incompetency of Soviet Communism?

Last year the Soviets suffered a catastrophic grain harvest, compelling them to buy 28 million tons of Western grain. Result: an increase in the price of bread in this country. The Soviets are also buying countless tons of American soybean meal to feed their dairy cattle, beef, hogs and poultry. Result: soybean meal which sold for around \$75 a ton in 1972 is now selling on the American market for \$207 a ton.

Since the U.S. farmer has to pay three times as much for his feed as he previously did, he is passing along the price increase to the consumer. Thus milk and all dairy products cost more in the local supermarket. Our widely touted grain deal with the Russians has much to do with this.

The Soviets are so incompetent when it comes to agriculture that they are constantly dismissing and replacing their agricultural ministers, always looking for a "fall guy." The latest to go is Vladimir Matskevich who has been replaced by Dmitry Polyansky, a member of the 15-man Politbureau which guides the Soviet Government.

Polyansky, who used to be Premier Alexsei Kosygin's first deputy, faces a monumental task. He must see to it that Soviet farmers meet this year's harvest target of 197.4 million tons of wheat.

NEW YORK TIMES

11 March 1973

**U.S. Aides Accused of Prying
In Yugoslav Student Interviews**

By RAYMOND H. ANDERSON

Special to The New York Times

BELGRADE, Yugoslavia, March 10—A Yugoslav student organization has accused American diplomats here of prying into sensitive political and social issues during interviews with students seeking to participate in a summer work and travel program in the United States.

Charging that the diplomats had asked "tendentious and provocative questions," the student organization reported that it had sent a "sharp protest" to the United States Embassy in Belgrade and had suspended Yugoslav participation in the program.

According to a dispatch by Tanyug, the official press agency, questions asked during talks with 80 students dealt with the internal political situation, church-state relations, civil liberties, the election system, Yugoslavia's foreign political orientation and other issues.

Many foreign diplomats here have been seeking policy definition in these areas in recent months, following an abrupt campaign to tighten Marxist ideology and to purge "bourgeois" influences in Yugoslavia.

Camp Counselors

The interviews with Yugoslav students were reported to have begun in January to choose students to work in children's summer camps in the United States and later to travel around the country.

The protests about the questions was raised in the Republic of Slovenia by the executive committee of the Student Assembly of Ljubljana's institutions of higher learning. Ljubljana is Slovenia's capital.

The student committee charged that the questions by the American diplomats "were not in good faith and represented abuse of their position."

The American Embassy, in a statement, said it had not yet received the student protest. It added that the questions had been the same as asked in other countries participating in the International Camp Counselor Program. The questions were not intended to be tendentious or provocative, the statement said.

The embassy stressed that

Yugoslav officials had taken part in the interviews and had made the final selection of those who were to go to the United States.

Tanyug said that the interview topics had been introduced "under the pretext of asking, 'What would you answer an American child?'"

The Slovenia student committee said that an explanation would be sent to American officials about suspension of Yugoslav participation. It added that a wish would be expressed for resumption of the program in the future "under correct cooperation."

A week ago, a leading Belgrade paper, Borba, expressed indignation over interrogation of Yugoslav students but identified the questions only as diplomats of a "Western country." Borba commented acidly that the diplomats had asked "quite unusual questions."

For example, the newspaper said, "the diplomatic representatives maintained that Yugoslavia is a satellite of the Soviet Union and asked the candidates if they could refute this thesis."

Other questions, Borba complained, dealt with Yugoslavia's one party Communist rule, the possibility of non-Communists' holding high posts and the honesty of elections.

Turn to the East?

"Finally," Borba said, "they asked the candidates whether they could prove that Yugoslavia 'had not sold itself' to the Russians and had not turned to the East."

"A most mildly worded comment must state that is inquiry signifies interference in the internal affairs of Yugoslavia," the paper charged.

The allegation came only a few weeks after a visit to the United States by Deputy Premier Jakov Sirotkovic, who reported successful talks for expansion of economic cooperation.

The focus of Yugoslav policy now is on good economic ties with the United States with a minimum of ideological influence.

have to provide wheat to all these countries, the price of a loaf of bread in this country will skyrocket.

What is the answer? One possible solution is for us to provide the Soviets with our agricultural know-how by sending them a flock of experts, which is exactly what we did for India.

If we don't, we're going to keep paying via higher prices for Soviet mistakes

Because the Soviets are agriculturally backward and ill-equipped, this is no easy job. How long can the Soviets afford to buy grain from the U.S. and Canada? How long can the United States afford to sell it? Especially if we must also sell wheat to China, India and other nations.

If Russian crop failures happen to coincide with Indian and Chinese famines and the U.S. and Canada

Western Europe

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
17 March 1973

'Neglect' by Nixon brings Europe unity

By Joseph C. Harsch

Washington
President Nixon was vague at his latest news conference about when he will be going over to Europe to visit old friends and allies of the NATO alliance. And just perhaps, this may turn out to be a good thing after all because it gives the West Europeans more time to get themselves together in their common interests.

Originally, it was expected that spring would find Mr. Nixon doing the rounds of London, Paris, Bonn, Rome, etc., as a first step in his "year of Europe" program. But the closer the date, the more uncertainty that it will come before September.

Mr. Nixon in fact seems to be giving other subjects and problems a higher priority than talking to NATO allies. This in turn is giving the NATO allies a rising sense of urgency about doing things for themselves.

Solving a crisis

We have just had an example of this process in operation. The Common Market countries worked out a way of handling the latest money crisis, by themselves. It was a patchwork job — granted.

The British and Italians did not come into the common "float" which, in effect, had the

Pattern of diplomacy

French franc and German mark working together.

But there was a sort of money modus vivendi set up which seems to have put an end to the latest money "crisis" and which, in the process, has provided an example of the Europeans managing to handle a problem collectively.

Mr. Nixon has applied "benign neglect" to the problems of blacks in the United States and, so far at least, those problems have seemed to become quiescent. Is he applying the same treatment to his NATO allies?

American diplomacy is working hardest right now at improving and extending the American relationship with the Russians.

Progress there at the moment is being delayed by linkage in Washington between a trade agreement with the Russians and Russia's "education tax" on emigrants. That tax has apparently reduced the flow of Jewish migration from Russia to Israel.

A majority in the Senate seems disposed to block the trade agreement until and unless

Moscow reduces the tax to "nominal" levels.

But Russians are no more inclined to modify their domestic policies under foreign pressure than Americans. The attempt at pressure has hackles up in Moscow.

Mr. Nixon's policies toward Russia could be seriously damaged unless some way can be found around this impasse. And, after all, the detente with Moscow is the central key to all of Mr. Nixon's policies — both foreign and domestic.

All of this has deferred and reduced the urgency for Washington of negotiations with NATO allies. And this in turn could be just what is needed to stimulate more "togetherness" among the Europeans themselves.

Obviously, the ability to patch up a solution to one monetary crisis does not prove the capacity even to handle the next one. But it is stimulating mightily the amount of traffic between the capitals of Western Europe. They are getting to know each other better by the day. They begin to understand each other's problems and points of view.

In other words, Washington's neglect has the effect of pushing Europeans together for their own protection. It is beginning to fuse the highly diverse nations of classic Europe into a new European community.

At least, it has revived momentum in that direction.

By contrast, most observers thought, as of about six months ago, that momentum had been lost. No one at the turn of the year was quite sure that it would ever be regained.

THE SUNDAY STAR and DAILY NEWS
Washington, D. C., March 18, 1973

GI TORTURE CHARGED

Hostility to U.S. Rises in Germany

By ANTHONY COLLINGS
Associated Press Writer

BONN, Germany — An unusual number of anti-U.S. Army incidents in Germany last week has added to the strain on the alliance.

And it has revealed an "ugly American" image of the GI among a small but growing number of Germans, once among the most solidly pro-American allies.

The incidents ranged from a rare demonstration at the U.S. Embassy in Bonn to protest over shock disclosures of GIs torturing German soldiers.

Chancellor Willy Brandt's worried government has tried to play down the anti-American incidents, fearing they will hand fresh ammunition to U.S. congressmen seeking to pull out the 300,000 U.S. troops in Germany.

U.S. Senate Democrats voted overwhelmingly Thursday in favor of substantially reducing the 600,000 GIs overseas over the next 1½ years. About half the troops are in Europe—and most of those are in Germany.

Cautious On Pullout

Brandt and most other West Germans want the troops to stay, as part of an American commitment to defend Germany against any Soviet threat.

He would like any partial U.S. pullout to be balanced by larger Soviet troop withdrawals from Eastern Europe. But so far East-West exploratory talks on this have bogged down, and meanwhile U.S. congressional pressures for a one-sided pullout are building.

So are pressures within Germany. Militant leftists claiming to

represent 250,000 youth members of Brandt's own Social Democratic party urged Brandt last weekend to demand a U.S. pullout. Brandt refused.

Series of Incidents

With U.S.-German relations already strained by dollar and trade woes, these were last week's troublesome incidents: ● Seven hundred Germans from Nuernberg bearing a petition signed by 80,000 citizens chanted slogans outside the U.S. Embassy against plans to make a local forest into a U.S. tank base. Two lawmakers from Brandt's own Socialist party joined them.

The petition expressed fear that German children would be "mutilated by exploding abandoned ammunition" in the picnic area. It said Nuernbergers knew the GIs were there "to defend our freedom," but said the proposed tank base wasn't needed.

● On the same day, protests by the head of the German policeman's union over a 1964 incident caused Interior Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher to

reveal long-secret information that U.S. troops had mistreated and in some cases even tortured German border police in overly realistic joint maneuvers.

Genscher told a parliamentary committee that Germans posing as "enemy" forces were subjected to illegal interrogation methods by GIs, including Green Berets. Some were forced to strip, had dogs set against their backs and endured extreme heat and noise. One GI beat a German "prisoner," he heard.

School Building Barred

● The press reported Friday a German mayor's angry charge that the U.S. Army made "a monstrous insult to our citizens" by refusing to let a town near Frankfurt appropriate a playground for GI children and use it to expand a German school.

● The same report noted that the German head of a nearby town refused to participate in an upcoming annual German-American "Friendship Week" adding to alleged noise pollution.

Near East

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
9 March 1973

Mirror of opinion

Double standard on Mideast

Commentary by Robert Pierpoint
on CBS News, March 7, 1973

During this period of its emotion over a series of tragedies in the troubled Middle East the United States appears to have lost its sense of fair play and justice and seems to be operating on a double standard.

When the Israelis a few weeks ago carried out a commando-type raid deep into Lebanon, striking at Palestinian refugee camps 180 miles from their own territory, and snuffing out 80 or 40 lives in the process, there was next to no outcry in this country. That event which caused perhaps a dozen innocents to die along with some Arab guerrillas whom the Israelis claim were Black Septemberists — that event was quickly overshadowed by the Israeli shooting down of the Libyan airliner. That did cause some official U.S. regrets although not expressed publicly at the level of the White House. Nor did any U.S. official ever indicate the U.S. might think twice before it dispatched more American-built Phantom jets to Israel of the type that had shot down the Libyan airliner. Indeed, the very next week President Nixon let it be known, after his talk in the Oval Office with Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir, that more such Phantoms would soon be on their way.

Contrast these events with what happened after the Arab Black September massacre of Israeli athletes at Munich. The U.S., from President Nixon on down, expressed outrage, and the President ordered steps taken to see that no such terrorism could strike at Israelis in this country. After the murders by Black Septemberists in the Sudan of the two American and one Belgian diplomats, President Nixon expressed shock and a deep sense of grief as indeed most decent people everywhere feel. The President also declared that "the perpetrators of this crime must be brought to justice." Secretary of State Rogers suggested he thought the death penalty "quite appropriate" for this kind of crime, adding "I don't know any other way to deal with it." Rogers did not mention that a trial should be held first, although perhaps he assumed so. But the emotional response was escalated another notch by Sen. Hugh Scott on March 6. After a meeting with President Nixon to discuss domestic problems, standing at a White House podium, Scott was asked what he thought should be done to the Arabs who participated in the murders in Khartoum. "I hope they shoot them all and the sooner the better," was Scott's response. No mention was made of a trial or of the possibility that if a fair trial were held it might turn out that not all the terrorists were guilty of the murders.

What this seems to add up to is a double standard in this country toward terror and murder. For so long Americans have become used to thinking of the Israelis as the good guys and Arabs as the bad guys, that many

THE GUARDIAN MANCHESTER
5 March 1973

CAMPBELL PAGE on
the Greek Colonels'
new and violent
repression of student
protest in Athens

Brute force of law

RECENT STUDENT protests in Greece have pushed the regime into some of the clumsiest and most panicky counter-measures taken since the 1967 coup.

The police admitted yesterday that they have arrested four of the lawyers (Nikos Karamanlis, Vgonizos, Kenaladis, and Alavanos) who took the wholly legal and constitutional step of defending the 11 students charged after demonstrating with 700 colleagues at Athens Technical University last month.

Meanwhile in Brussels Greek students have staged a hunger strike to get conclusive information about two Athens students, Maria Vassiliopoulou and Demetrios

Skantzaz. There are strong rumours that they died during the recent demonstrations.

Such rumours easily arise when excited demonstrators see their fellows spectacularly manhandled. In Greece at present news is particularly hard to evaluate because the regime has reinforced its press law, designed to prevent newspapers from straying into "error," by the harassment of the Greek and foreign press.

This time the regime is casting its net more widely and is also asking reporters to ignore the evidence of their own eyes. The picture of young people waving placards from the roof of Athens University Law School demanding "Freedom for Students" (widely used in the European press two weeks ago) seems to establish that the foreign press has not been disseminating inventions.

Students at the Technical University have also given their own eye-witness account of what happened on February 14 when 700 of them assembled to protest against the new and hastily drafted law which stipulated that students boycotting classes or inciting others to do so would be called up immediately for military service. The students passed resolutions against the new law, shouted slogans, and sang the songs of Theodorakis.

Their account continues: "Kalivas, Smallis, and Gravaritis, the familiar security officers with reputations for torture and interrogation, appeared at the gates of the school and were greeted with shouts of 'Out Smallis — out the torturers.' Four police armoured vehicles followed by jeeps appeared in the area. In the meantime all gates were closed except the one on the right of the central gate.

"A massive exodus began and the first to leave were beaten in front of the gate and many were arrested. A retreat was called and a committee appealed to the Senate to guarantee the safe exit of all.

"At 4 pm while negotiations continued, the police forced their way in through a side door. The clash is frightful. Policemen, informers, and paid sympathisers carry clubs, revolvers, cudgels, and

react emotionally along the lines of previous prejudices. The fact is that both sides have committed unforgivable acts of terror, both sides have killed innocents, both sides have legitimate grievances and illegitimate methods of expressing them. Perhaps the Arabs' action was more irrational — sheer terror. At least it was not backed by a relatively rational government which justifies its actions as necessary.

The Israelis have and utilize a formidable political and propaganda force in this country in the form of six million Jews. The Arabs, with only slightly less than a million descendants in America, are just beginning to organize a nation-wide counterforce. Perhaps this will help bring balance. In the meantime, the rest of us might apply more studied balance and fair play to the difficult problems of the Middle East.

Robert Pierpoint is a White House correspondent for CBS News.

crowbars. The regime's appointee as president of the Engineering Students' Council, Generalis, beats his fellow-students with a cudgel. The students retreat into the buildings and the persecutors follow them beating mercilessly. They isolate students and beat them to the point of fainting.

"In the meantime the Senate is in session. Smallis breaks into the room and overturns chairs and tables. He slaps the faces of students and professors sheltering there. Professor Ladopoulos was crying from the beatings while the rector had a heart attack. Gravaritis isolated a student there with the help of informers and started cursing and jumping on his chest.

"On the one hand policemen ask students to come out peacefully. On the other hand the students have to pass through the assembled tough

guys who beat them near the Senate and others waiting in the courtyard. They strike students with the butts of their revolvers.

"At the same time civilians and the parents of students were beaten too. Those arrested that day numbered about 200. The same night the doorkeepers at the Technical University, escorted by policemen, walked around the cells pointing out which students were activists."

There is a similar account of events at the Law School where 1,500 students gathered the next day. Eventually the Rector promises that if the students leave in orderly fashion the police will not attack.

"We start coming out in tens, hand in hand. We go through a corridor of informers and paid sympathisers of the regime. They

spit on us, curse and kick. They shout: 'Communies you will die.' Many students are isolated in the building and are beaten up. The police start beating people with clubs. The 1,500 students who have managed to get out organise a demonstration in the main streets of the city. The traffic stops."

There are a number of significant points about these confrontations. First they have developed from the relatively mild student mood of only two years ago. Then, apart from the minority in the resistance groups, students were almost equally suspicious of the military regime and the previous democracy, and were looking for new bearings.

Their most defiant gesture was to hand over to a foreign reporter the first pamphlet — a sober assessment of higher education — published by their

new and now suppressed discussion group, the Greek-European Youth Movement.

Second, there is the growing polarisation. A man who had served a sentence for a political offence, admitted recently that some Greek policemen had always been brutal but emphasised that the military regime had willy-nilly introduced a process of natural selection by brutality.

Third, the students have realised that the regime's policy in higher education is to buy their silence by generous provisions to study or to coerce them by informers, military appointees, and finally by violence.

At the same time the regime's deliberate corruption of higher education explains why it is facing the most serious mass demonstrations since it seized power.

LOS ANGELES TIMES
9 March 73

India's Growing Militarism

India's expenditures for military purposes in the fiscal year just coming to an end were \$256 million over the budgeted amount, an overrun of more than 10%. The military expenditures totaled \$2.2 billion and will continue at the same level next year. This level of expenditure is 16% higher than in fiscal 1971-72, the year in which the Bangladesh war took place.

In contrast with the United States, India's military budget represents a smaller percentage both of the total budget and of the nation's gross product. But it shows the high cost of nonalignment.

India, already the dominant military nation of the subcontinent, appears determined to be more so.

For India's neighbors, particularly Pakistan, this must be worrisome. India's military superiority was demonstrated in December, 1971. Now the imbalance is even greater.

For India's friends, and these include the United States as well as the Soviet Union, it is also worrisome, but in a different way. For they must ask with real concern what the limits may be. For a nation so poor, each dollar diverted from development to defense retards progress. And yet the heady victory of Bangladesh has set in train a militarist mood that supports large military expenditures now and looks in the future to the possibility of going nuclear.

India, like Israel, Japan and some other nations, has the capability to produce nuclear arms quickly. It also has a significant number of citizens urging that it do just that.

Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, who herself serves as minister of atomic energy, has wisely resisted the temptation, arguing that there are higher pri-

orities. One of them is not unrelated. India is moving rapidly ahead with nuclear power generation.

It is obvious that India cannot afford the kind of all-out nuclear arms program that would produce a sizable inventory of bombs and a delivery system of missiles to put them on target. But India could afford, without major economic disruption, token development of a limited arsenal that would be perceived as a terrible threat by nonnuclear neighbors.

This would break the monopoly of the five charter members of the Nuclear Club, including China, which in itself would satisfy some in India. It would illuminate India's own status among the developing nations of the world. It would expand the new national pride.

But the impact would not stop at India's frontier. India has not signed the treaty barring the proliferation of nuclear weapons, but most nations have, and some would be tempted to break its terms if India exercised the nuclear option. With proliferation, there would be the increased risk of accident or abuse, the increased possibility that the unthinkable weapon would be put to use.

In other words, this would be a world problem.

Scolding and lecturing will not stop India. Diplomacy may. Diplomacy, and a better recognition of India's needs by India's friends. Some of the new jingoism and belligerency have their origins in the errors of American policy, particularly in President Nixon's insistence in 1971 on telegraphing his bias for Pakistan when he should have been condemning Pakistan's atrocities. India must be helped to security and a sense of security, and given assurances so that it will be clear in New Delhi that actions disturbing to world security will help no nation's security.

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
16 March 1973

U.S.-Pakistan arms deal bruises ties with India

By Razia Ismail
Special to
The Christian Science Monitor

New Delhi

The United States sends "arms to Pakistan and jimsonweed to India."

This is the bitter catchphrase now being used in New Delhi to describe American foreign policy.

It's the result of two recent disclosures that have given another setback to Indo-American relations, just when they seemed to be headed for better days. It illustrates how sensitive these relations have become.

The critical blow was Washington's hint that American military equipment would soon be flowing again to Pakistan. It came during a March 12 congressional appearance by the Assistant Secretary of State for South Asian Affairs, Joseph J. Sisco, who said that "the U.S. is looking again at its commitment made in 1970 to Pakistan for the supply of some spare parts."

U.S. issues statement

This was quickly interpreted in New Delhi as a signal of America's intention to resume supplying Pakistan with large-scale armaments — including promised B-57 bombers, F-104 fighter-interceptor jets and armored personnel carriers.

[The State Department announced March 14 a decision to allow Pakistan to receive \$1.1 million in military spare parts and \$13 million in armored personnel carriers for which purchase had already been transacted.]

It would mean the end of the 15-month-old embargo placed on all such shipments to this region at the time of the war over Bangladesh, even though the critical settlement phases of this war are far from over.

India's reaction was one of immediate disappointment and dismay.

Security threat seen

"A grave threat to India's security," said Foreign Minister Swaran Singh in Parliament March 14.

"We are making earnest efforts to normalize relations with Pakistan and establish durable peace," he stated. "The United States intention to resume arms supplies to Pakistan will jeopardize the process of normalization and adversely affect the chances of establishing durable peace on the subcontinent."

The arms-supply news had come on the heels of the discovery that recent American grain shipments to India contain narcotic and poisonous jimsonweed seeds. The Indian press, government, and public were finding the whole affair rather hard to stomach and American explanations that such foreign matter is common in "livestock feed" did not

improve matters. The grain had been purchased for famine relief.

But the major concern here is still over "arms to Pakistan."

Protest aired

Foreign Secretary Kewal Singh summoned U.S. Ambassador Daniel Moynihan to the Foreign Office to formally convey India's "utmost concern."

Coming as it did on the eve of Ambassador Moynihan's first meeting with Premier Indira Gandhi, the American move to give Islamabad previously promised arms can hardly be said to have given the new envoy a good start to his tenure here.

In his statement to Parliament, Foreign Minister Singh reiterated India's conviction that U.S. arms aid has "encouraged the anti-Indian and militaristic policy of Pakistan." He added, "We hope that the U.S. will carefully consider the implications of such an action...."

[Pakistani President Zulfikar Ali Bhutto has issued a statement telling India not to overreact, because the decision will not endanger Indian security, the Associated Press reported March 15. "We need the military equipment for our own defense, to stand on our feet, not for offensive or aggressive uses," Mr. Bhutto said at a conference near Rawalpindi.]

Policy spotlighted

It is clear that New Delhi is keeping a wary eye on Washington's professions of wanting peace in Asia and of keeping out of Indo-Pakistan affairs. Recent U.S. pronouncements in this vein have been greeted with skepticism.

Actually, it had been expected here that when Washington thought the time was proper it would indicate that it did not wish Pakistan to be left without weaponry.

But apart from the fact that this was hardly the proper time in the limited context of envoy Moynihan's so recent arrival — not to mention the much larger context of delicate peace prospects concerning Pakistan, India, and Bangladesh — the announcement has been more a disappointment than a surprise.

New Delhi has been wondering just how serious Mr. Nixon is about peace in this area. Whatever small intangible gains might have been made in the past month, American intentions about bilateral relations with India and the U.S. Government's whole concept of what makes for peace in this region now are most suspect all over again.

"Arms for Pakistan and jimsonweed for India?"

Ambassador Moynihan will have an uphill task convincing New Delhi it isn't so.

BALTIMORE SUN
18 March 1973

How to keep away from any oil cut-off by the sheiks

ROBERT E. HUNTER

Washington.

The year is 1980; at the White House, the President has called an emergency meeting of the National Security Council. The nation is in deep crisis. Is the United States being threatened with war by Russia or China? Not at all. Instead, a handful of the world's smallest countries are holding the nation to ransom. They are refusing to sell us their oil, and the U.S. economy is paralyzed.

Today, this may seem to be an implausible scene. Yet some of America's leading experts on oil and the Middle East fear that something just like this could happen by the end of the decade. By then, we will have to import more than half of all the oil we use, a major part of it from a few small states clustered around the Persian Gulf and sitting on nearly two thirds of the world's known petroleum. And if we are so dependent on foreign sources of energy supply, the argument goes, then our economy could easily be disrupted at the whim of oil-rich leaders of far-away countries.

This new and unprecedented dependence on others is what we have come to call the "energy crisis." It is first of all a state of mind—a fear of relying on other people for vital raw materials that drive our economy. Nothing like this has happened to us since the Japanese cut off our sources of natural rubber in 1942, and then we produced synthetics. But there is no "synthetic oil"—or at least there won't be enough of it for many years, whatever we do today. So as our own known reserves of oil begin to shrink, we will have to import more—or consume less—even if the new finds in Alaska prove much larger than anyone now imagines.

The problem of U.S. attitudes about being dependent on the outside world might not be too difficult to overcome; Europe and Japan, after all, have long had to import virtually all of their oil, and have learned to live with it. But there are several very tangible problems that will demand our time and attention in the coming years.

Once worried about Russia

Interestingly, a few short years ago we worried about importing Middle East

oil because of the position there of the Soviet Union. And its role, along with the supposed vulnerability of Middle East energy to political or military threat, led us to import only about 3 per cent of our oil needs from there, while concentrating on oil from countries safely within the compass of the Monroe Doctrine. Today, however, very little concern is expressed about a possible Russian "hand on the tap" of our energy, and we are even planning to import some Russian liquid natural gas. Above all, this shift reflects the progress of detente, and President Nixon's trip to Moscow. Apparently, neither Washington nor Moscow is going to let fears about potential threats to U.S. energy imports disrupt more important parts of our relations with one another.

The second cause for worry is the Arab-Israeli conflict. Today, we support Israel with arms and diplomacy, and are able to do so without thinking very much about the massive amounts of oil owned by the Arab states. But tomorrow, when we get perhaps a quarter of all our oil from the Arab world, the situation could change. Would we someday have to choose between Israel and oil? Some observers think so. Yet this view is exaggerated, and requires a complex chain of reasoning: 1) that the Arab oil producers will try to use oil as a political weapon; 2) that they could maintain an effective embargo on oil shipments to the United States, and possibly West Europe and Japan; 3) that they would be willing to jeopardize stability in world oil markets; 4) that the United States would respond to blackmail; and 5) that Israel's security is dependent on the United States.

What to do with the money

All of these assumptions are open to serious doubt. And together the doubts greatly reduce any worries we might have about oil and the Arab-Israeli conflict. Still, we do have an interest in helping to damp down the conflict and foster some partial settlement—provided, in the process, that we don't get left "holding the bag" if diplomacy fails once again. We also have an interest in placing our relations with the Arab oil producers on a firm footing, quite apart from their conflict with Israel.

The most important problems stem from a simple fact of glut: that many of the Middle East oil states will be earning so much money by 1980 that they will have trouble spending it. Saudi Arabia, for example—a country of about 8 million people—could earn more than

\$20 billion a year by then! Will these countries pump the oil we need, or will they simply leave it in the ground to increase in value? This is the problem with which this article began; that several major oil producers may decide to limit production, and leave us to ration gasoline or make do with electricity only a few hours a day.

This horror story, too, is exaggerated, and reflects again our inexperience at being dependent on the outside world. But some things need to be done, beginning with more ways for the oil producers to spend their revenues. Some internal economic development is possible; far more development is possible in other Arab states, like Egypt, that are oil-poor but thirsty for oil capital; and far more still is possible in the outside world, where countries like India stand to face the greatest problems from a general rise in the world price of energy. These ideas may not be politically possible; but increased investment in the outside world certainly is. Saudi Arabia, for example, wants to invest heavily in the United States—and offers the prospect of a "camel in the tank" instead of a tiger!

Bring in oil producers

But most important, we need to recognize the great economic leverage that oil-money can bring, and make the necessary adjustments. In particular, this means bringing the oil producers into international negotiations on the future of the trade and monetary systems. If we want these systems to work very well for us—and judging from all the fuss made about them lately this is certainly true—then we will have to recognize a new and important role for the oil barons of the Middle East. And above all, we must not try to align ourselves with West Europe and Japan in a desperate effort to confront the oil producers. Cooperate to bargain on price, yes; but introduce acrimony into relations with producer states, definitely not. For one thing, the producers seem better at getting together for bargaining on oil than we are in the West. And for another thing, a confrontation could simply lead to reduced production of vital energy supplies.

At the same time, we have to recognize the vast quantities of money that the oil countries will have to play with in international monetary affairs—perhaps \$150 billion by 1985, or about the total amount of foreign exchange in the world today! Clearly, the oil producers can't be shut out of important talks about monetary and trade relations.

They will help to decide the world's economic future, one way or another.

Of course discussing these problems implies that the oil producers do not already feel responsible for the orderly growth of worldwide economic activity. Many do. But to increase their incentive for helping the rest of the world rather than harming it, we need to give them their due in international economic policy. And it must happen now.

Must act now

Lastly, the United States could, if it chose, do many things to reduce its dependence on foreign sources of oil and natural gas. We could invest more in domestic supplies of fossil fuels; and step up research into nuclear and other forms of power. But all of this will take time, and come at a price. Furthermore, even if we did shelter ourselves from foreign energy dependence, the world will not let us alone on other counts. We have seen what other countries can now do to the dollar, and to our ability to export goods.

One day we will also have to import large quantities of other vital resources, from aluminum to zinc. Like it or not, we can't have an economic Fortress America any more than we could have

a military one. Thus we would be far better off accepting our future involvement in the outside world right from the start; and begin reshaping our attitudes and taking the political steps that can help make tomorrow's world a more congenial place for us than it otherwise will be.

The international oil industry recently resolved its difficulties in two of its major trouble spots, Iraq and Iran. In Iraq, the solution was very painful. In Iran, the outcome was a relief.

The Iraq settlement largely formalizes the situation that has existed since Iraq nationalized the rich Kirkuk oilfield last June. The Western-owned Iraq Petroleum Company will receive 15 million tons of oil in compensation for the loss of its properties but to settle other claims it will pay Iraq about \$200 million, which is only slightly less than what the 15 million tons of oil is worth. IPC has also given up all claims to the North Rumaila field, which the Iraqis seized in 1961 and which had

been a bone of contention ever since.

IPC emerges with only one major property in Iraq, the Basrah oilfields, where output will be expanded from the present 32 million tons to 80 million tons—little short of what IPC used to produce from all its Iraqi properties including Kirkuk.

The consortium of oil companies that operate in Iran reached its agreement with the Shah in an unusually painless way. Nor has much of significance changed in the consortium's relationship with him. Just the same, the new deal should give the Shah something to brag about when he gets home from his winter holiday in Switzerland. That, after all, was the object of the exercise.

The Shah has to pretend to be more than second banana, although he will not be. If the companies were ever forced to make a painful choice between Saudi Arabia and Iran they would opt for Saudi Arabia in a flash. Saudi Arabia's immense reserves, both proven and probable, make it in the West's view the most important oil-producing nation, and there is nothing that the Shah can do to change the situation.

—The Economist

Mr. Hunter is a senior fellow of the Overseas Development Council in Washington. This article is based on a chapter in the ODC's "The United States and the Developing World: Agenda for Action."

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
8 March 1973

Will Mideast oil czars run amok?

A. J. Meyer is professor in Middle Eastern studies and lecturer in economics at Harvard. The following article is an edited version of a recent address he delivered to the World Affairs Council in San Francisco. In it he sought to put into perspective some misconceptions (as he sees them) about what role the major oil-producing nations of the Mideast may play in the current world energy crisis.

By A. J. Meyer

Special to The Christian Science Monitor

WHETHER WE LIKE IT OR NOT, THE U.S. seems hooked — for the next decade at least — on oil and gas imported in ever greater quantity from the Middle East and North Africa.

Like Europeans and Japanese before us, we Americans now face the awesome task of paying for these imports, adjusting our international political arrangements to minimize chances of supply interruption and to cushion, in various ways, the long-term impact of this new relationship with Eastern Hemisphere nations.

The economic implications of these changing circumstances are staggeringly complex.

The U.S. probably will increase its imports of Eastern Hemisphere crude oil by a million daily barrels each year for at least the next decade, perhaps longer. By then half our oil, and perhaps a third of our total energy, could come from Eastern Hemisphere sources.

Much of this oil will be very cheap to produce (6 cents to 25 cents per barrel), yet will be increasingly expensive (\$1.50 to \$3.50 per barrel, perhaps more) at loading terminals in producing countries.

Revenues of member countries of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) will soar from \$9-\$10 billion yearly now to \$20-\$25 billion yearly by 1975

A leading expert on the economics of oil says, "No." He suggests Mideast oil producers are unlikely to misuse the powerful financial leverage their vast petroleum reserves give them.

and to perhaps twice that by the early 1980's. Up will go also the balance-of-payments deficits of oil-importing industrial nations. The Chase Manhattan Bank forecasts \$20 billion deficits for the U.S. alone within the decade. Levels of investments of all kinds will be huge, as most certainly will the flows of reserve funds from oil-exporting nations back to those world capital markets wide and deep enough to accommodate them.

Saudi Arabia alone, under highly probable circumstances, might well control, 10 years hence, financial reserves greater than those backing the U.S. dollar and the Japanese yen together. These are big numbers indeed.

Our national organizations and university scholars concerned with foreign policy are understandably preoccupied with the resulting problems. Among these are the Foreign Policy Association and Prof. Morris Adelman of MIT, a distinguished authority on energy. Since we are good (and old) friends, I take the liberty of disagreeing strongly with him on many of his positions taken in a paper in the winter, 1972-73, issue of Foreign Policy and condensed in a recent edition of the Wall Street Journal.

Disruption of wealth doubted

First, I disagree strongly that "much of that wealth (i.e., payments to Middle Eastern oil-producing govern-

ments), will be available to disrupt the world monetary system and promote armed conflict."

To date the only two Middle Eastern countries with enormous foreign reserves are Kuwait and Libya. Neither, when confronted in years past with chances to move assets away from dollars or sterling, chose to do so. On two occasions at least, such decisions cost both nations dearly.

Saudi Arabia, the next candidate to control massive foreign holdings, has for 25 years been distinguished by a preference for U.S. banks, by an ultra-conservative investment policy, and by an unwillingness to stray even into the speculative quicksands of Triple A bonds. To expect that these nations will overnight become international money market "gunslingers" seems most unrealistic. Individual Middle Easterners — like Americans and Europeans — will of course move private funds about in an occasionally volatile manner. As for Saudi Arabia, the very enormity of its public foreign holdings will make quick shifts difficult, if not impossible to manage.

Neither do I share the view that these huge sums will necessarily "promote armed conflict." The really big sums spent on arms in the Middle East since World War II have originated in the U.S. and have gone to Turkey, Iran, and Israel — in the latter instance financed by public and private gifts. Outlays by Egypt in the past decade have been huge, but most of the arms have come from Russia, involve little payment, and have not been financed by gifts to Egypt from oil-rich countries.

Across the board, Middle Eastern nations (except for Israel and Egypt), put very modest percentages of gross national product into military outlays, have contented themselves with defensive weaponry, and have not — with the possible exception of Israel — opted to introduce truly obliterative weaponry into the area. Maybe they will change, but I doubt it. Meanwhile of course, many will continue to direct ferocious noises toward their neighbors.

I also disagree with the statement:

"The most important player in the game is the American State Department. This agency is deplorably poorly informed in mineral resource economics, the oil industry, the history of oil crises, and the participation therein of the Arabs with whom it is obsessed."

Producers' importance stressed

The important players have been, and continue to be, the producing governments and the oil companies, not the U.S. State Department. As in other areas, the State Department's role under President Nixon has waned markedly, and its alleged "obsession with the Arabs" does not seem to have altered U.S. policy perceptibly. The decision to accept OPEC's demands (which led to recent leapfrogging) was made by the companies, not by the U.S. State Department.

Professor Adeiman further says, "The world 'energy crisis' or 'energy shortage' is a fiction." He goes on to say "there is no more basis for fears of acute oil scarcity in the next 15 years than there was 15 years ago." I disagree strongly.

Free-world oil consumption rises at about 2 million barrels per day, and no change in the profligate end use is yet evident. The U.S. and Venezuela are peaking out as oil producers (from traditional source). Canada is moving to limit exports of oil to the U.S. And flat-out programs in coal liquefaction and shale-oil and tar-sands extractions are yet to be mounted. The North Sea and Nigeria offer hopes for only modest annual increases. Algeria and Libya at the moment offer even less hope.

North Slope oil from Alaska seems predictably far off, for well-known reasons. Which leaves Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Iraq (and probably the Soviet Union) as the several big oil producers of the coming decade. For a multitude of reasons, I forecast that none of these will push output up anywhere near as feverishly as have Iran and Saudi Arabia during the past three years. Neither certainly will Kuwait.

My reasons for the above statement are several.

First, Western academic folklore to the contrary, some very sophisticated thinking now goes on in many Eastern Hemisphere oil-exporting countries about the wisdom of leaving oil in the ground or pumping it out at maximum rates. Most such experts concur that Iran alone (among the oil "haves") today has the absorptive capacity to invest enormously higher sums in its development effort without massive waste and leakage.

Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Iraq at the moment have well-defined limits on sums they can invest at home intelligently, and policymakers in all three countries know it. They also wrestle daily with the question of foreign financial reserves and how best to handle these. Many, curiously enough, have visited the gold-rush ghost towns in California's Placer County with rather more than the usual tourist's curiosity about the lessons implicit in them.

No rapid changes indicated

My second reason for not expecting wild output increases derives from belief that internal political developments and philosophies will continue, in several oil-producing countries—as they have in the past—to prevent rapid production increases. In short, I do not expect that Libya, Iraq, and Algeria will change their ways dramatically and overnight again become (as all once were) leaders in oil exporting. Soviet oil will also take time to develop.

My third reason for not expecting oil output to soar flows from the foregoing. Only two nations, Saudi Arabia and Iran, seem to me candidates to increase output dramatically. Increases of a million barrels per day from each for several years probably are possible — at least for Saudi Arabia. Experts differ on Iran. And much investment will be required in each country to make large increases possible.

Now a word about the oil companies. Professor Adelman obviously is right and perceptive when he accents their role (first pointed to by the managing director of British Petroleum) as "tax collectors" and as downstream "agents for OPEC." He also is correct in saying that so far the companies have passed on slightly more to the consumer than they have given up, and at the moment they are about 5 cents to 10 cents per barrel ahead of the game.

But his proposal that consumer-governments legislate to get the companies out of the Middle East and his implication that something better would evolve quickly in their place seems well intentioned, but slightly naive. For the record, oil-company returns on investment remain in the modest 8 to 12 percent range, and have not moved up with recent price increases.

At the moment, in short, I see no alternative to oil companies — despite their disarray (in recent negotiations with Middle Eastern and North African producers), their frequently unlovable behavior, and their past, which has been immortalized in fact and fiction. Until a substitute for them is found, we have to live with them. And like many marriages, the relationship will endure for want of a better alternative.

Africa

THE ECONOMIST MARCH 3, 1973

Sanctions against Rhodesia

A report on how a colander works

The United States is now, with Portugal and South Africa, among the world's most obvious violators of the United Nations' policy of sanctions against Rhodesia. Figures released in Washington last week show that America imported \$13.3m worth of chrome, nickel and asbestos under a congressional amendment passed in 1971 that allows America to import from Rhodesia certain materials considered strategically necessary. But the man in charge of America's strategic stockpiles, Mr William Lawrence, has said that the country now has a surplus of 2.2m tons of chrome ore and that, in his view, imports of Rhodesian chrome are not necessary for America's national security.

Other countries do discreetly what the Americans have been doing openly. The fifth report of the UN sanctions committee brings the scene up to date. With the committee's four previous reports, there are now details of 138 prima facie breaches of sanctions that have taken place between December, 1968, and the end of 1972. Of these, 127 were reported to the sanctions committee by Britain. Many countries play their part in bringing their own nationals to heel, but the business of tracking down foreigners who are flouting the UN's mandatory directives is left almost entirely to Britain, just as it was largely left to Britain to

enforce the anti-slavery laws in the first part of the nineteenth century.

Of the 138 notifications listed, only a handful led to prosecutions. Not all suspected breaches turn out to be genuine. For instance, there was a shipload of tobacco imported to Switzerland in 1969 through a Mozambique port, which British intelligence at first thought came from Rhodesia but in fact came from Zambia. And when Britain draws attention to a probable breach it refers usually to a certain ship, sailing at a certain time: this ship may be owned by a firm in one country, be registered in another and be unloading its cargo at half a dozen different ports between Rotterdam and Singapore; even then it is possible that a consignment is re-exported and sent on to another country. When, therefore, Britain "suggests that the committee... may wish to ask the Secretary-General" to bring a report to the attention of a certain government, it is not necessarily claiming that a breach of sanctions has occurred, merely that there is enough evidence to warrant investigation.

Seldom does the investigation amount to much. There are three countries whose attention is most frequently drawn to suspected breaches. West Germany heads the league with 30 or more notes from the UN Secretary-General; Holland is runner-up with at least 26; and Japan is not far behind with about 20. There is then a gap before Greece (12 or more), Switzerland (11 or more) and France, Italy and Belgium (8 or 9 each) are reached.

Countries with many ship registrations—such as Panama (at least 10) and Liberia (at least 6)—are ahead of Iran and Spain (5 each), leaving a host of ones, twos and threes ranging from Russia to the Food and Agriculture Organisation.

Their responses to the notes from the UN vary in form, but not in effect. The more diplomatic countries pay lip service to the niceties, say they have made some inquiries, scrutinised bills of lading and so on, only to find that there was "no evidence of the shipments originating in Southern Rhodesia." Other countries pass the buck. Others either do not reply at all or repeat, parrot-fashion, that they do not trade with the illegal regime in Salisbury. Only very occasionally—as with a shipload of maize imported by Egypt ("erroneously") which was confiscated by the Egyptian government in September—does the notification of a suspected breach lead to action.

Nearly all the reports concern Rhodesian exports, since these are less difficult to identify than imports which, because they must pass through Mozambique or South Africa, can always be described as destined for these countries. Much of Rhodesia's chrome, tobacco and asbestos can be distinguished by its quality from similar commodities from other countries. Yet although there have been 37 notifications about chrome and 10 reports about tobacco, there is no mention of asbestos, undoubtedly one of Rhodesia's main exports.

THE GUARDIAN, London
2 March 1973

Official secrets from whom?

A report published in the Guardian of November 15 on the successes of the Frelimo guerrilla movement in Mozambique appears to have led to the charge now brought against our correspondent in Salisbury, Mr Peter Niesewand, under the Rhodesian Official Secrets Act. This charge does not supersede the detention order served against him on February 20. That simply alleged that he might commit acts prejudicial to public safety. The Official Secrets charge refers to an act already committed. It was after he had sent the November 15 dispatch to the Guardian that his office was searched and he was told that papers would be sent to the Director of Public Prosecutions.

Mozambique is one of Rhodesia's two lifelines. The Administration is thus sensitive to any thing written about the war going on there. Niesewand's report told the world far more about what is going on than Rhodesians have been able to learn for themselves through their press and radio. He quoted Rhodesian intelligence reports about a major guerrilla offensive against the railway from Beira to Tete, the site of Mozambique's large Cabora Bassa hydro-electric scheme, which had cut the track in several places. (The Portu-

guese also, must have disliked this particular dispatch.) He reported that attacks on the road between Rhodesia and Malawi, through Portuguese territory, had continued for several months and that armed convoys were having to travel at walking speed after several vehicles had been blown up by land mines. And he gave "military sources" for the information that Rhodesia was unofficially helping Mozambique with aircraft and occasional patrols.

Since then the guerrillas have changed their tactics and left the dam alone. Attacks on it were becoming wasteful because of the heavy concentration of troops around it. Even so, Niesewand's report was enough to pierce the silence about Mozambique which is imposed on the Rhodesian media. The police demanded to know where Niesewand had got his facts. He refused to tell them. Nothing he wrote gave information to an enemy. The enemy knew. It was the people at home who were ignorant. Thus the Act is being used not to protect official secrets but to preserve the silence in Rhodesia. Looked at from the Rhodesian Government's viewpoint this may be sound enough. The Rhodesians have reason to be alarmed and despondent when they contemplate Portugal's misfortunes. But that ought

not to be the purpose of the Act. Mr Niesewand's lawyers should not have much trouble in disposing of the charge if the court acts in a judicial and not a political rôle.

Since November 15 Rhodesia's own security position has worsened. Irrespective of what happens in Mozambique (and the war there has ebbed and flowed indecisively for several years) incursions across Rhodesia's frontiers have increased. The intruders come not only from the Frelimo areas in the north-east but across the

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR

8 March 1973

Foreign firms ordered to hire Liberian workers

By Ed Honnold
Special to
The Christian Science Monitor

Monrovia, Liberia

Couldn't a Liberian worker do the job just as well?

This is the question being put more frequently to foreign-owned industries in this small, independent republic on the west coast of Africa.

"I think we ought to be able to Liberianize the entire staff at Bong Mine except for perhaps a dozen department heads and managers," says an official of the Liberian National Mine Workers Union.

"And I'm sure the government is in full agreement with me on this. It's already long overdue."

The four large iron-ore mines and several rubber plantations that form the base of Liberia's economy are all foreign-owned — and foreigners hold most of the top-paying jobs.

At the German-owned Bong Mine, for example, there are today 507 staff-level employees, of whom 367 are expatriates — mostly Germans, with a few Italians, Spaniards, and Americans. If the union official has his way, 355 of these people would be replaced.

Skilled-labor shortage

"There's such a shortage of skilled labor in Liberia that we have no choice but to bring in our own men," argues a German manager at Bong Mine. "It's absolutely impossible to Liberianize management. Liberians don't yet know how to do the work, and they have little sense for business."

The government, however, is determined to increase the benefits to Liberia of the foreign business operations, which have profited from Liberia's open-door policy.

With the new administration of President William Tolbert, in office for more than a year now, government pressure for reforms in the corporations has increased. It appears the "open door" is closing slightly.

"We must strongly oppose those bent on impeding this nation's development, from both within and without," stressed the President in a nationwide address in October.

"From within we face corruption, and from without, the fact that all production is in the hands of expatriates."

No nationalization

So far there has been no move to nationalize foreign-owned firms. Instead the government has moved to increase the Liberian role in management.

The new policy is widely felt.

Zambezi frontier with Zambia. They have caused, ugly, and in some cases personally tragic, incidents in the past few weeks; no attempt has been made to disguise these from the Rhodesian public. Niesewand's offence, then, if it was an offence, was to state the causes for the alarm which the Government now openly expresses. Even by Rhodesian standards it should prove hard to work this action up into a criminal charge. Whether the charge succeeds or fails the detention order remains in force. So should the challenges to it from this and other countries.

"Things have gone downhill here in the past year," complained Mr. Johnson, an American supervisor of mechanics at the American-owned mine, LMC (Liberia Mining Company). "In the machine shop we desperately need two more men. But the government just won't let us bring the men in from the States."

"Sometimes you have to advertise for six months in the Star (Liberia's daily newspaper) to find somebody qualified."

A personnel manager also complains. "The government watches us very closely," he says. "They know what vacancies we have and sometimes present us with a Liberian who they claim has the needed qualifications. They don't let us fire anybody, even if he is absent most of the time and does no work."

Many Liberians, however, find fault with the companies.

"Liberians have become ready to take over positions of responsibility far faster than most expatriates would like to recognize," claims a Liberian staff member at LAMCO, the Swedish-American iron mine at Mt. Nimba, in the north.

"But all the foreign investors are highly nationalistic and are more eager to help relieve unemployment at home than in Liberia."

And a professor at the University of Liberia believes that "many times the corporations throw up false blocks to Liberianization by setting job qualifications too high. They ask for brain surgeons when all they need is nurses."

At heart of the new developments in Liberia is the country's greater self-sufficiency and wealth. Up until 20 years ago the black republic was poor and virtually undeveloped.

Situation reversed

"In 1926 when the Firestone company considered starting a rubber plantation here, Liberia needed Firestone more than Firestone needed Liberia," says a professor at Cuttington College, in Liberia. "Therefore the company could set its own terms."

"Today the shoe is on the other foot. The country is feeling stronger and wants a better deal."

In a number of African countries, a great exodus of foreigners followed achievement of independence. Liberia has never been a colony, but if new measures get tougher, she may face a postcolonial situation.

"When we first came here this area was 'bush,'" says a German staff member at Bong Mine. "We developed the area completely. But we get no thanks, only complaints. If it were for me to say, I'd say to pack up our things and leave Liberia tomorrow."

Western Hemisphere

WASHINGTON STAR
7 March 1973

WASHINGTON CLOSE-UP

Why Not Forgive Castro?

By FRANK GETLEIN

We seem to be drifting toward some sort of improvement of our relations with Cuba, the well-known Commie outpost 90 miles from Key Biscayne.

The logic of such an improvement seems unanswerable. If we have decided that we can afford to be friendly with the Big Commies in Moscow and Peking, surely we can afford to be chums with such a little Commie as Fidel Castro, the Maximum Leader.

If we can even enter into amicable relations with the dread Commie North Vietnamese, despite the clear and present danger they still present to San Diego, surely it is not too much to be civil to Castro, despite his crimes.

His crimes, of course, are many and it is a moot point whether any atonement he may make will be sufficient to calm our enduring and justified anger at him.

★

In the first place, he drove out Col. Batista, in those days a two-bit military dictator but now recognizable as a true friend of America and of freedom everywhere. In Castro's defense, it can be argued that at the time of his blow against world freedom and democracy, the United States had not

BALTIMORE SUN
20 March 1973

yet clearly defined the free world and democracy as meaning mostly military dictatorships of a peculiarly subservient bent. Since we are officially opposed to punishment for crimes that were not crimes when they were committed, Castro probably can weasel out of that basic and serious charge without actually restoring the Batista regime.

More grievous is crime No. 2. Having caused Batista to flee the island with everything of value he could lay his hands on, Castro proceeded, after a certain amount of shilly-shallying, to declare himself a Communist and to undertake the total restructuring of his country.

★

This was a deliberate affront to Americans and the free world, both ideologically and practically. Under Batista, Cuba had been, among other things, one of the great casinos and brothels of the planet, and there it was, only 90 miles away.

Under both our official puritanism of Prohibition and our normal, built-in puritanism of all the time, we needed a bit of respite now and then, and Castro destroyed it all. That will take some reparations.

From there on, his crimes

get even more outrageous. Probably the most outrageous thing he ever did was to repel the great crusade of freedom called the Bay of Pigs invasion.

Under the astute leadership of the Central Intelligence Agency, our band of freedom-loving spooks and Cuban exiles landed. According to intelligence estimates, once the landing was made, the entire island would rise against the tyrant, overthrow him and get back joyously into casino-brothel enterprises for the benefit of the tired American businessman and free world tourism everywhere.

No such thing happened. Instead, the population and its army and air force rose up and threw the freedom-loving spook show off the island altogether, locking up in jail those who couldn't swim and forcing the late Robert F. Kennedy to buy their freedom with hard cash.

That, too, is going to take a lot of reparations. To be sure, we have since discovered that a number of our head people on that show were just common burglars at heart and we have tried and convicted them as burglars. There is even some possibility that some of them will put in some time in jail as a result of their Watergate fiasco until a presiden-

tial pardon is arranged.

Their jailing should make it easier all around for us to forgive Castro's uppityness in kicking them out a dozen years ago. If we ourselves can jail them, surely it was okay, a little premature, for Castro to keep the burglars off his island.

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After that, worse still, the Caribbean Commie tried to purchase a little security against future invasions by freedom-loving spooks by letting the Russians set up a missile base. This was intolerable, but on the other hand, the base was removed and the whole incident provided one of the great dramatic moments of government by great dramatic moments as practiced in those distant days.

The photograph of the Kennedy brothers silhouetted in a White House window was worth the strain all by itself, to say nothing of Arthur Schlesinger Jr.'s thriller-memoirs of pacing up and down and calling people away from dinner parties between the soup and the fish. Heady days, and we never could have had them but for Castro and his missile site.

Thus, in one way and another, a case can be made for forgiving Castro his crimes against us and building on that forgiveness a new friendship.

Peronist vows to break U.S.-Brazil

BY ROBERT A. ERLANDSON
Rio de Janeiro Bureau of The Sun
Rio de Janeiro—Is there a Washington-Brasilia axis and can it be broken?

Marcélio Sanchez Sorondo, 60, a Peronist Senate candidate and spokesman on Peronist foreign policy for the new Argentine government-elect, has not only declared the existence of such an axis, but also that it must be broken "to prevent Brazilian hegemony in Latin America."

Subsurface disputes

The United States and Argentina have been on amicable terms in recent years while U.S. friendship with Brazil has ripened into a virtual passion.

At the other point of the triangle, Brazil and Argentina have maintained cordial relations, but beneath the surface several disputes have smoldered and Argentine envy of Brazil's rapidly expanding economy has grown, too.

Both Brazil and the U.S. can expect a rough time from the new Peronist regime which takes office May 25. The former dictator, Juan Domingo Peron, who will be calling the turns, is strongly anti-American and highly nationalistic, and Brazil's progress in recent years, along with Argentina's economic decline, may prompt some extreme measures in Buenos Aires.

Called incompatible

Mr. Chavez said, "The Washington-Brasilia axis" is being used by Brazil's military dictatorship to try for continental leadership and for an "ultracapitalist" form of government which is "incompatible with our [Peronist] conception of life."

He said Argentina will try to form an economic and cultural confederation among most of the Spanish-speaking countries, and that Argentina's relations with Brazil will remain friendly if Brazil "abandons its expansionist pretensions and when the Washington-Brasilia axis, which does not consider Latin American interests, no longer exists."

U.S. capital and assistance flows like a river into Brazil.

'axis'

Not only because of severe restrictions elsewhere but because Brazil seeks and welcomes it as part of its own economic expansion plans.

Fueled by Nixon

President Nixon fueled anti-American and anti-Brazilian sentiment with his remark that "as Brazil goes, so goes Latin America" during the 1971 Washington visit of Brazil's President Emílio G. Médici.

But with the current state of South American affairs, Washington's view is that it must maintain close ties with the continent's largest and most powerful country, especially as

countries such as Peru, Chile and now, Argentina, take leftward, anti-American courses.

There is a close relationship between Washington and Brasilia, but whether that can be termed an "axis" is open to

question. Certainly, Brazil's progress in recent years has given it new confidence to reach out politically and economically in many directions, but the Brazil government is not subject to Washington's

directions by any means.

Brazil expects to be met as an equal, not in any subordinate role.

Although General Peron remains anti-Communist, Peronism has moved leftward. The

new government has said it will break what it sees as Argentine dependence on foreign enterprises. This undoubtedly means nationalizations and new restrictions.

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
13 March 1973

Choice of Brazil's President occurs in secrecy vacuum

By James Nelson Goodsell

Latin America correspondent of
the Christian Science Monitor

Rio de Janeiro

Brazil is about to choose a successor to President Emilio Garrastazu Medici, but you would never know it by reading Brazilian newspapers.

In fact, the whole issue of presidential succession is taboo as far as the press, radio, and television are concerned. Moreover, the Brazilian people will not be in on the selection process.

That task is up to the military, who have ruled Brazil since seizing power in 1964.

General Medici's four-year term runs out next January. And, in accordance with the decision of the military when it took power nine years ago, there are no second terms.

All of this is known to Brazilians, yet the military, in setting up press-censorship laws that prohibit any discussion of presidential succession, argues that the selection process would be more difficult if the press carried stories about the issue.

Speculation widespread

But if the press is not printing anything about it, there is a good deal of speculation in Brazil over just whom the Army will tap as the next chief executive.

Currently, the most widely mentioned name is that of Gen. Ernesto Geisel, chief of Petrobras, the state oil company. A four-star general who has been close to the inner councils of the military since the 1964 seizure of power, he has the added advantage of having a brother who is also a four star general.

Moreover, he is highly regarded in Brazilian business circles, and this asset could prove even more important because of this nation's developing economic boom, which has given it one of the fastest growing economies in the world.

Brazilian industrialists are constantly concerned about any threat to the prospering economy, and while they have little if any say in the actual choice of a successor to General Medici they almost certainly would approve of General Geisel.

The choice in the final analysis will be made by General Medici in close consultation

with his top military aides.

He himself was chosen by his fellow officers when Marshal Artur da Costa Silva was incapacitated. But Marshal Costa e Silva had given hints beforehand that he leaned to General Medici as a successor.

The secretiveness of the succession bothers many Brazilians, including some of the government's most ardent supporters. One high government official recently questioned, in private, the whole business:

"It does seem rather ridiculous to make so much of making it secret when everybody is speculating on it and when in the final analysis it is up to President Medici and a few around him. They seem to operate in a vacuum or at least try to."

Government opponents are much more critical of the news blackout. "After all, those who run the country are not the only ones concerned. There are close to a hundred million Brazilians who have every right to know about their government," a leading Brazilian writer commented. "What is more, it is really their business to choose their leaders."

Brazil's military, however, has shown no inclination to move toward anything approaching presidential elections, much less a return to full civilian rule.

There is a widespread belief here that the military sees itself in power for at least a decade more. General Geisel, if he is successor to General Medici would not be the end of the line of military successors.

"We are going to have the military as presidents for an indefinite period," a Brazilian diplomat on home leave said.

He had just come back from a tour abroad and argued, "After all, the military have brought stability to Brazil and although the price in political freedoms may be high, most Brazilians tend to accept the price."

He may be right that the majority of Brazilians accept the military government for what it is and for what it has brought to Brazil, particularly in the economic arena. But there is opposition.

Just how many oppose this government is hard to tell. Without any vehicles for the expression of opposition and because of a continuing fear on the part of opponents that the government may employ repressive tactics against them, those opposing the government tend to be less vocal than they might be otherwise.

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GAO Criticizes U.S. Assistance For Ecuador

By Terri Shaw

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Patrol boats "provided and supported under U.S. military assistance programs" have been used to seize U.S. boats fishing in waters claimed by Ecuador, the General Accounting Office said in a report on U.S. aid to the small South American country.

The report, which was critical of many aspects of U.S. aid to Ecuador, added that the U.S. government has reimbursed the fishing companies for \$4 million in fines paid to the Ecuadorian government to obtain the release of the captured boats.

Underlining the irony of the situation, the report said that in 1970 unidentified U.S. military advisers in Ecuador pointed to the capture of "foreign flag fishing craft" as a demonstration of "the capability of Ecuador's navy." The GAO, the investigative agency of Congress, released the report last week.

Ecuador, situated astride the equator on the west coast of South America, claims sovereignty over the waters up to 200 miles from its coast on the basis that the rich fishing area is one of its most important natural resources. The United

States recognizes only a 12-mile fishing limit.

A State Department source said that Ecuador has purchased some patrol boats from the United States and has others on loan from the U.S. Navy. He pointed out that Ecuador also has obtained patrol boats from European countries and that these boats also are used to seize U.S. fishing vessels.

Two bills have been introduced in the House of Representatives to require that the boats on loan to Ecuador be returned. A Capitol Hill source said there was little likelihood that the bills would pass.

The GAO report noted that while "direct and indirect" U.S. assistance to Ecuador amounted to \$360 million during the past 10 years, very little progress has been made in what it called "the basic and ultimate purpose of U.S. developmental assistance" — an improved standard of living for all sectors of the population.

The report criticized the United States for sponsoring ineffective and politically motivated aid programs and the

Ecuadorian government for its "failure to commit and mobilize its domestic resources for economic development."

For example, the report said, a program that almost succeeded in eradicating malaria in the early 1960s lost its

funding in 1965, which caused a "sharp resurgence" of the disease between 1966 and 1968. Only "the threat of a serious outbreak" persuaded the Ecuadorian government to resume its support for the program, and thereby obtain renewed U.S. aid, the report said.

In another case, the report noted that while the United States financed the advanced training of more than 4,000 Ecuadorians between 1960 and 1971, a total of 2,350 skilled Ecuadorians emigrated to the United States during the same period.

"Training under U.S. assistance programs was not increasing Ecuador's supply of trained personnel substantially, but rather was serving to replace skilled Ecuadorians emigrating to other countries," the report said.

The report found that none of the shifting governments that have ruled Ecuador since 1960, except the military junta which governed from 1963 to 1966, made much of an effort to carry out social or economic reforms.

As an illustration of the governments' laxity in promoting

development, the report said a group of U.S. Internal Revenue Service experts in Ecuador during the mid-1960s "found that Ecuadorians with wealth and influence were paying little or no taxes."

The GAO pointed out that since U.S. assistance made up 13 per cent of the Ecuadorian government's revenues and 22 per cent of the country's imports, the United States is "a major partner in Ecuador's development."

Ecuador's new ambassador to the United States, Alberto Quevedo-Toro, said in an interview: "We recognize that there has not been as rapid a process of development as we might have wished."

He pointed out that Ecuador's economy is dependent on the export of agricultural products, whose prices fluctuate widely.

"During the decade from 1960 to 1970, there was a severe depression in prices" which affected the entire economy, Quevedo-Toro said. The new ambassador, who wrote a column on economics in Ecuador's largest newspaper for several years, was finance minister in 1964 and 1965.

Quevedo-Toro said the current government, which took power in a coup one year ago, had put into effect a five-year development plan and intended to resume the tax reforms begun under the 1963-66 junta.